

CHAPTER V.

THE RULE OF FAITH

AND

THE TRUE CHURCH.

THERE is no point on which the controversy betwixt Protestants and Papists may not soon be ended, for every serious and candid mind, when it is brought to the test of Scripture alone. But the Papist perpetually appeals to tradition and the authority of the Church, thus endeavouring to subvert the authority of Scripture, under pretence of supplementing it, and to force upon our acceptance interpretations which no process can ever reconcile with its text. It is also a common thing with Papists to quote Scripture in a way which is only fitted to make any reference to its authority ridiculous; and thus the mind is habituated to look upon it without seeking in it evidence for anything whatever,—the very effect which Papists falsely ascribe to Protestant familiarity with its pages. The way in which Scripture is often quoted by the theologians of Rome is not more calculated to promote respect for it than the way in which its sacred expressions are sometimes made to garnish the works of the worst class of facetious writers. Nay, we shall presently see that grave Popish theologians can speak of the Bible in a manner which indicates a high dislike, producing a willingness to treat it with irreverence. Instances of this kind shall be laid before the reader, which will probably satisfy him that if Bible-burn-

ing be not a daily spectacle even in England and Scotland, it is not because the inclination to it is wanting.

With Protestants the Bible and the Bible alone is the rule of faith,—the Bible recognised as the word of God, and as exclusively and in all its parts characterised by inspiration. Our recognition of the sovereign authority of the Bible resolves itself simply into a recognition of the sovereign authority of God; it is such a recognition of his authority as, by bringing the soul into an immediate relation to him, emancipates it from all human domination in matters of conscience and religion. And the world exhibits in the aspects and histories of its nations, the contrast betwixt the freedom of those who acknowledge the authority of God alone as he himself speaks to them in the Holy Scriptures, and the abject slavery of those who wait for the interpretation of the Church as it is given forth by councils and synods, bishops and priests, or for the voice of tradition assuming to make known the mind of God, but lost in the confusion of its own echoes amidst the vaults and arches of cathedrals, or becoming faint and indistinct as it passes down the long vista of ages, mingling with other sounds,—imperfectly heard even at first and imperfectly transmitted by each hearer to his fellow.

But it is to be borne in mind that the Protestant, emancipated from all human dominion over his faith and conscience, is not left to his own will and liking, but brought into the closest relation to God, to listen and obey. It is to be remembered also, that the liberty of interpretation for which we contend does not exalt the human intellect or reason upon a throne where she may sit supreme. The mind of man is indeed set free from the control of minds no better endowed than itself, but it is placed under the guidance and government of the Spirit of God, without whom we cannot search the meaning of a single text, or profit by a single verse of his own inspired book. We must sit at the feet of Jesus to learn the law from his lips, who is the Prophet of all ages,—teaching by his word and Spirit, the will of God for our salvation.

When the human heart begins to indulge its natural pride

and self-righteousness, it naturally also shrinks from God, and is reluctant to acknowledge even to itself a full, direct, and immediate responsibility to him. The priest is introduced, and besides his other functions the priest must teach. His teaching must maintain him in his position,—must confirm the error to which that position is due. Thus tradition or the voice of man, (though pretending to be also the voice of God,) has begun to compete with the word of God, whenever there has been any departure from the pure doctrine of justification by faith.

Cardinal Wiseman pronounces very strongly against those who treat the question of the Rule of Faith as merely *one* of the questions at issue betwixt Protestants and the Church of Rome, placing it on a level with the other questions, whereas according to him it is “the fundamental question” and “the main point.”¹ It is easy to see why a Popish disputant should be anxious so to represent it. It gives him a prodigious advantage in dealing with every other question. However weak and preposterous his arguments may be, he has an argument from this source which will make amends for all. Driven from every other ground, he may take refuge here. But it is an advantage which should not be conceded him. Not only are we ready to meet him on his own ground, and freely to discuss with him his fundamental question; but we can confidently examine other points in the first place, assuming that the Scriptures which we hold in our hands are God’s word to us, and that the very noblest exercise of our faculties is to search out their meaning. We set aside the merit of human works, we set aside the priestly figment of purgatory, and the worship of the Virgin Mary, and the efficacious potency of holy water—and strong in our confidence of the first principles upon which we have proceeded, as for ever incapable of being overturned, we can look with disdain on the opponent who comes forward as the representative of another authority to interfere betwixt our minds and those Scrip-

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I. 5.

tures in which we have recognised the voice of God. Moreover, he comes with a very bad grace ; as whenever any of these other questions is proposed for consideration, he shews an extreme anxiety to bring forward arguments from Scripture. No doubt he takes a protest that in so doing he is not to be understood as renouncing the high vantage ground of the authority of the Church to decide controversies and declare the true sense of the Bible according to (what exists only in fraudulent assertion and foolish credulity) the unanimous consent of the Fathers. But his protest avails him nothing, or ought to avail him nothing, if men would look into the real nature of the case. It is a lame apology for his behaviour. Here is a man who comes to reason with me, who asks me to reason with him, and who brings an argument from the Epistle to the Romans. By the very fact of his so doing, he assumes that he and I are both of us entitled to read that epistle, entitled to judge of its meaning, and capable of determining thereby the point in controversy between us. If this is not his meaning, it ought to be : if he tells me that it is not, his whole procedure has been disingenuous. In short, the advocate of Popery would let you forget that you are not entitled to interpret Scripture for yourself, if only he could persuade you to adopt a particular interpretation ; but failing that, he is ready to crush your intellectual faculties under the weight of an enormous load of tradition and Church authority.

However, "It must be manifest," says Cardinal Wiseman,—

"that if we establish that right whereon, alone, we base all particular doctrines ; if, in other words, we can prove that, besides the written Word of God, an infallible authority exists, and always has existed, in the Church—which, being under the guidance of God, cannot be deceived in sanctioning anything as having been revealed by Him—assuredly, we likewise make good all those different points on which we are charged with having fallen into error, but which thus will be proved to have their foundation on authority derived from God. And therefore, however, for the sake of entirely convincing the minds of those who doubt, and of more easily satisfying their peculiar difficulties, we may be induced to treat singly such points as I have instanced, it is evident, that they are all virtually and essentially demonstrated, if this leading proposition can be

proved ; and, thus, all the questions of fact are absorbed in the one touching the divine right possessed by the Church to decide, without danger of error, in all matters regarding faith."¹

Strange ! that for the sake of *entirely convincing the minds of those who doubt, and of more easily satisfying their peculiar difficulties*, a man should have recourse to a mode of argument which, according to his own principles, is essentially hollow, and by which the conviction or satisfaction is only produced through a tacit assumption of a right or power which has no existence whatever.

But, says Cardinal Wiseman,—

"As it has pleased God to order things, the Catholic has no need of any other ground-work of his faith beyond the written word of God. For it has pleased him (though he might have otherwise ordered it) to give us in his holy Scriptures sufficient evidence of that authority which he has bestowed upon his Church. This reasoning may be thus illustrated, as we do not allow of any doctrine which is not contained and rooted in Christ Jesus incarnate, the Word of God, and Eternal Wisdom of the Father, and yet we admit other doctrines, only remotely connected with him, based only on him, and less directly referable to him,—for no doctrine can have any force except inasmuch as it rests on his authority, . . . &c., &c. Thus it may be truly said, that whatever is believed by the Catholic, although not positively expressed in the *written* word of God, is believed, because the principle adopted by him is there expressly revealed."²

The *written* word of God would thus seem to be invested with authority only for a moment, that it may abdicate in favour of the unwritten word, or of the priesthood who keep and dispense it. And it may be as well to inquire how the ground-work of all is here alleged to be found in "*Christ Jesus incarnate, the Word of God.*" How does he come to be known ? How do those doctrines come to be known, which these designations imply ? Dr Wiseman tries to solve this question by supposing that the Gospels are first examined, "simply as historical works, intended for our information,"—that in course of this examination their historic truthfulness is clearly recognised,

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I. 4.

² Ibid., I. 60.

and that "we thus arrive at the discovery that besides their mere narrative, they unfold to us a system of religion, preached by one who wrought the most stupendous miracles to establish and confirm the divinity of his mission," and so acknowledge "the authority of Christ to teach as one who came from God," and are "led to the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find him to have taught." Even this is very far short of the acknowledgment of "Christ Jesus incarnate, the Word of God," &c.,—an acknowledgment of doctrine which surely cannot be made without the teaching of tradition, if it be true, as Mr Keenan asserts, that the doctrine of the *Trinity* depends upon tradition, and is not clearly laid down in Scripture.¹ But how, at all events, are we to draw so much from our own study of Scripture, and suddenly stop there? Nay, we are to find in it, according to Cardinal Wiseman, texts in which our Saviour himself asserts that a certain body of men are the *depository of the doctrines* which he came to establish, invested by him, "NOT MERELY WITH GREAT AUTHORITY, BUT WITH POWER EQUAL TO HIS OWN." And "from the moment he [the inquirer] is satisfied that Christ has appointed a succession of men whose province it is, by aid of a supernatural assistance, to preserve inviolable those doctrines which God has delivered,—from that moment, whatever these men teach is invested with that divine authority, which he had found in Christ through the evidence of his miracles."² How is all this so much easier to decide upon than any other point of doctrine? How are the texts bearing upon this subject so much simpler than any other texts? It is strange thus to concede the right of interpretation, and then to take it away. But it is very requisite that Popish theologians should more precisely state the amount of knowledge which they conceive it possible for the human mind to acquire in its study of the Scriptures as mere historic documents,—or rather the amount of knowledge which they deem it indispensable to acquire in this preliminary study before the authority of

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sec. 5.

² Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I. 64.

the Church is thereby established as commissioned by Christ to declare his mind, to determine the questions of the canon and of inspiration, and authoritatively to interpret the written word of God. Here indeed it may be found there is considerable difference of opinion amongst them; and when Mr Keenan says that it is by Catholic tradition only that even a Protestant knows the Bible to be the word of God,¹ he makes a statement which it is not so easy to reconcile with Cardinal Wiseman's view, as it is to explain it otherwise, and the reader of which could not certainly be expected to understand it in any such restricted sense. Dr MacHale also gives an account of this matter very different from Cardinal Wiseman's. Having quoted some of the texts of Scripture usually adduced to prove the authority and infallibility of the Church, (texts which will come under our consideration by and bye), he goes on to say,—

"The ancient prophecy of Isaiah, so often abused, becomes literally realized in the Catholic Church—'All thy children shall be taught of the Lord,'²—because in adopting her doctrine we adopt that of Jesus Christ, by whom we are taught to obey her. By reposing on this authority, the faith of the Catholic is always uniform and immoveable. As it is on its credit he receives the inspired writings, it is on it likewise he receives their interpretation. He, therefore, is not guilty of the inconsistency of trusting solely to the Church, while he receives from her the instrument of her own power, and then by an abuse of the same instrument, of attempting to elude her jurisdiction.³ No, he is conscious that the Church was in the full enjoyment of its prerogatives before the New Testament was published to the world; nay, that the written manifestation of the New Covenant is one of the effects of that authority. It is not then exclusively from Scripture that the Catholic proves the infallible authority of his Church, because it is only from the Church he learns its inspiration. He takes a still higher position by relying on the living authority of that order of men, on whom Christ transferred his own power, and which was visible during the interval in which the Scriptures were yet unknown. The Scriptures are, if you will, a record of the authority to which the Catholic submits, first exercised by Christ himself and then delegated to his apostles. . . . But anterior to this record, and independent of its subsequent testimony,

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. i.

² Is. liv. 13.

³ Which Papists represent Protestants as doing. See the assertion last quoted from Mr Keenan.

the public and uninterrupted ministration of its doctrines and sacraments, gave a more visible and striking attestation of the authority of the Church, than any written record could convey. We require not, therefore, the aid of Scripture, to prove the establishment of a Church, which had been founded before the Scripture was written. Are we guided then, solely, by its own testimony? Yes, but it is a testimony as strongly fortified by the auxiliaries of truth, which a sound criticism requires, as the written testimony of Scripture itself. It is confirmed by the ancient distinction between the pastors and the people" &c., &c.¹

These are strong statements, but not stronger than may be found in Milner's End of Controversy. Nay, he says—

"You have no sufficient authority for asserting that the sacred volumes are the genuine composition of the holy personages whose names they bear, except the tradition and living voice of the Catholic Church."²

And again,—

"Granting that St Paul wrote an inspired Epistle to the Romans, and another to the Ephesians; yet, as the former was entrusted to an individual, the Deaconess Phebe, to be conveyed by her to its destination,³ and the latter to his disciple Tychicus, for the same purpose, it is impossible for you to entertain a rational conviction, that these Epistles, as they stand in your Testament, are exactly in the state in which they issued from the Apostle's pen, or that they are his genuine Epistles at all, without recurring to the tradition and authority of the Catholic Church concerning them."⁴

Nothing can be more decidedly at variance with Cardinal Wiseman's statement already quoted of the way in which Papists proceed from the study of the Scriptures as historic documents, to the acknowledgment of the authority of the Church in matters of faith.—And however Papists are wont to boast of the infallible certainty which their faith has, as resting on the testimony of an infallible Church, these exponents of Popery no more find a foundation for this infallibility, than the oriental

¹ MacHale, Evidences and Doctrines, 223, 224.

² Milner's End of Controversy, Letter ix.

³ He refers to Rom. xvi. The reader may examine the source of this argument; I refrain from offering any remarks on its nature.

Milner, *ut supra*.

sages did for the feet of the tortoise on whose back they placed the bull which supported the earth.¹ Even on Cardinal Wiseman's view of the subject, the infallibility rests upon mere moral certainty or moral probability, a mere ordinary examination of historic and documentary evidence. And this infallibility of the Church, or authority of the *unwritten word*, implying, as we have seen, the assertion of certain great doctrines regarding Christ, and implying also the assertion of his Spirit's continual presence with and guidance of the Church, as Papists continually hold forth that it does,—the question recurs how the necessary fundamental knowledge is to be attained concerning Christ and concerning the Holy Spirit. "If the infallibility doth depend upon the promise," says Stillingfleet, "nothing can prove that infallibility, but what doth prove that promise to be true and divine."²

"You offer," says the same author, "to prove to your adversaries the Church to be infallible out of Scripture; for this you bring them particular places, and think presently to vanquish them with *Super hanc petram, Pasce oves*, and *Dabo tibi clavos*;³ but hence arises another question. How you come infallibly to know that this is the sense of those places? You know your adversaries presently deny any such thing as infallibility to be proved out of them. And what way have you then to assure them this is the sense of them, but that your Church, which is infallible, delivers this to be the sense of them. And is not this then a plain circle? *You are to believe the Church infallible, because the Scripture saith so; and you are to believe the Scripture saith so, because the Church is infallible.*"⁴ This argument has been much employed by Protestants; and that Papists feel the force of it, is evident from the attempt which we have seen that Cardinal Wiseman makes to avoid the position in which he

¹ Faber, Difficulties of Romanism, 44, 45.

² Stillingfleet's Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion, 237.

³ "Upon this rock," "Feed my sheep," "I will give thee the keys."

⁴ Stillingfleet's Rational Account, 127.

would be exposed to it,—though how far he thereby improves his case is not so obvious. Bishop Gillis of Edinburgh (or Limyra) seems to adopt, at least for the moment, Wiseman's view, but makes exceedingly short work of the whole argument, when in his Discourse on the Mission and Influence of the Popes, he says the words of Christ to Peter "are such as to admit of no other meaning" than that which Papists are accustomed to put upon them, in order that they may maintain the Church's authority and Peter's supremacy, and that "such also is their context, as to render that meaning unavoidably evident."¹ Yet here also for the moment, Bishop Gillis concedes that very right of private judgment against which he contends, and founds his whole case upon an appeal to it.

I may be allowed here to quote against Cardinal Wiseman himself and his brethren in general, an argument which he uses in discussing the signification of the words of institution in the Sacrament of the Supper, but which seems rather more applicable to the question now under consideration.

"The question may be placed in this view; are we to take the Bible simply as it is, and allow it alone to be its own interpreter?—or are we to bring in other extraneous elements to modify that interpretation? If there are certain rules for interpreting the Bible, and if all these rules in any instance converge, to show us that certain words will not and can not bear any interpretation but one, I ask, if there can be any means or instrument of interpretation, of sufficient strength to overpower them all? If we admit such a case, do we not reduce to a nullity the entire system of biblical interpretation?"²

And what is the principle of interpreting Scripture according to tradition, but the very admission of which the Cardinal here justly says that it reduces to a nullity the entire system of biblical interpretation?

¹ A Discourse on the Mission and Influence of the Popes, delivered in St Mary's Catholic Church, Broughton Street, on the day of Solemn Thanksgiving for the return to Rome of His Holiness, Pope Pius IX. By the Right Rev. Bishop Gillis. P. 13.

² Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doct., II., 202.

I regret that I cannot attempt to follow Cardinal Wiseman step by step through his argument on the rule of faith as set forth in his Lectures. But it occupies a whole volume, and the examination of it in detail would require more space than can here be allowed for the purpose. Moreover, the method which the Cardinal has of dealing every now and then in vague generalities, seemingly remote from the matter in hand, is unfavourable for this sort of detailed and consecutive examination. I prefer to make use of his Lectures only for occasional reference, explanation, or illustration, and to invite the readers' attention, in the first place, and more particularly to the more systematic argument of Scheffmacher, as reproduced with considerable modifications in Mr Keenan's Controversial Catechism.

Preliminary to the discussion of the rule of faith, Mr Keenan gives a chapter on faith itself, to which we shall afterwards recur on account of the illustration which it contains of the Popish propensity to disparage and make light of Scripture;—his argument running thus, that as the Bible cannot be a sure rule of faith in the way that Protestants allege, "a wise God must have left in his Church some judge perfectly qualified" to decide controversies, which judge is "the teaching body of the Church," by which teaching body of the Church, says he, "I understand not the Pope alone, nor the bishops alone, either severally or collectively, but the Pope with the bishops *as a body*; and not every or any body calling themselves bishops, but those only who are in communion with the See of Rome."¹

It is after this convenient clearing of the way, that Mr Keenan proceeds to discuss what he calls *the Three Protestant Rules of Faith*,—and these are *the Socinian Rule of Faith*,—*the Rule of Faith* "adopted by the Anabaptists, Quakers, Moravians, and Methodists, which consists in a supposed private inspiration

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat. chap. iv., sect. 5. Cardinal Wiseman speaks less plainly of THE CHURCH assembled for the solemn purpose of defining what has always been an article of faith of the Catholic Church. (Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 61.)

made by God to each individual,"—and "*that of the respectable portion of Protestants.*"¹

It is a common trick of Papists to confound together all who call themselves Protestants,—and even in speaking of their different views, still to represent them as forming one class or body united in their opposition to the Church of Rome, whereas every Popish priest in this country may surely be supposed to know that evangelical Protestants who hold the doctrines of the Reformation have no more sympathy with Socinians than they have with Papists, and would as soon think of seeking brotherly fellowship with the Pope himself, as with one who denies the divinity of Christ, or who holds "that nothing is to be admitted, but what reason can clearly comprehend."² It suits the purpose of a Papist to rank Socinians amongst Protestants, although knowing well that Protestants esteem them—and unable to deny that they rightly esteem them—as no better than slightly disguised infidels. I shall not stay to inquire whether Mr Keenan has correctly stated the views of Socinians, nor how he has managed his argument against them.³ And of his argument, I shall only observe that it has very much the appearance of being framed for the purpose of preparing us for that by which the "rule of respectable Protestants" is to be overthrown, by directing us to seek safety in following "the overwhelming majority of Christians," and by an undue depreciation of human reason,—to whose errors we are invited to ascribe everything "ridiculous, gross, absurd, and shameful," and from which as it gives us so many "contradictory systems of medicine,

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat. chap. v.

² Ibid., chap. v. sect. 1. Milner in his *End of Controversy*, (Letter vi.) makes only two "fallacious Rules of Faith" one of which is that of private inspiration, the other is "the written Word of God, or the Bible, according as it is understood by each particular reader or hearer of it." And this, he says, "is the professed rule of *the more regular sects of Protestants, such as the Lutherans, the Calvinists, the Socinians, the Church of Englandmen.*"

³ Some explanation of terms must be necessary where he tells us that the Socinian "admits that the Scripture is *inspired*."

philosophy, politics, and agriculture," we are told that we could only expect "the same Babylonish confusion as regards religion."¹—But reason is God's gift, and within its own proper sphere it must be trusted and ought to be trusted. This depreciation of it is like the argument against the evidence of the senses by which Papists support the doctrine of transubstantiation, a horrid hacking and hewing at the very pillars of truth, and a commencement from which men can only proceed to universal scepticism. It is not thus that the Socinian is to be confuted, or that we are to meet him and to drive him back when he proudly arrogates to his reason prerogatives which God never gave, and ventures towards regions which he has no right to enter.

We come now to the "second Protestant Rule of Faith."

"What say you to the rule adopted by the Anabaptists, Quakers, Moravians, and Methodists, which consists in a supposed private inspiration made by God to each individual."²

In answer to this question, Mr Keenan dilates upon the monstrosities clothed with the name of religion by John Bockhold and others of the same class. This line of argument he prosecutes at considerable length, and very much as Milner does in his *End of Controversy*.³ But how are Moravians and Methodists grouped with such persons as Bockhold and Joanna Southcote? I purposely refrain from touching upon Milner's attempt to justify this association by disingenuous arguments and unfair quotations. Good men may have sometimes employed exaggerated language in speaking of the teaching and help and inward witnessing of the Spirit, but there is a reality in that teaching, help, and witnessing quite distinct from inspiration, and constituting one of the greatest blessings enjoyed by the Church of Christ. Utter ignorance of these things, as well as a hatred of fervent spiritual Christianity and a desire to make it seem odious, may be amongst the reasons why Popish

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. v., sect. 1.

² Ibid., chap. v., sect. 2.

³ Milner's *End of Controversy*, Letters vi. and vii.

divines so frequently confound those who have spoken much of the Spirit's grace and illumination with the Anabaptist fanatics who deemed themselves inspired, set aside the authority of the written word, and rushed headlong into all vice and crime.

But might it not occur to a Popish controversialist, that his own Church agrees more nearly than his Protestant antagonists do with Anabaptists in the very point in which they so completely differed from the Churches of the Reformation—in rejecting the supreme and sole authority of the written word. The correspondence appears more close when it is more considered, for the new authority set up soon supersedes the written word of God. And it is very evident that the Pope and bishops, or whoever they are who authoritatively interpret Scripture, and thus give forth the alleged mind of God, require all the inspiration which the Anabaptists ever claimed—nay, all that even prophets and apostles ever enjoyed.

Mr Keenan's view of infallibility as residing in "the Pope with the bishops, as a body,"¹ that is, in a "general council,"² does not diminish this necessity. It really adds to the difficulty by making the inspiration to be diffused in some mysterious way amongst the members of this body, without any of them individually having a complete inspiration of his own. Of course this latter difficulty does not lie in the way of those who place infallibility in the Pope himself,—and although Mr Keenan utters his own opinion so unhesitatingly, as if it were the faith of his Church, he knows very well that some of her greatest defenders have maintained very different opinions concerning the seat of this infallibility.

Mr Keenan employs a very good argument against the Anabaptists and their rule of private inspiration, when he points to their contradicting the Scripture. There is no better argument against the distinctive tenets of his own Church; nor is it easy to see how his Rule can claim to be above it any more than theirs. He also makes a very just remark when he says, that in order to

¹ Already quoted, p. 477.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. ix., sect. 1.

prove themselves to be guided by the Spirit of God and not the spirit of error, they would need to work *some unquestionable miracle*; "but in this," he adds, "they have never succeeded." Let this test be applied also (and why should it not?) to the Church of bleeding pictures, winking statues, worshipping elephants, and saints that run about with their heads beneath their arms. Yes, in order to prove that God authorises them to interpret his mind in a way that shall make their interpretation the rule of faith, "they should work some unquestionable miracle." Have they ever succeeded? Of course all the Papists answer, Yes. But let them tell us when and where. No doubt there are plenty of miracles narrated in their books; but then we have a saving clause introduced sometimes—lest perhaps we should think them too grotesque, and they should produce an effect the opposite of that which was intended—that nobody is bound to believe them, and that "in obedience to the decrees of Urban VIII." the author declares that he has "no intention of attributing any other than a purely human authority to the miracles, revelations, favours, and particular cases" recorded in his book.¹ Which, then, of all this multitude of miracles will Mr Keenan put in the foreground for our consideration in his next controversial treatise? Or might he not get a winking statue to wink the controversy to an end in some conspicuous public place in Dundee?²

But what have we to do with this Rule of Faith? Or why should Dr Milner and Mr Keenan dwell so long upon it, if not to distract attention from the real question betwixt Protestants and Papists. The work which they had undertaken was to refute Protestantism; and instead of so doing, they busy themselves about the aberrations of a few fanatical sectaries.

¹ Liguori's Glories of Mary, at the end.

² Cardinal Wiseman has surely committed himself on this point already, appealing to each and all of the miracles recorded in the volume which he edited of the Lives of the Saints. Else why are they recorded? Which would he have us to examine first? Shall it be the miracle of the walking-stick that came through the air to its owner, or the miracle of the peaches that grew on the chestnut boughs? The reader has already had opportunity of considering these and a few more.

But we come at last to the opinions of Reformers and Protestants.

“What is the third false Rule of Faith?”

“That of the respectable portion of Protestants, who maintain that the Bible and the Bible *only*, and the Bible not as it sounds, or as it is understood by the learned, but as it is understood by each private individual, whether ignorant or learned, is the rule of faith given by a wise and good God to mankind.”¹

It is curious how the Popish author here contrives to mix up his argument with the very statement of the opinions against which he contends, stating them in such words as by insinuation to favour the conclusion which he advocates. This is not the fairest way of stating the views of an antagonist.

What Mr Keenan means by “*the Bible not as it sounds*,” may perhaps be perceived on reference to the common Popish argument in favour of transubstantiation from the words *This is my body*, taken according to their *sound*—instead, it may be added, of being taken according to their *sense*.

Could he not have told his readers, leaving argument to follow after, that Protestants accept the inspired Scriptures—the Bible only—as their Rule of Faith, holding it to be every man’s duty and privilege to search out the meaning for himself? And why should he have attempted to make it appear as if Protestants disregarded learning and held it to be a thing of no consequence, at least in regard to the interpretation of Scripture? Does he not know that the contrary is the truth, and that every man is considered bound to avail himself of all assistance of this kind that he can—always under his own responsibility, which will not permit him to subject himself to the dictation of any man, however learned, or of any body of men? The Protestant Rule of Faith thus requires and promotes a certain activity of mind, from which cultivation, improvement, and real learning naturally result; and this may very reasonably be held to suggest an argument in favour of Protestantism and against Popery, which allows the great multitude of minds to lie dormant, ac-

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.

cepting the authoritative decisions of those who are set up to think for them.

And why in the consideration of this subject should the grace of the Holy Spirit be kept out of view, who teaches the humble Christian savingly and to profit, and without whom all means and appliances of learning will be vain? Cardinal Wiseman shakes himself free of a difficulty which threatens to incommode him in his exhibition of the train of argument, whereby those of his Church arrive at the possession of the Holy Scriptures and their entire canon and inspiration,—which train of argument he admits to require considerable investigation,—by referring to the doctrine that faith is “a virtue essentially infused by God in baptism;” from which he concludes that this virtue of faith acts upon its proper object whenever presented, without going through the process of investigation at all, so that “the child and the most illiterate” may “perform an act of faith grounded on proper motives.”¹ Much more may we refer to the work of the Spirit, who enlightens our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and searches for us all things, yea, even the deep things of God. It is a delightful thing to think that the faith of the humblest and most unlearned Christian, of her

“Who knows and only knows her Bible true,”

is of as excellent a nature as that of the most profound theologian who ever investigated doctrines and evidences—nay, that the faith of every true believer is of the same origin, and rests upon the same foundation with that of every other true believer. But it would not be delightful to think that the faith of any Christian was independent of all rational conviction of the mind. For whilst there is a work of the Spirit of God in the soul, and true faith is his gift; yet he does not supersede the faculties with which we are endowed, but rather calls them to their highest exercise—such exercise as they never otherwise could have reached. And there can be no act of faith without a process of thought, however rapid and unobserved, in which

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I. 75.

there is a conclusion as rationally arrived at, as any that was ever set forth in argumentative volumes. Such a process may never be analysed by the mind in which it has taken place; but it is one thing to reason justly and another thing to analyse the process of that reasoning, and the capacity for the former is happily a more common thing than the ability for the latter. The woman of Samaria, with whom our Lord conversed at the well of Sychar, shewed what sort of rational evidence her own faith had rested upon, when she said, "Come, see a man which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ?"¹ And although the evidence be in itself quite satisfactory, and the reasoning most just, when the first act of faith takes place,—further evidence and further reasoning may be requisite for confirmation of faith, and for the removal of objections, which though they did not meet the Christian at the entry of his course, do meet him in his progress. There is occasion for all that learning can do, and the utmost cultivation of mind; whilst yet the rudest and the simplest who become subjects of saving grace and receive the baptism of the Holy Ghost, have essentially the same faith, in no case apart from and independent of rational judgment,—nay, the rational foundation of which he who most thoroughly investigates it will ever find increasing reason to admire.

At the point to which we have now followed him, Mr Keenan contrasts the Popish Rule of Faith with the Protestant, in order that by this very contrast its excellency may be made to appear:—"All truly inspired Scripture, and all really divine tradition, interpreted not by the ignorant nor even the learned laity, but by the lawfully sent and ordained pastors of God's true Church."²

¹ John iv. 29.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.—Dr Milner is rather more cautious. He does not commit himself so fully to a particular view as to the seat of the Church's infallibility. He says, the rule is "*The word of God at large, whether written in the Bible or handed down from the Apostles in continued succession by the Catholic Church, and as it is understood and explained by this Church.*" (End of Controversy, Letter vi.) Cardinal Wise-

It is easy to see what a mighty power the general acknowledgment of such a Rule of Faith must place in the hands of an unscrupulous priesthood, and how it practically exalts them to stand in the place of God, and to bear to the people a relation which is properly his own. God speaks to mankind in general through the priests. Such is the Popish theory. They speak for him, (although it may be only as a collective body,) giving an authoritative exposition of his mind and will. He has indeed himself spoken, but his word must not reach men save as the priests please; it cannot be understood by men except the priests explain it. Yet, surely, one would think it must be possible for God himself to express his mind in terms as intelligible to the great multitude of mankind as any which the Church can employ; though the Popish rule of faith and some of the arguments for it seem to be based on the opposite assumption.

But still following the course of argument adopted in the Controversial Catechism, we find its author bringing forward as his very first reasons in favour of the Popish and against the Protestant Rule of Faith, the alleged unity and universality of the Church of Rome. These are amongst the distinguishing marks on which the advocates of the Church of Rome found her claim to be regarded as the true Church. In dealing with such subjects and examining such arguments, it is not easy to avoid repetition;—in which, however, many Popish writers seem to delight, and none more than Mr Keenan. In arguing on the Rule of Faith it is with universality he begins:—

"In comparing these rules, why do you give a preference to the Catholic rule?"

"Even at this moment there are in the world seven Catholics for one Protestant; hence we have seven to one in favour of our rule; . . ."¹

It comes, then, to a simple matter of counting heads. Papists are more numerous than Protestants, therefore they are in the right! On this principle might and right will be more frequently

man seems to be of the same mind with Mr Keenan. (See Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 61.)

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.

united than on the ordinary principles by which men judge of right and wrong. But why does Mr Keenan stop short in his course? Let him follow out his argument. Paganism is more prevalent and numbers more adherents in the earth than all the forms of real and nominal Christianity, therefore Paganism is right and Christianity is wrong, and holy water ought to be sprinkled in another name than it has for sometime been in Dundee, and perhaps a fetish should be procured instead of a crucifix.

But a full exhibition has not yet been made of all the parts of this argument.

"We have, in addition to this, the whole world during fifteen hundred years before Luther; . . ."

Of course every one knows what a favourite argument this is with Papists of all classes: and every one can see what short work it makes not only of the Lutheran Reformation but of all Reformations.

A reference to the Waldenses and Albigenses may help us to understand the propriety of this appeal to the testimony of the whole world, and with the Bible in our hands we may go back at once to the commencement of the fifteen hundred years and try the question there. But instead of arguing this point at present, let us hear Mr Keenan out, for he has not yet completed his answer to the question above quoted.

"—And all this is confirmed by the fact, that whilst all Catholics of every age and country agree as to the Rule of Faith and its interpretation, no two sects of Protestants are agreed upon every question of religion; nor do they give their Rule of Faith one and the same interpretation; each individual Protestant explains the Scripture for himself, whilst each Catholic has the Scripture explained by all that is at present—or ever was—wise, learned, great, or good in God's Church. The Protestant has only the security of his *one* judgment; the Catholic has that of the *whole* Church."²

With what infinite self-complacency the Popish Church speaks of itself by its priests and defenders! Yet as to the unity in

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. 5, sect. 3.

² Ibid.

faith here boasted of,—we may fairly inquire what two Papists are perfectly agreed upon *every question of religion*? Will it be alleged that Jesuits and Jansenists were agreed upon every question of religion, or even upon the Rule of Faith and the interpretation of it? Are all members of the Church of Rome perfectly agreed as to the power of the Pope? Or do they all equally receive the doctrine of developement?

Before proceeding to any further examination of the subjects which have thus been brought before us, another quotation may be made from Mr Keenan.

"Can any thing be more absurd than that an ignorant peasant should pretend to interpret the inspired volume better than all the pastors of the Church?"¹

He forgets that he has himself appealed to the judgment of ignorant peasants in appealing to the multitude of seven to one,—that his numerical argument allowed no superior place or authority to learning. The present argument, however, proceeds upon the assumption that the interpretation of Scripture depends upon learning. But the Rule of Faith has already been declared to be found, not in the interpretation even of the learned laity, but only of "the lawfully sent and ordained pastors of God's true Church." Here are two elements, then, whose relation to one another it must be important to determine. It is not upon learning that the Papist is taught to depend, or the opinion of the learned laity might be accounted as good as that of a priesthood not more numerous and not more learned. It is in fact, a new and continual inspiration of the priesthood which is requisite to give authority and value to their interpretation; and the whole argument as to ignorance and learning is irrelevant.²

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.

² It is to no purpose that Mr Keenan varies the numerical argument of seven to one, and tries to combine it with this argument from learning. "If, as the Scripture says, 'there be wisdom among many counsellors,' truth will be on the side of Catholicism; we have the learning of eighteen centuries, Protestants have only that of three." Besides the other points

The argument in favour of the Popish Rule of Faith from the universality of the Church, as we have seen it put forth, is a mere argument from numerical majority. It is not universality in a strict or proper sense, which is asserted when Papists are represented as seven times more numerous than Protestants. It is absolutely ridiculous when brought forward to aid in making out the application of the often quoted "Catholic Rule" of Vincent of Lirins, "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*,"¹—whether that Rule be valuable or worthless. But Dr Milner, having told us that "the true Church is catholic or universal in three several respects, as to *persons*, as to *places*, and as to *time*," proceeds to explain himself by saying, that "it consists of *the most numerous body of Christians*; it is more or less *diffused wherever Christianity prevails*; and it has *visibly existed ever since the time of the Apostles*."² And then he descants upon the numbers who belong to the Church of Rome, and the countries in which they are to be found. Mr Keenan, in like manner, vaunts of the extent of the world covered by his Church, and contrasts it with the "small corner of the earth" to which Protestants are confined. He even enters into calculations for the purpose of shewing how many times "Catholics" out-number the Church of England, and how many more times they out-number Presbyterians; nay, he produces a statistical table, extracted from a work called the *Scientific Miscellany*, to exhibit the comparative numbers of "Catholics" and Protestants in all quarters of the globe,³ which statistics, he says, "are of absurdity here presented, we cannot but admire the facility with which the truth of Popery is taken for granted and made an argument in favour of itself by this assumption of its eighteen centuries of learning."

¹ *What has been held at all times, in all places, and by all persons.*

² Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xxvi.

³ The Statistical Table is as follows:—

EUROPE.	ASIA.	AFRICA.	AMERICA.	OCEANICA.
"Catholics, 154,444,600	40,000,000	12,400,000	34,110,000	3,450,000.
Protestants, 39,675,000	50,000	10,000	9,150,000	50,000."

The author of this statement could easily write miracles for the next *Glories of Mary*. Has the *Scientific Miscellany* the approbation of the Synod of Thurles?

the most decisive proof that the Protestant is not the Church of all nations,"—and rising above his statistics, although not above the reasonable demands of his argument, he adds, "She is not even the Church of any one nation, no, nor of even one parish, exclusively, on the face of the earth."¹ Yet were this table correct, and all these assertions as to numbers, the universality in point of numbers would still resolve itself into an acknowledgment of non-universality. No one but an Irishman would think of telling a Member of Parliament that he had many times more votes than the candidate whom he had defeated, and at the same time congratulating him on his unanimous election.

And how strange is this argument from numerical majority when viewed in the light of Scripture! The final triumph of pure Christianity, we are indeed taught to expect, when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ,—but not until there shall have been a long and great struggle,—a great apostasy,—witnesses prophesying in sackcloth, and slain and risen again from the dead,—the growth and destruction of a tyrannical and wicked power symbolized as Babylon the Great, over whose fall the heaven is to rejoice and the holy apostles and prophets of God, when God shall have avenged them on her.² It is not from Scripture that men form their opinions when they take it for granted that the Church now, or at any former time, numerically largest in the earth, must therefore be the purest and the best, nay, exclusively, the true Church of Christ.

Here, however, Papists feel the difficulty in which they are involved, and try to reason themselves out of it. Cardinal Wiseman discusses this topic whilst endeavouring to establish the Popish Rule of Faith. It is indeed in a somewhat different connection from the present, but we may as well consider it ere we pass from the argument of the numerical majority.

"But having thus spoken of these promises and pledges which Jesus

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 6.

² 2 Thes. ii.; Rev. xi., xviii., &c.

Christ gave to his Church, of unfailing protection and direction, may I not be met by other texts of a character apparently contradictory, such as must, if not destroy, at least neutralize those which I have alleged? Are there not a series of strong passages in which so far is the stability of the Church from being secured, that its total defection is foretold? . . . My brethren, in replying to this species of objection I must be on my guard. I must avoid touching that view of it, however popular it may be, which pretends to see in the Catholic Church the foul characteristics attributed to the enemies of Christ in the Apocalypse, and other writings of the New Testament; and I must follow this course for several reasons, First, because I would not profane the holiness of this place with the blasphemous calumnies," . . . &c.—"Leaving aside, therefore, that class of applications, let us simply take and try the position, that a general defection from the truth is foretold in the New Testament: and that this prediction is even to be reckoned amongst the evidences of Christianity Good God! and is it possible that any believer in the divinity of our Lord can assert so monstrous a proposition." [Then he presents the case "familiarily in the form of a parable."] . . . "And if so, my brethren, must we not call it almost impious and blasphemous to suppose that our Saviour can have given, as evidence of his divine commission to establish a religion and a Church, that His work should not stand, but, after a few years, become disfigured with error and crime, and in a few centuries perish, or what is worse, relapse into idolatry and corruption?"¹

There is much more in this strain. But everything is here managed with a certain sort of adroitness. There is a convenient mis-statement of the whole case to begin with—a *total* defection substituted for a *general* corruption, which again is even more strongly represented as a *perishing* or something worse. Cardinal Wiseman knows well that this is not what Protestants allege either as to the meaning of Scripture or the history of the Church. He is tearing to pieces a mere man of straw. And then, it is convenient to get rid of the Protestant argument even when he has mis-stated it, by means of an exclamation and a parable.

Mr Keenan dismisses these Protestant objections to the Church of the numerical majority even more briefly than Cardinal Wiseman,—although it may be admitted that he uses more arguments. These arguments are so curious that I cannot but quote one

¹ Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, I., 112-114.

or two of them, and having so done I shall pass from the subject.

"What does the Apocalypse say, chap. xi.?—That, during the above reign of Antichrist, during twelve hundred and sixty days, Henoah and Elias will preach against him. But Henoah and Elias have not yet come; therefore neither has Antichrist.¹—What says chap. xiii. of same book?—That Antichrist will mark on the right hand or forehead all his followers; but the Pope has not done so, therefore he is not Antichrist. Again, no man is to be allowed to buy or sell, but he that hath the character or the name of the beast, or the number of his name. But Catholics have neither his character, nor name, nor number, nor has the Pope prevented them from buying or selling; therefore, again, the Pope is not Antichrist."²

All this is at once lamentable and ludicrous. But what more have we than a Papist's own word for it, as the basis of this last argument, that he has neither the character of the beast, nor his name, nor the number of his name? And if perhaps he mistakes in this important point, we know that he has abundant privilege of buying and selling; and in the eighteenth chapter of the same book from which he quotes, Mr Keenan will find a long enumeration of articles of merchandise, concluding with the SOULS OF MEN.

One other argument of Mr Keenan's I must quote. We have seen instances already of the extraordinary readiness with which,—although in this he is only an example of his class,—he falls into modes of stating his arguments, most inconsistent with the reverence that ought to attend the mention of the name of God or of Christ. But this is surpassingly offensive.

"Were it true that the Church had in reality fallen into idolatry, what inference would you draw from that fact? That Christ was an unskilled architect and a false prophet, because he must then have built his Church, not upon a rock, but upon the sand, like that foolish architect of whom he himself speaks, Matt. viii.; and because the gates of hell would then really have prevailed against the Church in spite of his prediction."³

¹ It may be very well for Tradition to make Henoah and Elias the two witnesses, but it is hardly fair to make "the Apocalypse, chap. xi." say so.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. viii., sect. 3.

³ Ibid., chap. vii., sect. 1.

The argument is the same with Wiseman's, though stated in a different way.—Of course, it is obvious at a glance, that all speciousness which it may have in any way of stating it, must depend upon the unfair and delusive introduction of the idea of a *complete* lapse of the whole Church into idolatry,—and that as to any thing short of this, it would be equally easy to be just as triumphant concerning the impossibility of the Israelites ever falling into idolatry, or in particular, of their worshipping a golden calf at the very base of Sinai.

This subject of the predicted apostasy has about an equal connection with the Popish boast of universality as to numbers, and with that of universality as to time. For the universality which is held forth as a mark of the true Church and an argument for the Popish Rule of Faith, is, we have seen, an universality also as to time. And so Mr Keenan, as already quoted, says, "We have the whole world during fifteen hundred years before Luther."

Dr Milner explains the universality as to time as consisting in this, that the Church "has visibly existed ever since the time of the Apostles;" and thus explained, and if these terms be understood in their proper sense, it must certainly be admitted as an essential mark of the true Church of Christ, though denied to the Church of Rome. This universality as to time is also the same thing which is otherwise contended for under the names of Unity and Apostolicity, when Popish writers are engaged in treating of these other marks of the true Church: for the four marks which they generally enumerate, Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity, all variously run into and blend with each other.

"No one will dare to deny," says Mr Keenan, "that the Catholic Church," by which of course he means the Church of Rome, "is the Church of *all* ages."¹ Of course he knows well that a great many persons do dare to deny it. What shall we call this figure of speech?

When Mr Keenan, (after Scheffmacher), declares these to be

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 6.

essential characteristics of the Church of Christ—that it "must have been established upwards of eighteen hundred years ago, by Christ and his Apostles," and that "it must have existed unceasingly in the world from that time to the present,"¹—no Protestant can hesitate about admitting the correctness of the statement, and proceeding accordingly to an examination of the case. And believing that the Church of Christ exists wherever there is faith in Christ, a confession of his name, and an enjoyment of Christian fellowship, we do not shrink from the question, so often put by Papists, Where was your Church before Luther?—Not where Popes and Cardinals pursued their careers of worldly ambition, amidst magnificence and luxury and crime,—not in Cathedrals where pompous ceremonials had excluded all vital religion,—but wherever two or three were met together, to call upon the name of the Lord and to worship God in spirit and in truth.

But Scheffmacher, and after him Mr Keenan, very briefly dismiss all pretensions of Protestant Churches to the characteristics above mentioned.

"How long is it since the Lutheran Church was established? About three hundred years. Luther preached the first Protestantism ever known in 1517; and Calvinism was first preached in the year 1537.—Were there no Lutheran or Calvinistic Churches before these dates? No; no such doctrine, nor churches, nor pastors, nor sects, were known in any country prior to that time."²

And again:—

"What question can you put to a Protestant, to which he can give no satisfactory reply?—Ask him where the true Church was before the time of Luther and Calvin?"³

I shall not encumber myself with similar quotations from Milner or other writers. It were easy to produce them in abundance. But these may suffice. The argument is perhaps the commonest of all in the mouths of all classes of Papists.

The assertions above quoted are strong. But the doctrine of

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 1.

² Ibid., sect. 2.

³ Ibid., sect. 3.

the Church's infallibility must be admitted, and that the Church of Rome is the true and infallible Church, ere her doctrines can be acknowledged as the same which are set forth in the writings of the Apostles: and this were certainly to reason in a circle. We are not bound, as Papists are, by the outward forms of things, and the names of Lutheranism and Calvinism cannot prevent us from looking at the truths by the advocacy of which Luther and Calvin were so useful to the world, as truths which were asserted and maintained ages before they were born. Therefore the exact dates of their first preaching do not concern us in the present inquiry. And when we read the promise that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church, we turn with satisfaction to the Paulicians, and Cathari, and Albigenses, and Waldenses, and Lollards, and Wickliffites, and Hussites, and other vilified and persecuted antagonists of Rome,—in whom we see its admirable and continued fulfilment, till at last we see God glorified in the Reformation of the sixteenth century, and are encouraged to expect the future more signal triumph of the same cause which was then so much advanced in the world.

It would indeed be a conclusive argument against the connection of the modern Protestant Churches with the Waldenses and others who in ages prior to the Reformation refused to acknowledge the pretended successor of Saint Peter, if it could be proved that there was a radical difference of doctrine: and accordingly it is customary with Papists to make very strong and confident assertions to this effect. "Observe," says Dr Milner, "that none of the ancient heretics held the doctrines of any description of modern Protestants." The Albigenses, he says, "were real Manicheans, holding two First Principles or Deities, attributing the Old Testament, the propagation of the human species to Satan, and acting up to these diabolical maxims. The Wickliffites and the Hussites were the levelling and sanguinary Jacobins of the times and countries in which they lived. In other respects these two sects were Catholics."¹

¹ Milner, *End of Controversy*, Letter xxvii.

And in his *Letters to a Prebendary* he adduces what he is pleased to call evidence in support of these charges, and of other charges of the most monstrous description,—evidence which in some instances has no relation to the parties libelled, in other instances consists of the gratuitous assertions of their malignant, prejudiced and credulous enemies,—whilst he takes care never to allude to the evidence afforded by their own writings or the other valid and trustworthy documents of their times.¹ In like manner Mr Keenan tells us that "the Albigenses taught that there were two Gods and two Christs,"—"reprobated marriage and denied all the sacraments, as well as the resurrection of the body,"—that "the Waldenses aimed at plunder,"—"declared it a heinous sin for a magistrate to condemn to death for any crime,"—"held it a mortal sin to take an oath," and maintained that "the clergy became reprobates by holding one farthing's worth of property,"—but that "in other things these deluded fanatics were Catholics; they held the Sacraments, Mass, Transubstantiation and Purgatory," &c.²

How far the doctrines of Wickliffe agreed with those of the subsequent Reformers, may be learned from a perusal of his published works, and no further evidence on this point can be desired, nor any other confutation of the Popish calumnies respecting him, than will be afforded by an hour's examination of the volume of his tracts and treatises published by Dr Vaughan. With what audacity and falsehood does Dr Milner make the error of the Wickliffites consist merely in their *Jacobinism*, and assert that they were in other respects good Catholics,³ when the Synod of London in 1396, condemned the following, amongst other articles from Wickliffe's *Trialogus*,—"That the substance of the bread remains on the altar after consecration, and that the bread does not cease to be,"—"That as John was

¹ Milner's *Letters to a Prebendary*, Letter iv.

² Keenan, *Controv. Cat.*, ch. ii., sect. 1.

³ Though against this reckless assertion of his *End of Controversy* may be placed his own assertions in his *Letters to a Prebendary*, (letter iv.) ascribing to the Wickliffites "*impious*" as well as "*seditionous*" tenets.

Elias figuratively and not personally, so the bread is figuratively and not naturally the body of Christ."¹ And he must be an easy dupe, who believes that if no other heresy than a levelling and sanguinary Jacobinism had been laid to the charge of Huss, he would ever have been proceeded against in an ecclesiastical council, or that any other power than the ordinary powers of the empire would have been concerned in his death.

The statements continually made by Papists concerning the monstrous opinions and infamous morals of the Waldenses and Albigenses, have been well characterized as mere transcripts or imitations of the ancient calumnies of the Pagans against the primitive Christians, whom they represented as habitually guilty of promiscuous incest in the darkness of their private assemblies, of indecently worshipping the presiding priest, of adoring the head of an ass, and of drinking the blood, and devouring the flesh of murdered children.² They are not more worthy of credit than these former statements were,—or the other stories which were circulated in the dark ages concerning the persecuted Waldenses, whose children their own Popish countrymen believed to be born with black throats, four rows of teeth, and skin covered with hair,³—or the metamorphosis of a dead Albigensian heretic into the toad denominated *crapaldus*, as recorded by Lucas of Tuy, who abounds also in the still repeated slanders.⁴ It is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Popery, that during all the centuries of its prevalence, and down to the present day, it has involved its most zealous supporters in the sin of calumniating and vilifying all that has been most excellent, pure, and heavenly upon the earth. But so long as these slanders are repeated, or the analogous falsehoods concerning the Reformers, and so long as the legends of fictitious miracles are multiplied, we have a ready answer to the argument that the Pope cannot be Antichrist, because he has not marked his followers on the forehead or the right hand.

¹ Tracts and Treatises of John de Wycliffe, 131. (London, 1845.)

² See Faber, Vallenses and Albigenses, 78.

³ Blair's History of the Waldenses, II., 168.

⁴ Faber, *ut supra*.

Mr Faber's "Inquiry into the History and Theology of the Ancient Vallenses and Albigenses," contains not only a valuable exhibition of the general identity of their theology with that of the Reformers, but an exposure of the malicious falsehood of the charges brought against them by their Popish persecutors, with a particular examination and refutation of the most frequently repeated charge of Manicheism. The *Noble Lesson* and other documents of the Waldenses exhibit their theology as substantially the same, in the most essential points, with the theology of the Reformation. And it is interesting in reference to this subject to consider that when the light of the Reformation shone on the previously dark regions of Germany and Switzerland, the Waldenses acknowledged the doctrine of the Reformers as the same which had been cherished in their own valleys from the earliest times. "In all things we agree with you," said their deputation to Œcolampadius, "and from the very time of the Apostles our sentiments respecting the faith have been the same as your own."¹ Indeed it is of itself an admission more than enough to outweigh many a false testimony concerning the religion of the Albigenses or Waldenses, when we find their enemy the apostate Reinerius, who wrote against them in the thirteenth century, declaring, that one cause of their heresy was their having translated the Old and New Testaments into the vulgar tongue, and their diligence in learning great portions of these translated Scriptures by heart, so that, says he, "I have heard and seen numbers of them who perfectly knew the whole New Testament, and because they are unlearned laymen, they falsely and corruptly expound the Scripture."²

It is very interesting and important to trace back the history of true Protestantism, and to note its existence in one place and another during the earlier centuries, before the crusades against the Albigenses and Waldenses began,—in the Culdees of the British Isles, and the Churches which in various parts of the world Rome had much difficulty to bring into subjection to herself,—in the Paulicians of Armenia, who made their appear-

¹ Faber, Vallenses and Albigenses, 448.

² Ibid. 449.,

ance in the seventh century, and whom persecution drove westward into Europe,—and in the faithful men, more or less enlightened, who from time to time rose up in different quarters to testify against the errors and abominations which prevailed or had begun to prevail. We need not be disconcerted even when a Papist tells us, that if we should succeed in proving our *visible succession* from the “Hussites, Vaudois, and other heretics of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,” we “have still twelve hundred years of invisibility or non-existence to account for;”—which, when Mr Keenan has told us, he adds, in that peculiarly graceful and agreeable style which imparts such a charm to all his writings, that until Protestants “prove their visible existence during all these long ages, none but a fool will believe that they are the Church of Christ.”¹

This is a point upon which Papists love to insist,—the visibility of the Church. “An invisible Church is no Church at all,” says Dr Milner.² “The Catholic Church alone,” says Mr Keenan,—meaning, of course, the Church of Rome,—“has, beyond all doubt, existed in every age, from the present till the Apostolic age. . . . We have a complete list of an uninterrupted chain of Roman Pontiffs, reaching from the present Pontiff, Pius IX., to St Peter. We have lists of all the Catholic Sees in the world, and the names of the bishops who in every age occupied them.”³ And all this is, no doubt, essentially necessary upon the Popish (and equally upon the Tractarian) view of the nature of the Church of Christ. But it is a little more than can be easily credited. And notwithstanding the confident assertion of Cardinal Wiseman, that from the Apostle Peter “the series of the Popes is uninterrupted and certain to the present day,”⁴ we must be allowed not only to doubt whether Peter was ever at Rome at all, but whether the very names of some of his pretended successors are not mythical.⁵

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vii., sect. 3.

² Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xxvii.

³ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 7.

⁴ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 278.

⁵ It is very amusing to read Cardinal Wiseman's remarks on the question

Let us listen again to Mr Keenan on the visibility of the Church. We shall find his style fragrant, as before, with the rich odours of Maynooth. Supposing a Protestant to be posed with the question where the true Church was before the time of Luther and Calvin, he says,—

“May he not reply, that the Church was then invisible, that there were Christians in every age who held the doctrines of Luther and Calvin, but that they dared not openly profess their faith?—Yes; but this answer will satisfy only fools; for surely, it must be evident to every one who thinks, that men who believed in their hearts one creed and professed another, like these INVISIBLE Protestants, were only hypocrites, dastardly traitors to their religion, utterly incapable of composing the holy, fearless body of the true Church of Christ.”¹

It occurs to him that against this opinion or argument, the case of the Jewish Church in the days of Elias may be alleged, and of the seven thousand men who had not bowed the knee to Baal; but he is reassured by considering, that “when the Jewish Church was invisible in the kingdom of Israel, it was in a most flourishing condition in the kingdom of Judah,”—and above all, that “*there is a very great difference between the Christian and the Jewish Church; God never promised that he would be with the Jewish Church all days, that the gates of hell should not prevail against her.*” Did the Jewish Church then so differ from the Christian, that the unceasing continuance of that Church from the giving of the law to the coming of Christ was a thing of little consequence? Did it not concern the glory of God's name, and the fulfilment of his promises respecting the Messiah? If the Jewish Church had been at any time extinguished, where then had been the Church of God? Could there be a time when God had not a Church at all upon the earth?

One word concerning the other branch of Mr Keenan's argument. His derision of those whom he is pleased to call invisible Protestants, and to taunt with their dastardliness, is in a strain

whether St Peter was first Bishop of Rome. He thinks, because it is so generally admitted that he was, it will not be necessary to enter into any argument to shew it! (Lectures, *ut supra.*)

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sec. 3.

which may perhaps remind the reader of what once was heard upon Mount Calvary. And how was he warranted to assume that the true Church of Christ and all the members of it must of necessity be fearless? Was Peter fearless when he denied his master, or when he dissembled at Antioch? But surely a Popish controversialist forgets himself, when in uttering his contempt of timid Christians, he thus alludes to the dangers to which they were exposed. Is not this something like glorying in the power which his own Church possessed and used in former times for repressing what she called heresy? What tried the courage of poor men and women now condemned for not being fearless? The persecution which aimed at wearing out the saints of the Most High. But, indeed, Mr Keenan ascribes to it more than its effects. It is not for us to doubt that many may now be pillars in the heavenly temple, who wavered and trembled much when upon earth; and we may well think with great tenderness of those whom Popery prevented from nourishing their souls by the reading or hearing of the Word of God, though we may have to regret the weakness which they manifested in the day of trial.¹ However, we know of many a persecuted Christian who chose rather to die than to recant. And the Church of Rome had conducted many a trial for heresy, long ere Luther arose, in which there was no display of that timidity now however condemned in language so unwarrantably and unreasonably severe. There were many *visible* Protestants, whose open confession cost them their lives. And to conclude, we may say in the words of the English martyr Bradford to two Popish prelates, "The fault why the Church is not seen of

¹ I know nothing more execrable than Dr Milner's reference to the case of Jerome of Prague. "Though the Council was guilty of no breach of faith to Jerome, yet was he guilty of a flagrant breach of it to the Council, in pronouncing a solemn condemnation of Wycliff and Huss, and making an explicit declaration of the Catholic faith, both of which were foreign to his mind, as he afterwards confessed." (*Letters to a Prebendary, Letter iv., note.*)—He had been tortured for days, and advantage was taken of the consequent weakness.

you, is not because the Church is not visible, but because your eyes are not clear enough to see."¹

But another asserted proof of the Popish Rule of Faith, is the *unity* of the Church.²

There is, unquestionably, an essential unity in the Church of Christ,—not a mere external crust, but an internal coherence at the very root and heart. It is too true, indeed, that the divisions and separations which exist amongst Protestants have proved a stumbling-block to many inquirers, and have tried the faith of believers whom a more perfect and manifest unity would have confirmed, giving a measure of plausibility also to Popish arguments, which otherwise, in virtue of the strifes continually raging within the Church of Rome itself, would only have seemed ridiculous. The Church is defaced by these divisions; but whilst we deplore them, we are not to forget that there is a real unity of faith and love amongst many who are yet, to a certain extent, formally separated because of differences which, though not on the most essential points of religion, they cannot consent to treat as unimportant.

But "what," says Cardinal Wiseman, "is the end to be attained by the use of any rule? Uniformity of thought and action in those matters which it regulates."³ And having assumed this principle with regard to the end or object of a Rule of Faith, he proceeds to apply it in argument; tacitly, however, making a further assumption that this end must have been *fully* attained and attained *from the very first* wherever the true Rule of Faith has been received,—an assumption to which perhaps a parallel would be found if it were to be taken for granted that because holiness and joy are amongst the ends for which the kingdom of God was established upon the earth, there must therefore be perfect holiness and perfect joy within all the bounds of that kingdom, and within the heart of every true Christian from the very moment of his becoming connected with the Church of Christ. The following is Cardinal Wiseman's

¹ Bradford, Writings, 521. (Parker Society.)

² See p. 486.

³ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 48.

way of stating this common Popish argument against the Protestant Rule of Faith:—

“And if God has given us a rule, or code of principles, is it not that all should be brought to know the same duties, and to practise the same virtues?¹—Is it not that all should be brought to entertain the same faith?—And has this rule of faith proved equal to that only end? Most avowedly not. It is not necessary to go far from the ground on which I am standing, to see many places of worship maintaining conflicting doctrines, and all professing to be taught on the authority of that one book. Here one man will denounce, as contrary to the Christian faith, the doctrines of Calvinism; there another, with equal zeal upholds them as the most essential ground-work of Christianity. In one you will hear the divinity of the Son of God, and the sublime mystery of the Trinity, decried as a human device; and in another, you will hear a creed recited, wherein all those who condemn these doctrines are condemned to eternal loss. And yet all hold the same book in their hands, and quote almost the same passages, while they profess an almost endless variety of conflicting and contradictory doctrines.—And is not this result, this solution of the problem, a satisfactory evidence of the insufficiency of the proposed rule?”²

Mr Keenan goes, if possible, even further in this line of argument. If “the Bible, as privately interpreted,” had been the rule intended by God, then according to this author “all Protestants would have been of one faith,—*they would have given the same interpretation of every passage.*”³ Nothing can be more gratuitous or absurd than this assumption. The Rule of Faith is divine, but the use of it is human, and partakes of the imperfection which attaches to all human things.—It would be resented as injustice, if all the crimes ever committed by Papists were, therefore, and without further evidence, to be laid to the charge of the Popish system of doctrine or morality. Not more reason-

¹ So then, according to Cardinal Wiseman's own reasoning, the Popish Rule of Faith cannot be the true one, if it has not brought *all* the members of that Church to know the same duties, and to *practise the same virtues*. We are not to acknowledge it as the true Rule of Faith, if we can show that any member of the Church of Rome, at any time, has been dissolute, vicious, and wicked. Cardinal Wiseman is bound to come forward as the vindicator of Pope Alexander VI. and his son Cæsar Borgia.

² Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, I., 48, 49.

³ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. v., sect. 3.

able are Papists when they charge against the Protestant Rule of Faith all the false doctrines which human folly and corruption ever professed to found upon erroneous interpretations of Scripture. But, says Mr Keenan,—with what reverence for the Word of God the reader may too easily judge,—these Protestant differences of opinion “*have proved the Bible, as privately interpreted, to be the fruitful source of delusions, heresies, and schisms.*”¹

The Popish argument from the divisions of Protestants, depends not merely upon those differences which are compatible with a very intimate Christian fellowship, but is founded mainly, as appears from the quotations already given, upon those which relate to more essential points of doctrine.² It might be a sufficient reply to Cardinal Wiseman to point out within his own Church, differences upon the same points of doctrine which have separated Calvinists and their opponents amongst Protestants,—such as the disputes betwixt the Jansenists and Jesuits, and those betwixt the Franciscans and Dominicans concerning free-will and the powers of nature and grace.³

As for Unitarians, a Popish controversialist can never be entitled to reckon them amongst Protestants, until he has made out that the Protestant principles and Rule of Faith properly lead to Unitarianism,—whereas Mr Keenan at least assigns to the Unitarians a separate Rule of Faith of their own.

Perhaps enough has already been said concerning the actual divisions subsisting within the pale of the Church of Rome. But it may be worth while still to attend for a few moments to the Popish boast of unity. “All Catholics believe the same truths,”⁴ says Mr Keenan. That they professedly receive the same creeds, may be readily enough granted, but they differ as to the doctrines asserted in them, and many of the canons of the Council of

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. v., sect. 3.

² See also Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xv.

³ When Dr Milner in like manner insisted upon the wide diversities which were to be found even within the pale of the Church of England, he had surely forgotten, or at least wished his readers to forget great part of the history of the Church of Rome. (Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xv.)

⁴ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vii., sect. 4.

Trent were purposely framed in order to compromise rather than to decide, nay, to satisfy in some measure men of very opposite views by ambiguity of expression, or even by the admission of statements not truly harmonizing with each other.—Nay but, says Dr Milner,—

“At all events, the Catholics, if properly interrogated, will confess their belief in one comprehensive article, *I believe whatever the Holy Catholic Church believes and teaches.*”¹

And this is unity!—And thus it is set down in Popish Manuals as an *Act of Faith* to say—

“I BELIEVE ALL THAT THE CHURCH BELIEVES AND PROPOUNDS TO ME TO BE BELIEVED,”²

or,—

“O MY GOD! I FIRMLY BELIEVE ALL THOSE TRUTHS TAUGHT BY THY HOLY CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC CHURCH, BECAUSE THOU, O LORD, WHO ART TRUTH ITSELF, HAST REVEALED THEM TO HER, AND COMMANDED US TO BELIEVE THEM.”³

But what if the doctrines themselves be unknown, which the person making this *Act of Faith* therein professes to believe? It is evidently regarded as of no consequence to the reality of the act of faith or of the unity in doctrine which it shews; for this is prescribed as an act of faith even for children, and that with Cardinal Wiseman's express approbation. A very good act of faith may be made in great ignorance of all that it relates to, if only there be a sufficiently blind and implicit submission to *the Church*. But “the moment any Catholic doubts,” says Cardinal Wiseman, “not only of the principle of his faith, but *any one of those doctrines which are thereon based*—the moment he allows himself to call in question any of the dogmas which the Catholic Church teaches as having been handed down within her,—that moment the Church conceives him to have virtually abandoned all connection with her.”⁴ It is not without much

¹ Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xvi.

² Preci Quotid., 2; in Uffizio della B. V. Maria.

³ Child's Manual of Prayer, 69. See also Key of Heaven, 94.

⁴ Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, I. 76.

reason that the Cardinal hereupon applies himself to the consideration of the objection that this is a tyrannical subjugation of men with “an iron yoke and a band of brass,”—“a bowing down of those powers and faculties which the Almighty left free to be exercised by each individual.” But it is interesting and instructive to note how he attempts to repel this objection. His reply, after an assertion that this is an entirely false view of the principle of submission to the Church, is founded upon the *beauty* of the *idea* of a *perfect unity of belief* “in the conception of a Christian Church,” because such an idea is “the consecration of the first and most essential principles whereon society is based.” “For the social union,” he proceeds to say, “tends to merge the feelings of each individual in the general mass, and leads him to embrace mankind, rather than individual men.”—And this monstrous, distorted, and discoloured representation of the social union is the ground-work of the reply to an objection which unrepelled must be fatal to the Popish system; a ground-work upon which, if an appropriate superstructure be raised, it must involve a denial of individual or personal responsibility, reward and punishment, happiness and misery.

Dr Milner speaks as if the uniformity of government and liturgy in the Church of Rome, were scarcely a less essential part of “Catholic unity” than unity of creed or doctrine.¹ Mr Keenan likewise exults over what he calls “the absurd contrariety” of the Protestant Church in respect of liturgy or public service, in a way which cannot but seem ludicrous to those who do not participate in his estimation of form. He boasts moreover of the unity of the Church of Rome as exhibited in respect of moral principles, saying that “all Catholics follow the same moral principles; the same vices are denounced on the one hand, and the same virtues inculcated on the other.”²—What has he to oppose to this as a proof of Protestant division? Nothing but a fresh outcry against the tendency of Calvinistic principles!

¹ Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xvi.

Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vii., sect. 4.

—But let his assertion concerning his own Church be tested by the case of Pascal and the Jesuits whom he exposed in his Provincial Letters; or if Pascal be rejected as *no Catholic*, let the Jesuits, who certainly were “Catholics” of the best stamp, be compared with one another. Or let Mr Keenan say whether he, whose own *Catholicity* is not to be called in question, approves and assents to the moral principles of some of these reverend fathers. I do not find, in his Catechism of the Christian Religion, any assertion of Father Layman’s doctrine of the lawfulness of duelling, nor of the opinions of Molina, Escobar, and their fellows, on the subject of homicide in general. Nor do I even find that he adopts the principles laid down by Peter Dens concerning sacramental confession, that the confessor may deny if questioned, all knowledge of what he knows only under the seal of confession, and if necessary, confirm his denial with an oath, because he is interrogated as a man, but he knows this only *as God*.¹ But what becomes of Mr Keenan’s argument, if these principles are not his?

The boasted unity of the Popish Church is illustrated in a remarkable manner by the doctrine of Development, which has of late found so great acceptance amongst her dignitaries, and has been advocated by Moehler, Newman, and others. There can be no doubt, indeed, that historically, the theory of Development is the true theory of the Church of Rome. It is implied in the common assertion of Popish divines, that the Church, (or as some of them say, the Pope), has power to constitute articles of faith, making that to be *of faith* which was not so before,²—an assertion very strongly made by Leo. X., in his famous Bull *Exsurge Domine* against Luther, wherein he condemns as one of Luther’s heresies the opposite doctrine, “that it is not in the power of the Church or Pope to constitute articles of faith.”³

¹ Dens, Theol., VI., 219.

² See above, p. 439, &c.

³ See Wordsworth, Letters to M. Gondon, Letter i.—“Gregory of Valencia says, ‘The same things have not always been believed *explicitly*; but divers points, in course of time, have been made manifest and believed;’

But although this has been the theory upon which the Church has in fact proceeded, it has not, until of late, been plainly and fully, nor is it yet universally, avowed. It is in fact irreconcilably opposed to the theory of Tradition, and the interpretation of Scripture according to “the unanimous consent of the Fathers,” as generally laid down by Popish theologians.¹ For whilst, according to that theory, unity consists in *identity* of doctrine; this theory of Development makes it consist merely in a certain sort of *harmony*,—contrary however to the ordinary assertions so boastfully made with regard to it, and the ordinary representations given of it. And the unity might easily be held up to ridicule, by setting over against one another, the accounts given of it by the assertors of the two theories concerning the Church’s doctrine, or even by such an exhibition of these theories themselves.

It may be proper, before passing entirely from this subject of the Unity of the Church, to take notice of the Popish outcry against the use of the terms *essential doctrines*, and *fundamental doctrines*,—terms which have sometimes been employed in the preceding pages, and which imply a distinction certainly, but not such as Papists are accustomed to allege. For the distinction

and Austin of Ancona, ‘The Pope may make a new creed, multiply articles of faith, and place more points under each article than were before.’ And thus the celebrated Salmeron declares, that ‘God has not given all things to all men, and that every age should enjoy its own truths which were unknown to preceding generations;’ and we are assured by Stapleton that ‘the Church learns many things from the Holy Spirit, which she has not been taught by Christ.’ In fact, Christianity, with many of your divines, admits of *discoveries* as much as Chemistry.” (Wordsworth, Letter i.)

¹ “By *Apostolical Traditions* we understand such points of Catholic belief and practice, as, not committed to writing in the Holy Scriptures, have come down in an unbroken series of oral delivery from the Apostolic ages.” (Berington and Kirk, 115.)

“I also admit the Holy Scriptures, according to that sense which our Holy Mother the Church, *has held and does hold*; to which it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures, neither will I ever take and interpret them *otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers*. (Creed of Pope Pius IV.)

is not betwixt *essential* and *non-essential*, as if we believed that the Christian system might do very well without any doctrine whatever of all that really belong to it, but concerns only the relative importance of doctrines, and the place which we must regard them to hold in relation to the piety, the holiness, and the salvation of men. Thus viewed, the distinction cannot be deemed absurd, as Papists say it is; nor is it liable to that reproach, which they cast upon it, and in connection with which they proclaim it to be absurd, of making light of the greater number of revealed truths. Nor can it be demanded of us, as they are accustomed to demand, that we should decide what are fundamental doctrines, and at what limits this character ceases to belong to the truths of revelation. It is not for us to make such an attempt. It is not for us to say what amount of Scriptural knowledge, or knowledge of Scripture doctrine is in any particular case indispensable to a man's salvation. Of course, we do not, like the Papists, regard any man as believing what he does not know, or, in a heap and without examination, "all that the Church believes." It is our duty to seek for ourselves greater acquaintance with divine truth, on which when ascertained, our faith is to be exercised, and to think charitably of those who differ from us in what we cannot deem to be the most essential or important points. Such a distinction seems clearly to be implied when the Apostle says, "If in anything ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you; nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing;"¹ and when he speaks of "the first principles of the oracles of God," and says, "Leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on unto perfection."² It is monstrous to find Papists insisting upon the necessity of believing "all that God has revealed," whilst they enlarge revelation so as to take in not only Scripture, but tradition, and then again reduce the believing to a mere act of faith in "all that the Church believes and

¹ Phil. iii. 15, 16.

² Heb. v. 12, and vi. 1.

teaches." But in reality this exhibits the reason and explanation of all. To doubt on any point is to call in question the authority of the Church. A man may be ignorant to the utmost, but only let him implicitly submit himself to the authority of the Church, and there is no further question of the sufficiency of his faith.¹

Returning to Mr Keenan's Controversial Catechism, we find him,—after the greater numbers belonging to the Church of Rome, her existence since the days of the Apostles, and her unity,—assigning as a further reason for preferring her Rule of Faith to the Protestant Rule, that the Protestant Rule *facilitates the teaching of all sorts of error, and this without the possibility of applying an antidote*. Does it not do so? he asks. His answer to the question must be given unabridged:—

"Yes, clearly. For example, an ignorant Unitarian cobbler denies the divinity of Christ, on these words, 'The Father is greater than I! It will be of no use for a Protestant minister to quote against him that other passage—'I and the Father are one, for the cobbler will reply, that their unity is a unity of affection, not of nature, and this he will say is evident from the former passage. The minister must leave him in his error; for the cobbler will tell him he has a right to interpret Scripture for himself, and that he is as good a judge as any minister.'"²

Here the author exhibits a little of a peculiar talent in which he excels, in the adaptation of his style to the purpose of provoking the mirth of the lowest sort of minds. This purpose the introduction of the cobbler serves. But what has just been quoted is otherwise very interesting. What antidote does Mr Keenan think of applying in the case supposed? Must he not also leave the man in his error, unless he can convince him by his arguments? If he refer to the authority of the Church, even on this point also, he must still labour to convince the man by his arguments. And should all his reasonings fail, must he not

¹ See Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. iv., sect. 1, and Doyle, Letters of J. K. L., 195, &c. See on the other hand, Stillingfleet's Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion, 44-106.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.

leave the man in his error? Or are we to understand that there is another way of applying the authority of the Church, which will make it a more effectual antidote? It might be thought of in Tuscany, but surely Mr Keenan does not think of it in Dundee. Yet what does he mean when he tells us, as if it were a peculiarity of Protestantism, that the ministers cannot restrain the *swarms* of sects, by *FORCING* all to accept their interpretation, "for this would be in contradiction to their own principles, it would be destroying the right of private interpretation?" It is hard to know what more those can do who deny, than those who admit the right of private interpretation, in the way of *FORCING* men into the adoption of their views, unless they are to employ such methods of coercion as were wont to be employed in the secret chambers of the Inquisition,—of which, however, as we shall by and bye see, Mr Keenan does not profess a warm admiration. He might, however, do well to explain how he would proceed with the Unitarian cobbler to *FORCE* him into an orthodox faith.

Perhaps none of the arguments employed by Papists against the Protestant Rule of Faith, has at first sight a greater speciousness and plausibility, than that which is founded upon the difficulty of the questions connected with the canon of Scripture. Cardinal Wiseman insists much upon it in one of his Lectures, in which also he endeavours to show that Protestants can never upon their own principles, prove the inspiration of Scripture, referring all certainty, both as to the canon of Scripture and its inspiration, to the authoritative testimony of the Church.¹ But we have seen how he endeavours to make out the authority of that testimony, and what reasoning in a circle there is,—from the Scriptures to the Church, and from the Church to the Scriptures again. Even according to Cardinal Wiseman's own way of demonstrating the authority of the Church in such matters,

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., Lect. ii.—See also Keenan, Controv. Cat., *ut supra*.

the genuineness and authenticity of the books of Scripture must still be determined as they are by Protestants, for they must be determined antecedently to the admission of the authority of the Church, which is to be proved out of these Scriptures, viewed as historic documents. Yet it is very common for Papists to assert that even on these points Protestants can attain to no certainty, and to refer them also to the testimony of the Church itself.¹

From this it may appear how vain is the Popish boast of exclusive ability to establish the genuineness and authenticity of the books of Scripture, or its canon and its inspiration, and (in like manner) its precise and uncorrupted text. Many volumes might be insufficient for the removal of all difficulties connected with these subjects, and of course for particular reply to all the cavilling objections of Papists and of infidels, who here stand upon common ground and agree in very much of what they say. Yet may the simple Christian have sufficient confidence in his Bible, because "the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole, (which is to give all glory to God,) the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God,"—whilst "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Saint bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts."² As vainly would a man attempt to create a new planet as to write another book which might, in respect of its own contents, be placed on an equality with the writings which compose the Old and New Testaments.³ There remain, however, on Protestant principles,

¹ Milner, End of Controversy, Letter ix.—Already quoted; see above, p. 474.

² Westminster Confession of Faith, ch. i., sect. 5.

³ There might be no great difficulty in finding many human writings evidently and vastly superior to the books of the Apocrypha, which are

abundant reasons for the investigation of every point connected with the canon of Scripture, its particular books, and the accuracy of its text.

It is an extraordinary argument which is found against the Protestant Rule of Faith in the existence of pastors in the Protestant Church, as if that were something inconsistent with the Rule of Faith.—Mr Keenan, with his usual elegance of expression, says, “The reformed rule makes these pastors an unnecessary lumber.”¹—It is like the assertion that the reformed rule makes learning of no account. The Christians of the Apostolic age were exhorted to respect and highly esteem their pastors and teachers, yet also to “try the spirits whether they are of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the world,”² and to “prove all things,” and to “hold fast that which is good.”³ The Jews also were certainly bound to hear their prophets with reverence. Yet to them it was said “To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.”⁴

But arguments seem endless. Mr Keenan says,—

“If Christ intended the Bible to be man’s *only* guide, should we not suppose that he would have written it, or ordered it to be written?—Certainly: and yet he never did so; he never commanded his Apostles to *write Bibles*, but to *PREACH the Gospel*.”⁵

This is so extraordinary, that we cannot but consult another author or two, to see whether it may not be a singularity of the Controversial Catechism. But we find it to be in fact copied from Milner,⁶—for it is not in Scheffmacher. And Cardinal Wiseman also adopts it and improves upon it, as will appear from the following extracts.

reckoned part of the Old Testament by Papists,—but it is ridiculous so to receive books which were never received by the Jews, and formed no part of the *Law* or *Scriptures* referred to and sanctioned by our Lord.

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. v., sect. 3.

² 1 John iv. 1.

³ 1 Thess. v. 21.

⁴ Isaiah viii. 20.

⁵ Keenan, *ut supra*.

⁶ Milner, End of Controversy, Letter viii.

“We find that to the Jews was given, indeed, a written law, but that there was a most express command to write it—that Moses was ordered to register all those precepts which God had given, even to the most minute particulars; and that this law was to be read to the people in the most solemn manner every seventh year, at the Feast of Tabernacles. . . . But you do not meet in the new law with anything of this sort; there is not a hint or intimation that our Saviour ever intended one word to be written down.”¹

The hollowness of all this will be manifest, if it be only observed how what is peculiar to the books of Moses is here treated by the Cardinal as if it related equally to the whole Scriptures of the Old Testament: or he seems to have forgotten that there are any other Scriptures of the Old Testament. And, indeed, if the argument were to be admitted, it must be *as against the Bible altogether*, and not merely against the adoption of it as a Rule of Faith. That Christ did not *order* the Bible to be written, nor *intend* one word of the New Law to be written down,—if it means anything that is however remotely to the purpose at all,—must mean that the Bible, or at least the New Testament, is destitute of authority from Heaven.

We need not concern ourselves with a long series of questions, which Mr Keenan proposes to *ask Protestants in addition*,—such as “Why did not the Apostles, who knew well the true Rule of Faith, write millions of Bibles, and send them to all the ends of the earth, with a command that all should read them? Why did they not establish schools that all might be taught to read?”² Nor is it necessary to exhibit similar reasonings from Milner, Wiseman, or others. It is easy to see that the drift of all such questions is unfavourable not merely to the Protestant Rule of Faith, but to the Bible itself and to the general diffusion of education, which the Papists of this country at this very time profess so anxious a desire to promote,—only, however, as the indication of feeling here given may help to assure us, in order that by their nursing the child might be quietly put out of existence.

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 68, 69.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.

So Dr Milner also significantly informs us that our Lord has not so much as enjoined it to his followers in general to study letters.¹

But I cannot dismiss Dr Wiseman's argument from contrast of the Old and New Testament Scriptures, without asking the reader to consider what can be his meaning, when he says, that "the law was so purposely interwoven with the daily actions and domestic concerns of the Jewish people, as to require that it should be ever before their eyes, that they should all possess a minute acquaintance with its provisions, so as to understand, at every turn, how to regulate their conduct."² This is no doubt true; but what is its bearing on the present question? Is the law of God not still equally interwoven with all the actions and concerns of his people? Is Cardinal Wiseman ready to assert, or does he mean us to understand him as asserting that the doctrines and moral precepts of the New Testament are not, *at every turn, to regulate our conduct?* And if we are not familiarly to acquaint ourselves with them, how are they to become effectual for this purpose? There would be a contrast betwixt the Christian and the Jewish dispensations indeed, in a point which seems to belong to the very essence of practical religion, if we are now to put ourselves as blind men under the guidance of a spiritual *director*.

The sentence above quoted seems to import something more than even its author himself afterwards asserts and endeavours to prove,—that "*in the Mosaic law, although we have in it the characteristics of a written code, and an express injunction to note down whatever was taught, yet by far the most important doctrines were not committed to writing; so that among the Jews there was a train of sacred tradition, containing more vital dogmas than are written in the inspired volume.*"³ A very bold assertion this is,—and very singular it would be, if it were true, that God should enjoin upon Moses great care in noting down

¹ Milner, End of Controversy, Letter viii.

² Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I. 68, 69.

³ Ibid., I., 70.

the more unimportant or less vital parts of revelation and leave the most vital dogmas without such token of his regard! It may also be fitly contrasted with our Lord's condemnation of the Jewish traditions as making the commandment of God of none effect.¹ And what are the proofs by which Cardinal Wiseman sustains this assertion? First of all he turns to account the strange error and paradoxical argument of Warburton; finding "great shew of plausibility" in Warburton's notion that the doctrine of a future state is not to be discovered in the Mosaic books or other early Jewish Scriptures, but forgetting to mention that this notion is reprobated by Protestants in general. He gives his own opinion also concerning our Saviour's argument for the resurrection of the dead, "from the Almighty's being styled the God of Abraham and of Jacob," that "it is, perhaps, difficult to discover the link between these two members of the argu-

¹ Mat. xv., 1-9, and Mark vii., 1-13. Cardinal Wiseman here makes a great parade of the authority of "the learned Molitor of Frankfort," author of "The Philosophy of History, or On Tradition,"—who having been a Jew has become a member of the Church of Rome, from finding "that among the Jews there was a series of traditions which received its development only in Catholic Christianity, and a sacred system of mystical theology, which," says the Cardinal, "has been manifestly preserved and continued in our Church." But who does not know, if he knows any thing at all of such matters, that the modern Jews have inherited the religious opinions and traditions of the Scribes and Pharisees of our Lord's time, and are in doctrine and practice their proper representatives? The correspondence betwixt Pharisees and Papists has indeed been pretty frequently pointed out, but Cardinal Wiseman could hardly have been expected to have thus brought it before us as a recommendation of Popish views. It is extraordinary to see his readiness to gulp down the whole mass of Jewish traditions. And yet, indeed, why should we wonder, seeing that he can believe the stories told in books which he has introduced to the British public? But by and bye, probably, we shall have a translation of the Talmud for the edification of British Papists; Cardinal Wiseman not hesitating already to appeal in course of his argument to the fact that in the first page of one of the "most esteemed and most ancient" Jewish treatises, "which, at least in Italy, is put into the hands of Jewish children for elementary education, it is expressly stated that Moses received on Sinai, besides the written, an oral and traditional revelation, which he delivered to the priests." (Pp. 73, 74.)

ment"! "For how," he inquires, "can the resurrection be proved from God's calling himself the God of Abraham?" And he finds it necessary to bring in, in order to supply the proper link, a reference to "the Jewish forms of reasoning and the manner in which they connect the two dogmas of the soul's survival and the body's resurrection"; which, if he had done it merely to explain how our Lord's hearers were so readily "satisfied by the argument," had been well enough, although nothing to the purpose which he has in view,—in order to which it would be requisite to make out that there is no real force in the argument used, independent of that opinion already existing in men's minds, and no other source of that opinion than tradition. But Dr Wiseman makes no attempt of this kind. — Another of his proofs is from the doctrine of the Trinity, and the mystery of the Incarnation, of which he alleges that *scarcely a trace* is to be found *in the written law*, and which he concludes "*must have been delivered as a deposit into the hands of the priesthood, and by them preserved inviolate to the time of Christ.*" What does he make then of such texts as Is. ix. 6,—“For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace,”—or Zech. xiii. 7, “Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of Hosts”? But I must not stay to argue on these points at present. I hasten to mention two remaining proofs which the Cardinal also adduces.

“Our Saviour tells us that Moses bore testimony of him; and in conversing with his two disciples on the road to Emmaus, quoted the authority of Moses for the necessity of his suffering and so entering into his glory, (Luke xxiv. 26); and yet you will in vain search the books of Moses . . .” &c.

Now without inquiring at present what may or may not be found in the books of Moses, let us only test the accuracy of this reference to Luke xxiv. 26. Is the statement fairly made, upon

which the reasoning is founded? I refer the reader to Luke xxiv. 25-27,¹ and pass on to consider next the rebuke of our Saviour to Nicodemus, “Art thou a Master in Israel and knowest not these things?”² which Cardinal Wiseman actually quotes to argue from it concerning the doctrine of regeneration:—

“Yet tell me where it is ever taught in the Old Law, or whence he could have possessed it, except from the traditional lore preserved among the priests and the learned.”

I shall attempt no answer. Blessed be God there are thousands of our Sabbath-school children who would be quite ready to shew Cardinal Wiseman the passages which Nicodemus and he seem to have equally failed to find!³

As closely connected with this subject of the Rule of Faith, I may here introduce some proofs and illustrations of Popish reverence for the Scriptures. And it may be as well to begin with Cardinal Wiseman; continuing in fact the consideration of that contrast betwixt the Old and New Testaments, which has already engaged our attention.

He represents it as “*characteristic of a written law, that it should not be merely formed of documents collected together, as it were accidentally.*”⁴ And he finds the “Old Law” to possess this requisite characteristic, but not the New Testament. Does he mean the Mosaic law or the Old Testament Scriptures? For the reason which he assigns for thinking that the New Testament is composed of documents collected together as it were accidentally, might be equally assigned with regard to the Old

¹ “25. Then he said unto them, O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken!

“26. Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?

“27. And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself.”

² John iii. 11.

³ See, for all which is referred to in this paragraph, Wiseman, *Lectures on Principal Doctrines*, I., 69-74.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 69.

Testament. But we only need to consider the reverence manifested. To proceed :—

“ We find moreover, on examining the history of these compositions, that they were, every one of them, the offspring of casual circumstances, and written for some local or personal purpose, which seemed to call them forth.”¹

It would be curious to compare this with arguments advanced against the Bible by some of the most noted infidels of our own or former times. I am confident that there would be no difficulty in finding this identical argument in the writings of many of them, and it suits them well.

Nor did I ever read a sentence which would more appropriately find its place in the writings of an open enemy of revelation, than one in which Bishop Gillis, arguing that the Bible contains in itself no clear undeniable proof that it is the Word of God and not a book of human invention, asks this question, “ *Would it force itself on the conviction of any unconverted pagan, who might chance to hit only on a stray copy of Solomon’s “Song of Songs?”*”²

But Cardinal Wiseman himself seems to reflect that this view may possibly be taken of his sentiments and arguments. Accordingly, he sets himself to the task of proving that the Church of Rome entertains the greatest love and reverence for the Scriptures. It was not unnecessary that he should; but how does he accomplish it? First of all by assertion; secondly by abundant declamation or exclamation—a method of disguising the nakedness of assertion and covering the weakness of argument; and thirdly, by two or three arguments more curious than conclusive.

“ The Catholic Church not love and esteem the Word of God! Is there any other Church . . . ? &c.³ And not only has she ever loved and cherished it, but she has been jealous of its honour and preservation, so as no other religion can pretend to boast. Will you say that a mother hath

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 69.

² Gillis, Letter to the Duke of Argyll, p. 18.

³ See next paragraph.

not loved her child, who has warmed and nursed it in her bosom for years, when nothing else would have saved it from perishing . . . ?” &c.¹

It is thus, and with much in this style, that the Cardinal embellishes his arguments, and envelopes them in rhetorical robes through which their proportions may not be so easily discerned, or through which as through other kinds of haze they may be magnified. But as to the arguments themselves,—first, we are asked if any other Church “places a heavier stake on the authority of the Scriptures?” “Is there any other Church that pretends to base so much of rule over men upon the words of that book?” We may frankly admit that there is no other Church which pretends to so much rule over men at all. We may give the Church of Rome the monopoly of the claim with all the credit attaching to it. But it is not so easy to be convinced that she pretends to base it all upon the authority of the Bible. Cardinal Wiseman indeed does so in a certain way, though not upon the authority of the Bible as inspired, but merely of some of its books as historic documents, and we have seen that he makes statements and adopts a line of argument on this subject very different from those of some of his brethren equally entitled to be heard as speaking for their Church; and it is not fair of him to speak as if that Church had adopted his mode of ascertaining her authority. But he says it was his Church which caught up the different fragments and portions of Scripture, as they proceeded from the inspired writers, and united them together. This argument would be conclusive, if we were to admit the assertion upon which it proceeds. But the Cardinal surely calculated much upon the simplicity of his hearers when he told them in effect that the Church of Rome is the Apostolic Church, and asked them therefore to believe that she loves the Bible. I shall not attempt to shew how ridiculously he supports assertion by assertion, the supplementary argument making an assumption like that which was made before. But one assertion is too extraordinary to be passed unnoticed—and it is

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 50.

supported by no small display of learning—that the Church of Rome “has been always foremost not only in the task of translating the Scriptures, but also of placing it in the hands of the faithful.” This is supported by a long and elaborate list of versions made and printed before the Reformation. It would be interesting to examine with care every particular statement, and to see what the published versions really were, and what connection the Church of Rome had with them. But it is enough, in reply to the Cardinal’s argument, to point to the facts that there was no general circulation of the Bible before the Reformation, and no attempt to circulate it on the part of the Church or priesthood of Rome—that in countries where Popery is universally prevalent no such attempt is made unto this day, and the Bible is almost entirely unknown to the people—and that the Council of Trent condemned any one who should have the *presumption* to read or possess a translation of the Bible without license, to be denied absolution from his sins until he should give up the book to his Ordinary.

In this country the publication of a translation of the Bible in an accessible form, and therefore guarded only by a limited number of notes, was a necessity imposed upon Papists by the prevalence of Protestantism. It was but the choice of the least of two evils. It is quite true that translations have been sanctioned even in Spain and Italy; but they have been so voluminous and expensive as to put them out of the reach of all but the wealthy,—as in the case of the Italian Bible of Martini, a commentary in twenty-three quarto volumes.¹ The reference to such instances, as if they proved the willingness of the Church of Rome to promote the knowledge of the Scriptures, is a trick to which if any but Popish priests could have recourse, surely none but Popish priests could repeat it after once it had been exposed. Yet, just after the title-page of the ordinary Popish Bibles used in this country, is a copy of the letter of Pope Pius VI., in 1778, to Martini, authorising and approving his translation and expla-

¹ Dr Cunningham’s Notes to Stillingfleet, 165.—See also M’Crie’s Hist. of Reformation in Spain, 380.

natory notes, which is announced as *shewing the benefit which the faithful may reap from their having the holy Scriptures in the vulgar tongue.*¹ And here, to one ignorant of the device, the Pope would seem to speak as if he had quite forgotten the decree of the Council of Trent, even saying that “the faithful should be excited to the reading of the holy Scriptures; for these are the most abundant sources, which ought to be left open to every one, to draw from them purity of morals and of doctrine.” But even here there is a reference to the laws of the Congregation of the Index,—which may convince us what measure of sincerity these fine words contained. It would not have suited the purpose of the editors of the Popish Bibles in this country to have annexed these laws to the letter which they have printed, or to have given a copy of the famous Bull *Unigenitus*, in which Pope Clement XI. condemned Quesnel’s doctrine, “that the reading of the sacred Scriptures is for all.”²

Here, to set this matter in a clearer light, I may be allowed to quote the words of the authoritative regulation as they are translated by D’Israeli in his *Curiosities of Literature*.

“As it is manifest, by experience, that if the use of the holy writers is permitted in the vulgar tongue more evil than profit will arise, because of the temerity of man; it is for this reason all Bibles are prohibited with all their parts, whether they be printed or written, in whatever vulgar language soever; as also are prohibited all summaries or abridgments of Bibles

¹ The following sanction of a portable edition is remarkable for the terms in which it is expressed:—

“I hereby sanction its circulation among the faithful, feeling convinced, that if read with becoming reverence, humility, and pious dispositions, its perusal will be attended with great spiritual advantage.

+ CORNELIUS DENVIR, D.D.,
R. C. Bishop Down and Connor.”

Here indeed is an illustration of Popish reverence for the Bible. One would think it were some new publication by some priest of his diocese, which Bishop Denvir was so condescendingly pleased to recommend.

² Why does Mr Keenan, in his chapter “On Reading the Scriptures,” take no notice of the Bull *Unigenitus*? He does not omit to mention the Pope’s Letter to Martini. (*Controv. Cat.*, ch. xxxiii.)

or any books of the holy writings, although they should only be historical, and that in whatever vulgar tongue they may be written."

"The reading the Bibles of Catholic editors may be permitted to those by whose perusal or power the faith may be spread, and who will not criticise it. But this permission is not to be granted without an express order of the bishop or the inquisitor, with the advice of the curate and confessor, and their permission must first be had in writing. And he who, without permission, presumes to read the holy writings, or to have them in his possession, shall not be absolved of his sins before he first shall have returned the Bible to his bishop."¹

It is no small triumph of Protestantism, that such numbers of the Douay Bible are now to be found amongst the Papists of this country. For, if this were at all to be ascribed to any Popish love for the Bible, or desire that the people should find benefit from its perusal, or to any thing else than a desire to keep them from reading Protestant Bibles, and to inculcate Popish errors by means of a few notes, why are Bibles so rare in France, and Italy, and Spain?²

Pighius, in his third book of Controversies, calls Scripture a Mute Judge, a "Nose of wax, which allows itself to be pulled this way and that, and to be moulded into any form you please."³ And many Popish doctors have laboured to prove it imperfect, uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. But perhaps few have said stronger things to this purpose than the

¹ D'Israeli, *Curiosities of Literature*,—(*"The Bible Prohibited and Improved."*)

² "Even the libraries of the priests are confined to a few religious and classical works," says Gardner, in his *Travels in Brazil*, p. 365, "and among these, the Bible is rarely to be met with, a mere abridgment of it supplying its place." But it is well known that a copy of the Scriptures may be sought in vain in the book shops of very many continental towns. And it appears also that even in this country, when Papists are contented to do without the Bible, their priests can be contented that they shall remain so. (See a pamphlet entitled *Popery in Campsie* in 1852.) Amongst 91 Popish women, employed in a public work, not one copy of the Douay Bible was found, but such works as *The Garden of the Soul*, *The Path to Paradise*, *Challoner's Catholic Christian Instructed*, *Keenan's Controversial Catechism*, *The Key of Heaven*, &c.

³ Wordsworth's *Letters to M. Gondon*, Letter iii.

author of the *Controversial Catechism*, who in his chapter on Faith, already alluded to, tells us that *the written Word of God "is susceptible of different senses, and the interpreter may give it a wrong sense,"*¹ and that *"the passages of Scripture which regard controverted points may be tortured into two different meanings,"* whilst *"the Scripture itself does not and cannot tell us which is the true sense."*² Surely it is fair to ask Mr Keenan what value the Scripture has at all; for if his account of it were just, it would seem as if we might be quite as well without it.—The following extract is from another place of the same *Catechism*. If the Bible were really to blame for all the harm here ascribed to it, it would surely be the worst book in the world.

"Are Protestants all one, because they all follow the Bible?"

"On the contrary, it is the Bible, abused by the principle of private interpretation, which occasions all their errors, heresies, and schisms. The Prussian Mucker teaches his filthy principles from the Bible; the silly Mormon palms his nostrums on the Bible; the execrable Socialist proves his brutalities from the Bible; the Chartist extracts Chartism from the Bible; in a word, the Methodist, the Dancer, the Dipper, the Swaddler, the Free Kirk-man, and every other sectarian, pervert God's Word in order to make it support their jarring and contradictory systems."³

Other books, in which there is anything good, yield up a little of it to those who read them and think over them. Not so the Bible, it appears. He who drinks at the fountains of God's pure Word may drink fearful poison, it may be one kind of poison, it may be another, but it is in the highest degree probable that it will be some kind of poison, unless he allow a priest to lift the water for him in the heel of his shoe, whilst he himself stands with his face averted that he may not see it lifted, and with a thankful confidence drinks what is given him.

Dr Doyle, in one of his works, gives his judgment that the Scriptures are very useful "in the hands of the ministry." But he says,—

¹ Keenan, *Controv. Cat.*, ch. iv., sect. 2.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. vii., sect. 4.

"The Scriptures alone have never saved any one, they are incapable of giving salvation, it is not their object, it is not the end for which they were written. They hold a dignified place amongst the means of the institution which Christ formed for the purpose of saving his elect," &c.¹

And in the same work he absolutely raves against Bible societies and their agents. He declares his admiration of the orthodoxy of a poor man in the County Kildare, who, "lest he should be infected with the heresy exhaled from the Protestant Bible," "took it with a tongs, for he would not defile his touch with it, and buried it in a grave which he had prepared for it in his garden."² He says the indiscriminate reading of the Bible leads to infidelity. It is not of the Protestant Bible in particular that he speaks, but of the Bible absolutely.

"Wherever the reading of the Bible is not regulated by a salutary discipline such as ours, it leads a great portion of the people necessarily to fanaticism or to infidelity. The French infidels know this well, and hence their alliance with the Bible Societies."³

For, according to him, "in France these societies are only abetted by the Calvinists and infidels." He speaks of "the wild superstition which under the name of Bible reading or Bible distributing, is now⁴ disturbing the peace of Ireland, and threatening the safety of the State,"⁵ denounces "the indiscriminate perusal of the Sacred Scriptures" in schools, as "a direct and mischievous interference with the religion of Catholics,"⁶ and signifies a general approbation of a saying of a priest, which he quotes with evident relish, that the Bible "*would play the devil* with the children in the schools."⁷ That the priests of Ireland still retain the opinions and feelings which their great champion expressed twenty-eight years ago, recent events have very clearly demonstrated.

In Ireland, in Italy, and over the whole world, Popish priests evince the strongest anxiety to keep the minds of the people

¹ Letters of J. K. L., 164, 165. ² Ibid., 179-181. ³ Ibid., 178, 179.

⁴ 1825. ⁵ Letters of J. K. L., 128. ⁶ Ibid., 142.

⁷ Ibid., 143.

from any close and familiar contact with the Word of God. The police and the prisons in Lucca or Florence, and the notes published with the Bible in Britain and Ireland, serve in different ways and in different degrees for the same object. But according to their own shewing, it is their love for the Bible that makes them act as they do! "Yes, we love it truly," says an aged priest, the chaplain of a Popish nobleman in Scotland,—

"Yes, we love it truly, and wish to train up our people in the love of it, and therefore we do not wish our children to be accustomed to treat it with the levity and indecency of a school-book. We do not wish it to be tossed and tumbled midst the mud of every turnpike road; to have them tearing its leaves, kicking it through the school, and pelting one another with it. We love it, and we wish that they should love it, and therefore, knowing that children, who generally love their play better than their studies, often conceive a kind of nervous horror for the book over which they have been made to pore in their early days, we do not wish them to conceive this horror for the Sacred Volume."¹

It might almost be thought that some of the recent Popes and of the College of Cardinals had been educated in schools where too much poring over the Sacred Volume had made them to conceive a horror of it. It is well known in what strong terms several Encyclical Letters within this century have denounced Bible societies and all their operations, and what a nervous dread they have manifested of the circulation of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue—"a pestilence," as Pope Pius VII. said in 1816, which it is necessary "to remedy and abolish."² The present Pope, Pius IX., in his Encyclical Letter of 1846, confirmed the previous anathemas, and especially those of Gregory XVI., against "those most crafty Bible societies, which, reviving an old device of the heretics, do not cease to put forth an immense number of copies of the books of the sacred Scriptures, printed in various vulgar tongues;" and in 1850 he admonished "all patriarchs, primates, archbishops and bishops," his "venerable brethren," *with what vigilance and*

¹ Otium Octogenarii, or Thoughts of an Old Teacher on Ragged Schools and Education; p. 23.

² See Wylie on the Papacy, 181, 182.

solicitude they ought to labour "THAT THE FAITHFUL MAY FLY WITH HORROR FROM THIS POISONOUS READING."

How little it is the wish of the Popish priesthood that any of the people should be familiar with the Bible will also appear from the circumstance, that their books of instruction for practical religion do not recommend the reading of it. There is no course of Bible reading in the *Spiritual Exercises* of St Ignatius Loyola. And in the *Spiritual Consoler*, or *Instructions for Pious Souls*, by Father Quadrupani, Barnabite,—a little work of which more than one English translation have appeared, — although we find a chapter on the subject of Spiritual Reading, we find no mention of the Bible as a book, the reading of which is even to be thought of. It might have been otherwise had Father Quadrupani written originally for Britain or even for Ireland. But he wrote for Italy, where Bibles are not so well known. Instead of saying, Make yourself acquainted above all with the Word of God, he says, "Make yourself acquainted above all with the works of St Francis de Sales;" and he adds, "When the choice of books is made with the counsel of a director" (a priest) "you ought to receive the teaching therein as though it came from the mouth of God."¹

From this digression on Popish love and reverence for the Sacred Scriptures, if now we return to the arguments against the Protestant Rule of Faith, we may still employ ourselves almost as long as we please in the examination of them. For there is no end of cavilling objections, the multiplication of which only requires a little ingenuity. But when we have seen their general character, we may feel ourselves relieved from the necessity of considering them all with very minute attention.

It is argued against the Protestant Rule of Faith, that it was impossible for the Bible to hold this place during the first century, because it was not completed,²—an argument which over-

¹ Quadrupani, *Spiritual Consoler*, or *Instructions for Pious Souls*. (Instruction on Spiritual Reading.)

² Keenan, *Controv. Cat.*, ch. v., sect. 3.

looks all the peculiarities of the Apostolic age, and which moreover indicates a very low view of the value of the New Testament Scriptures, even to those who lived whilst yet inspiration had not ceased, and when the Bible was not yet completed.—It is argued, with a preposterous absurdity of expression and of thought, which almost defies serious refutation, that "the Bible, as a rule of faith, was a physical impossibility" during the first four hundred years, when only a few copies existed.¹ But indeed, there is an error in saying, It is argued. All that can with perfect safety be said, is, that it is asserted. Yet even Cardinal Wiseman does not hesitate to advance as an argument against the Bible as a rule of faith, the small number of Bibles which necessarily existed in the world before the invention of printing, and the difficulties which attended their diffusion before the establishment of Bible Societies.² Why,—he asks,—"as our acquaintance with history proves to us the utter impossibility of the Bible's being extensively circulated without the aid of the press, why was not its invention provided for, as the necessary instrument for arriving at the rule and groundwork of the faith?" But this is a mere assumption as to the *necessary instrument*. It is a mere gratuitous assumption that the present multitude of Bibles and consequent facility of access to them are indispensable to the Bible's being the Rule of Faith. Our estimate of its importance leads us to desire that every man may be able to read it, and may have the fullest opportunity of doing so; but although there were only a few copies in the land, of which the greater part of the people could only hear the public reading occasionally, it might surely still be as authoritative as the law of Moses was amongst the Jews, by which the very prophesyings of the prophets were to be tried before they were received as from God. It is to no purpose, then, that we are treated to calculations of the cost of Bibles before the invention of printing, and the impossibility of their being purchased by persons in the humbler ranks of life. We are thankful for the

¹ Keenan, *Controv. Cat.*, ch. v., sect. 3.

² Wiseman, *Lect. on Principal Doct.*, I., 45, 46.

invention of printing; but the arrangement of providence which postponed it to a certain period has no more bearing on our adoption or rejection of a certain Rule of Faith, than that which postponed to a later period many geographical discoveries, of which advantage must be taken in order that the gospel may be preached to all nations, and the invention of the steam-engine, for which we are also thankful, as facilitating the evangelization of the world.

These remarks are almost equally applicable to a point on which Cardinal Wiseman dilates considerably, about the difficulty of making translations of the Bible. "Look," he says, "at any modern version, such as that authorized in these realms. Read the account of how often it was corrected, what combinations of able and learned men it required to bring it to any tolerable degree of accuracy. Its worth, after all, as a rule, must depend upon the skill and fitness of individuals for the task of translating; and can we reasonably suppose that the providence of God would stake the whole usefulness and value of his rule upon the private or particular abilities of man?"¹ But the Cardinal mis-states the whole case. Most readers may derive their knowledge of the Bible from translations; but this is not necessarily the case, and no one maintains that any translation is in itself the Rule of Faith,—the nearest approach to this being on the part of the Council of Trent, in its famous decree regarding the Vulgate, when, in so far as the Church of Rome acknowledges the written word to be a part of its Rule of Faith, that Council exalted the Vulgate to the place of authority. Should any man think that he has reason to suspect a translation of misleading him in any point of doctrine, he may acquire the ability of satisfying himself by examination of the original, at no greater expense of time and labour than is very often bestowed, and even by persons who live by the labour of their hands, upon things of very inferior importance, and which certainly no man ought to think too great, when it concerned the

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 45.

salvation of his soul. But the truth is, that a man may satisfy himself, though not of the critical accuracy with which every verse or clause is rendered, yet of the general correctness of a translation, without knowing the original language himself, by an examination of evidence similar to that which suffices to ascertain the genuineness of a document,—evidence of a kind which we have seen that Cardinal Wiseman represents as forming the very foundation of the argument for establishment of the Church's authority in matters of faith, and which therefore even a peasant must weigh before he can come to an intelligent acknowledgment of that authority. And all this is irrespective of the baptism of the Spirit, and the evidence which a man finds in his own soul's experience to assure him that his translated Bible does indeed exhibit to him the sincere word of God.

Mr Keenan exerts himself to prove that even Protestants do not adhere to their own Rule of Faith,—and this he seems to think a most conclusive argument against it. But what are his proofs? Instances of the contrariety of Protestant doctrine to Scripture; of which therefore he either calls us to judge for ourselves now when he places them before us, which is surely to admit and act upon our Protestant claim of private judgment,—or he requires us to believe that the Protestant doctrine is contrary to Scripture on the strength of his Church's authoritative interpretation, which were a monstrous way of arguing in favour of the Church and its right so to interpret. As for the instances themselves, it were too tedious to consider them individually, and would lead us back again to subjects pertaining to the very first chapter of this volume. It seems sufficient to notice that his first instance is the Protestant doctrine, which he gives in the words of the Westminster Assembly's Catechism, that "no mere man, since the fall, is able perfectly to keep the commandments of God,"—that his second instance is the doctrine "that faith alone justifies the sinner,"—and that this third instance is the doctrine which he states for Protestants in the words, "that good works are not at all necessary to salvation." I shall not follow him even to the statement of his other instances, relating

to such points as assurance, penitential works, the purity and visibility of the Church, the intelligibility and sufficiency of Scripture, transubstantiation, and confession!¹ The authority of the Church is proved in fact from those very things which the authority of the Church is most required to prove. The manner in which Scripture proofs are used invites attention. Every point is summarily established. For example, that the Church can never fall into error, nor corrupt the purity of the doctrine of Christ, is made out in a moment by a few texts, of which the first is, "Upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall never prevail against it,"—a text sufficiently remote from the matter in hand, and which being made to apply to it, is also conveniently supposed to relate to the Church of Rome.

It may be worth while to notice here the argument from the word *traditions* as used in Scripture. It is one very frequently advanced by Papists. Mr Keenan proves the Protestant doctrine, that Scripture contains the whole revealed will of God, to be contrary to Scripture itself, by the words of Paul, 2 Thess. ii. 14, "Therefore, brethren, stand fast, and hold the *traditions* which you have been *taught*, whether by *word*, or our epistle." But *tradition* here has not the same meaning as when now used in the Church of Rome, and this argument is therefore nothing but one of the meanest tricks of sophistry. The Apostle wished the Thessalonians to hold fast the things which he had preached to them, as well as what he had written in an epistle. These he calls traditions,—*παράδοσις*—things delivered to them. And what foundation does this give for traditions handed down through a succession of ages?

Cardinal Wiseman favours us with an examination of some texts of Scripture, which he says, are "often quoted for the purpose of demonstrating *that the New Testament is the Rule of Faith*." What sect of Protestants ever held this particular view of the Rule of Faith, I know not; but it is very essential to the

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sects. 7, 8.

cogency of some of the Cardinal's arguments concerning the texts in question. For example, when he deals with John v. 39, "Search the Scriptures," &c., he insists much upon the reference of these words to the books of the Old Testament,—forgetting that if the books of the New Testament are admitted to be now warrantably included in the same distinctive designation, the text establishes a principle which must have the same relation to them as to the other. He has another and more curious argument here. "Because the Jews were told to search the *Old Testament* for the discovery of *one* specific truth, it is concluded," he says, "that Christians must search the *New* and will find in it *all* truth."¹ For, according to him, our Lord "does not say that the Scriptures are *sufficient* to salvation—that they contain the whole truth—but only that they bear testimony of him." Has he considered the importance of this *one point*, as he terms it? Or how is he to make out that if the Jews were entitled to search their Scriptures,—which, it seems, was possible for them before the invention of printing,—Christians are not to be entitled to search their Scriptures also? For surely if they were to search even as to this one point, they were entitled to read the Scriptures without any special license from any priestly *director*. But a still more curious argument concerning this text remains still to be noticed. Dr Wiseman "cannot avoid being struck with a portion of the sentence not often quoted. Christ says, 'Search the Scriptures, for in them *ye think* ye have eternal life.' These words," says the Cardinal, "sound to me like anything but approbation of the principle." He would "almost venture to assert, that throughout the gospels, the verb here used, when applied out of a question, is only expressive of an ungrounded opinion; in other words, that wherever any doctrine or proposition is referred to the opinions or thinkings of any one, the expression implies disapprobation." And he brings forward instances, and contrasts the use of *Ye think* with that of *Ye know*. "This invariable consistency of expres-

¹ Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, I., 310

sion, when the opinion is approved or disapproved," he then says, "seems to me to leave not the slightest doubt that our Redeemer did not approve of that almost superstitious feeling of the Jews, renewed in our times, that the possession of the word of God alone is sufficient to save." It is a strange *argumentum ad hominem* which he therefore concludes by representing our Saviour as using. But without dwelling upon this, let us rather attend to his criticism on *Ye think*. Cardinal Wiseman is known to be a scholar; but it is not an uncommon thing for the criticisms of a minute scholarship to be conducted in utter disregard of the philosophy of language, or indeed of reason and common sense,—and citations are industriously brought together without the slightest reference to the principles which really regulate the use of the word or phrase under consideration. What indeed can be more ridiculous than the limitation, in the case before us, to the use of the word in the gospels? Let us take an instance which readily presents itself, of the use of the same word in another part of Scripture. Gal. ii. 6. "But of those who *seemed* to be somewhat." The Greek word is *δοκουντων*, the same that is used in the place under consideration, *ὅτι ὑμεῖς δοκεῖτε ἐν αὐταῖς ζωὴν αἰώνιον εἶναι*, although a different English word is employed by our translators. Again, in the same passage, Gal. ii. 9, "James, Cephas, and John, who *seemed* (*δοκουντων*) to be pillars;" Surely James, Peter, and John were pillars, as they seemed or were thought to be. An *argumentum ad hominem* concerning Peter, is scarcely requisite.

We may proceed to another text, "the second and the strongest text," from which Cardinal Wiseman undertakes to dislodge all Protestants. It is 2 Tim. iii. 14–17. "But continue thou in the things which thou hast learned, and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them; and that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly

furnished unto all good works." Here again the Cardinal insists as before, that the text relates only to the Old Testament. And the reply is as before. The commendation of Timothy for knowing the Holy Scriptures from his childhood, suggests also an obvious inference; and the assertion regarding *all Scripture* is perfectly general. But, says Cardinal Wiseman, "it is manifest that St Paul, when here speaking of the Scriptures, does not teach that they should be individually read and used by all the faithful, but speaks only of their use for the pastors of the Church,"¹—that is, in the words of Dr Doyle, the Scripture is "useful to the doctor that he may teach by it,—to the pastor, that he may reprove and instruct by it,—to all, that they may, each in his proper station, be instructed by it unto righteousness."² Yet it is surely not so very manifest that Paul in this passage does not mean quite another thing, namely, that all Scripture is profitable to the reader of it to teach him, to reprove and correct him, and to instruct him unto righteousness. This is at least as simple and natural an interpretation, and I know not how the other can be said to be manifest. True, Timothy was a pastor; yet on the other hand he is said to have known the Holy Scriptures from his childhood. And Cardinal Wiseman will certainly not allege that a desire to read or know the Holy Scriptures is a distinctive mark of the childhood of the future pastor or priest. Nay, he has given us his own authority for a very different opinion. "The young ecclesiastic manifests his vocation by a love of altars and church ornaments, and a voluntary initiation in the functions of the ministry"!!³

But the Cardinal has still another argument for the better disposing of this text. *All Scripture* is only said to be *profitable*, it is not said to be *sufficient*. And is not this, he asks in triumph, the very thing we say? But the Apostle does not say it is *not sufficient*, and that makes a difference.—But, demands the Cardinal again, "Do we not teach, that the Scripture is

¹ Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, I., 312.

² Letters of J. K. L., 217.

³ Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 61.

most profitable, most useful, and most conducive to every thing good: that it should be studied and practised as the guide and rule of our lives?" Studied by whom? we may demand in return. For at all events, no man is to read it in his own tongue without a license; and if the Papists of Britain have a general license they are indebted for it to the Protestantism around them. But when eloquence waxes a little warm, its words are not to be tried by cold rules nor taken in their strictest meaning.

Finally, a third Protestant proof-text is examined. It is the commendation of the Bereans: Acts xvii. 11. The examination of this text is introduced by one of the most contemptible of petty criticisms. Instead of "These were more noble than those of Thessalonica, *in that* they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily whether those things were so,"—the erudite Cardinal would read, according to the original text and ancient versions, "These were more noble . . . *who* received the word," &c., and he gravely says,— "Their being more noble is not proved, as the English version intimates, by their searching the Scriptures."¹ But giving him his own translation, as more verbally exact, I find no difference in the meaning of the sentence. For the connection betwixt the two clauses is manifest from the general structure; and that the Bereans were more noble than those of Thessalonica having first been asserted, is next demonstrated in the contrast of their conduct.—But of course, as before, the Scriptures alluded to are "only those of the Old Testament,"—which, of course, a Protestant admits; and, indeed, he never would think of looking to this text for proof that the New Testament is inspired Scripture, but finding from other evidence that it is so, he looks here to the commendation of the Bereans for searching *their* Scriptures and exercising their private judgment, and claims for himself the like right and privilege. But you are quite mistaken, replies his Popish antagonist. These Jews could do nothing better. "In the name of wonder, I would ask," says Doctor Doyle,

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 313, 314.

'what were these people at Berea to do if they were not to prove the doctrine of the men who came to preach to them a new religion by the only test in their power, and that a test to which the preachers themselves appealed?'¹ Dr Wiseman uses the same argument, although not in the name of wonder.

"The Apostles speaking to the Jews naturally appealed, . . . &c. Their hearers naturally and most justly verified their quotations, and satisfied themselves of their correct application. But surely when once convinced by these means that those who addressed them were sent by God, this task was at an end; and nothing remained but to submit with docility to their teaching."²

This seems pretty much like saying that the searching of the Scriptures is a thing for unbelievers rather than for believers: and that we are not to feel with regard to the *written word*, at least the New Testament part of it, like David when he said "O how love I thy law! it is my meditation all the day."³ And the text must have become a dead letter now in which the same Psalmist proclaims the blessedness of the man whose delight is in the law of the Lord, and who meditateth in his law day and night!⁴ It is a strange fancy, if even Cardinal Wiseman entertains it, that the Bereans having come to recognise the Apostles as teachers sent from God, and having found their teaching in accordance with the ancient Scriptures, should have ceased from their *task* and not have proceeded to search the Scriptures more and more by the help of the new light which they had now acquired, comparing the former revelation with that now made, prophecies with their fulfilment, types with their antitypes, enjoying the solution of difficulties which they had previously felt, and delighting in their fuller comprehension of many a familiar portion of the word of God.

But it is time that the discussion of this part of the subject were brought to a close. And it shall be done by the exhibition of another argument from Mr Keenan, the purport of which and

¹ Letters of J. K. L., 214.

² Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 314.

³ Psalm cxix. 97.

⁴ Psalm i. 2.

the spirit in which it is conceived will probably be well understood from the following question :—

“If the Bible as privately interpreted were our only tribunal of appeal, would not God have acted like an unwise legislator who would make every man his own judge in matters of law?”¹

The irreverence, not to say the impiety, of these words must strike every reader whose soul has not been drugged and deadened by Popery. Bad as they are, their author has found it possible, at least in one instance, to express himself even worse, when he says, concerning the Protestant doctrine of man's inability perfectly to keep the commandments of God, that “a wise God” could not give to his children commandments that he knew they were unable to observe, “for even a master who would order his slave to carry a burden beyond his strength would be reputed A FOOL.” But as to the argument just introduced to notice, and which may be found also in more decent language somewhere in Wiseman's Lectures, the attempted analogy fails, on which the whole argument is based. We are told that we must not only have a divine code of laws, but divinely appointed interpreters and judges of these laws, otherwise every man becomes his own judge. But God himself is judge, and will bring every man to account,—and, meanwhile, every man must act on his own interpretation of the law and on his own responsibility; just as under human laws, indeed, according to the suggested analogy more truly brought out,—men must act upon their own interpretation and responsibility till they come before the judgment seat, where the decision is final.

It will be borne in mind that the Popish Rule of Faith is “all truly inspired Scripture and all divine tradition, interpreted by the teaching body of the Church,” and that this “teaching body” is held to be infallible.² Nothing can be more obvious than that the teaching body thus comes to have the Rule of Faith in its own power, and with it the faith of the trusting and

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. v., sect. 3.

² Ibid., ch. vi., sect. 3.

dependent Church, and that the infallibility would need not only to be sure as it respects the minds of those who compose this teaching body, but as it respects the utterance of their minds—in fact, that we need not merely to be sure of provision made by God for keeping them intellectually right, but also for keeping them morally right, lest through depravity and to serve some wicked purpose of worldly interest they should combine to falsify their oracular verdict. And, perhaps, the more it is considered the more serious will this consideration appear. For “the teaching body of the Church, taken collectively with the Chief Pastor at their head,”¹ as Mr Keenan expresses it, meaning by the Chief Pastor the Pope, must be, in point of moral character, pretty much according to the character of the generality of the individuals who compose it. And this has not always been rated very high, even by the members of the Church of Rome, nor have the Chief Pastors themselves been free from the reproach of scandalous lives and atrocious crimes.

As for Scripture, it is plain enough that it holds a very subordinate place in the Popish Rule of Faith. For if the priesthood may be allowed to put what meaning upon it they please, it matters little what the text is: and the difference of a few books more or less would be of little consequence, unless there were persons in the world who hesitated about the Rule of Faith, and doubted the infallibility. And upon what do we depend for our certainty that any tradition is “divine?” It cannot attest itself, but is attested by the “teaching body of the Church,”—who, if they can manage to mould and shape at will even the solid text of Scripture, may be supposed to have but easy work with material so loose and pliant as tradition.

The utmost consequences which we can deduce from the statement of the Popish Rule of Faith as to the power of an unprincipled priesthood, Mr Keenan himself asserts in strong terms; only he takes for granted that the priesthood are not unprincipled, and that the greatest confidence may safely be placed in

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sect. 3.

their upright and faithful dealing with their mighty trust—a thing which would need some proof. “Now,” he says, “if this great fundamental truth be clearly laid down in Scripture, *then Catholics will be quite safe in following the teaching of their pastors*, THEN THE TEACHING BODY WILL BE TO THE TAUGHT AN INFALLIBLE RULE OF FAITH. Mark well, we do not maintain that the pastors of the Church are of themselves infallible, but that God has made them so, for the benefit of his people, and that Christ himself teaches by their lips.”¹

Yes, reader! Mark well the humility of these Popish priests. They call upon you to consider that they did not make themselves infallible, that they do not possess this quality except as a gift from God. They would not have us to think that they are absolutely gods. But as to the matter now in hand, what Protestant could use stronger language in holding up the claims of the Popish priesthood to reprobation, and endeavouring to shew them in their most monstrous aspect, than Mr Keenan has employed in commending them to our most favourable regard?

The assumption is therefore made that the teaching of the priesthood is the teaching of God himself; and “of course God himself can neither deceive nor be deceived,”² says Mr Keenan, as if this settled the matter, and we had to do with God alone. The Popish Rule of Faith—resolving itself as we have just seen, into the teaching body of the Church—is, we are told, “a rule for all, the learned as well as the ignorant; it relieves the former of all doubt and uncertainty, and spares the latter the trouble of a difficult inquiry and examination, for which they are in no way qualified.”³

How compassionately these gentlemen speak of the ignorant, and what a benevolent disposition they shew, in being so willing to undertake all the trouble of thinking for them, and indeed for the learned also! They “will be quite safe in following the teaching of their pastors.” And this Rule of Faith, Mr Keenan tells us, has these three peculiar advantages: “it banishes all

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sect. 3.

² Ibid., sect. 1.

³ Ibid.

doubt,” “it decides finally every dispute,” “it preserves unity.” He might rather have said, it coerces the human mind to inaction and deadens all the faculties; it reduces its poor victims to a degradation beneath that of slaves who are bought and sold in market-places; it hands them over, soul and body, to their priests.

But Mr Keenan, remembering that he writes a controversial book, and has to deal with Protestants who will not renounce the right of thinking, proceeds to adduce Scripture proofs in favour of his Rule of Faith. The power of thinking must indeed be well nigh gone before such proofs will be accepted. First, we have an attempt to prove the authority of tradition. “We believe that what Christ or his Apostles *spoke* is as true as what they *wrote*.”¹ But this is nothing to the purpose. It is the transmission from person to person and from age to age which alone is in question. Then follow other texts, one of which has been already noticed, where the word *tradition* is used. As to all of them, it is only necessary to consider the meaning of the word and the state of the question, which is not about the truth or authority of what was spoken by Christ or his Apostles, but about the authoritative transmission of it from one to another indefinitely and throughout all generations.

And here occurs a most perfect instance of the ridiculous, though in connection with a glorious subject,—an instance with which, as it is illustrative of the learning of the Popish priests who are amongst us, and their knowledge of the meaning and doctrines of Scripture, the present dry discussion may be enlivened. Mr Keenan, labouring to prove the authority of tradition, says, “In 2 Cor. iii. 3, it is said, ‘You are the Epistle of Christ, *not written with ink*, but with the spirit of the living God.’ Here, what is not *written*, is called the *Epistle* of Christ, written with the spirit of the living God upon the heart, which, though only tradition, must certainly be as true as the written word itself.”² This needs no comment.

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sec. 2.

² Ibid.

It is not my purpose to discuss the authority of tradition. I can only exhibit some of the grossest features of the Popish doctrine, and some of the grossest absurdities of the current Popish arguments. I shall not therefore attempt to shew by any process of reasoning, or any induction of particulars, what has been often shewn,—how vain is the appeal to the *uniform and universal testimony of Christian antiquity*,¹ for evidence of the truth of any tradition, and how far that testimony is from being uniform and universal on any point. Nor shall I do more than refer to the important distinction—which Papists generally overlook—between tradition and Scripture; where in the one case, we have only the *doctrines* alleged to be in this manner handed down to us from the earliest ages, and to come to us with the authority of Christ himself,—and in the other case we have not only the doctrines, but the very *words* which we may ponder and examine, as those did to whom they originally came. The sophistry of much Popish argument on the subject of tradition may be detected by adverting to this simple distinction.

It may be interesting to consider a few of the texts which are quoted in support of the infallibility of the Church,—the very point, however, it may be again remarked, concerning which an argument from Scripture is most inadmissible, as necessarily founded upon the assumption of a right of private judgment; whilst on the other hand, the interpretation given of the texts which are adduced, and the whole mode of arguing from them would need all the support of a previously acknowledged infallibility. An illustration or two must suffice. But I doubt not that the reader will find them to be curious.

Mr Keenan's first proof text is Isaiah ii. 3.

"In Isaiah ii. 3, Christ is represented as teaching the Church; 'He will teach us his ways, and we shall walk in his paths.' That Church must be infallible in its teaching, which has Christ for its director, and whose children walk in the paths of the Saviour."²

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sect. 2.

² Ibid., sect. 3.

It is obvious enough that in this text, the Church is taught to depend upon the infallible teaching of Christ; but it does not appear how the Church or the priesthood should therefore be held infallible. Every good man is taught by Christ, and walks in his paths; but every good man is not therefore infallible. The text and the argument have evidently just the same bearing on the Church and on an individual Christian.

In like manner it is, that texts which proclaim the privileges of the Church, and the blessedness especially of her best and still future ages, are seized, and dragged into service, in proof of the alleged infallibility. Throughout page after page, Mr Keenan prosecutes this mode of argument, finding a "strong text" in one place, and a "brilliant testimony" in another, and manifesting all the while an extreme anxiety to apply the doctrine of the Church's infallibility,—where, no doubt, he must be sensible it is much needed,—for the vindication of the Church of Rome from the charge of idolatry. For example, commenting on the text, Ps. cxxxii. 13, "Our Lord hath chosen Zion; he hath chosen it for an habitation to himself: this is my rest for ever and ever; here will I dwell, because I have chosen it," he says,—

"It must be manifest that the Church of Christ is pure and free from error, for were she the mother and mistress of idolatry, the pure God of heaven would never have chosen her for his dwelling-place."¹

It is easy to deal with this argument in a way already adopted, by pointing out the error in the statement of it; for no Protestant holds the Church of Christ to be the mother and mistress of idolatry,—nor can the Popish controversialist be allowed, however convenient it might be, to assume as he goes along, that his Church is *the Church of Christ*, and to translate an assertion of the total apostasy of Rome into an assertion of the total defection of the Church which God has chosen for his dwelling-place.

It is easy also to deal with it just as with the argument last

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sect. 3.

quoted,—to try it by its application to the individual believer. For it is as applicable to the individual as to the Church. God has chosen the believer for himself,—and according to his unerring word, every believer is a temple of the Holy Ghost. With him God dwells. Is it therefore manifest that the believer is pure and free from error? God's grace to his Church corresponds with his grace to her individual members.

In connection with these arguments Mr Keenan indulges in the following utterance of triumph:—

“According to these texts, either the Church is perpetual, pure, and infallible, or God is a false prophet.”¹

No excuse can be pleaded for such hateful irreverence.

Of course, when proof-texts are to be had so readily, we are favoured with them in large number from the New Testament as well as the Old. Matt. xviii. 17, is one of those in most constant use. It is thus that Mr Keenan adduces it, and sets forth his argument from it.

“What do you observe on Matt. xviii. 17, ‘If he will not hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen and a publican?’

“We ask, could a good God, who came to teach truth, and to save men by the belief of truth, give such a command as this, if the Church, which he appointed to teach, were an idolatrous Church . . . ?”²

And so he runs on, expatiating upon this theme, and varying or repeating without variation this one argument, as if his whole soul were possessed with the single idea.

“Suppose, for a moment, that Church teaching even one error, does not Christ in the above text command all to believe *that error* under pain of being as heathens and publicans, for whom is no salvation?”³

And then he indulges himself in a few outcries against the blasphemy of the Protestant supposition. One look into the Bible,—one thought of the context, and the whole argument vanishes: an irrepressible indignation arising because of its employment. For the text has manifestly nothing to do with

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sect. 3. ² Ibid., sect. 4. ³ Ibid.

doctrines, or the teaching of truth or error, but merely relates to quarrels amongst brethren, and offences given by one Christian to another. “Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church: but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.”¹

What must that cause be which its defenders combine to defend by arguments like this? What are we to think of a claim of infallibility resting on such palpable errors?

It is needless to examine in succession all Mr Keenan's arguments from “strong passages.” The peculiarity of his style may again for a moment detain us when he says, “either she [the Church] cannot fail, or Christ is only a false and impotent prophet.”² In the use of such expressions he excels, and varies them in a way that adds to their repulsiveness.

His argument from Matt. xxviii. 18–20³ is, however, worthy of especial notice.

“Now, he [Christ] says he has all power, therefore he *can* make his teachers *infallible*. He, the God of truth, sends them to teach all nations, and surely he does not send them to *teach error*. *He will be with them*, he says, all days, and beyond all doubt he will be with them to preserve them at all times from teaching even the smallest error, for he could not be with an idolatrous Church. Hence, as *Christ himself* is the *guide* of the Church, and this in *every age*, she can obviously teach no error; hence she is infallible.”⁴

Here, even at the risk of tediousness, a few observations must

¹ Matt. xviii. 15–17.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vi., sect. 4.

³ “And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, [*all days*, Rhem. Test.,] even unto the end of the world.”

⁴ Keenan, *ut supra*.

be made. In the first place, we have an argument commenced from our Lord's omnipotence. He *can* make his teachers infallible. But this argument stops short immediately. We are left indeed to fill up the blank with the conclusion, *He will*; but Mr Keenan shews us no good reason for so doing. The power of Christ being admitted, we must have some evidence of his will so to exert his power.—In the second place, we have an argument framed in the lowest style of sophistry, "Surely he will not send them to teach error." For the question is not about what they are sent to teach, but about their fulfilment of their commission, their actual teaching. The argument, as framed by Mr Keenan, derives a sort of speciousness, probably, in the eyes of Papists, from their notions about the insufficiency of the Scriptures, unless supplemented by the Church's teaching, as a Rule of Faith. But this is to look for proof to the very thing which is to be proved.—In the third place, it must be remarked that the whole of these arguments, whatever their value, evidently relate as much to any individual teacher sent by Christ as to the whole teaching body of the Church. Hence they prove too much. Even Mr Keenan only professes to maintain the infallibility of his Church, but does not venture to assert his own personal infallibility.—It is perhaps scarcely worth while to notice, in the fourth place, the absurdity of the argument, that because Christ cannot be with an idolatrous Church—which may be admitted—therefore the teachers of his Church must be preserved "at all times from teaching even the smallest error," as if there were nothing between even the smallest error and the dark abyss of idolatry,—as if because the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church of Christ, therefore she could never suffer even any temporary or partial disaster from the power of all her enemies.

This text affords Cardinal Wiseman also one of his principal arguments.¹ But he expands it through ten pages; and if so much space has been requisite to point out the fallacies and

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 101-111.

errors which Mr Keenan has contrived to condense into a single paragraph, it may be supposed that something like a volume would be necessary for a close examination of the course pursued by the Cardinal in dealing with the same subject. But perhaps it may be possible to exhibit the substance of his argument more briefly. He bestows much attention upon the meaning of the expression "I am with you;" inquiring "what is the meaning in Scripture of God's being with any person," and concluding that "it signifies a more special providence in regard to that individual than is manifested towards others—a particular watchfulness on the part of God over his interests, in such a way, that what he undertakes shall infallibly succeed." And to this he recurs, after further investigations as to the meaning of other terms.

"Whenever a commission is given by God to accomplish what appears impossible by human means, he guarantees its complete success and perfect execution, by adding the words, 'I am with thee.' And if so, we have a right to conclude, that in the text under examination, Christ by the same words promised to his apostles, and to their successors, till the end of the world, such care, such a scheme of especial providence, as might be necessary and sufficient to secure the full accomplishment of the commission given them."

No fault can be found with this; and it is one of the peculiar dangers which attend this author's mode of conducting an argument, that he can carry along his reader or hearer through many steps of sound and correct reasoning, more or less remotely connected with the subject, and then suddenly assume the very point most requiring to be proved, when the mind that had begun by examining the first steps with care is now more easily satisfied, perhaps partly fatigued, and in some measure off its guard. In the present case, the assumption is made that the teaching body in the Church have no help but that of their mere memories in order to their retaining with accuracy whatever Christ has commanded them, except in so far as he aids them in fulfilment of his promise to be with them; the possibility that anything might be committed to writing, and especially of inspired Scriptures, never seeming to have been thought of.

“And further, what are the things to be taught? ‘*To observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you!*’ How can they, dull, illiterate men; how still less can their successors, in remote countries and ages, hope to retain with accuracy, or to teach with unfailing authority, *all and every thing* which our Lord has taught?”¹

Certainly, but for the inspired *Scriptures* the successors of the Apostles would have needed inspiration as much as the Apostles themselves. But if we do not *take for granted* the existence of traditions equally authoritative with Scripture, it must be evident that the existence of the New Testament Scriptures makes a great difference in the case; and thus we cannot but be led to a view of the matter very much at variance with an immediate conclusion, that in this commission to “the Apostles and their successors” our Lord has instituted “an order of men,” to whom he “has given security that they shall be faithful depositaries of his truths.” It may well be said that in the promise which accompanies the commission we have a guarantee for its complete success and perfect execution; but Cardinal Wiseman seems not to be aware that there is a wide difference betwixt saying this, and saying that the discharge of their duty is insured to be always perfect on the part of those to whom the commission is addressed. However, having first inferred from this text the institution of an order of men who are to be faithful depositaries of Christ’s truths, he proceeds to infer further, that Christ establishes his own permanent teaching in the Church, so as to prevent all error from entering in,—and proclaims that the Church “is gifted with an exemption from all liability to err, and has authority to claim from all men and from all nations submission to her guidance and instruction.”²

One of Cardinal Wiseman’s instances brought forward to establish the meaning in Scripture of “God’s being with any person” is the declaration that the Lord was with Joseph.³ He speaks of “the peculiar providential care which watched over the innocent Joseph, and made him ever successful.”⁴ The instance is appropriate enough. But when we observe the fact

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 109.

² Ibid., 110.

³ Gen. xxxix. 3 and 23.

⁴ Wiseman, Lect. on Prin. Doct., I., 110.

of Joseph’s success and prosperity, why should we omit to observe the adverse incidents of his life, which were not inconsiderable? If we might argue as Cardinal Wiseman does, from our Lord’s promise to be with his disciples, much more might it be argued from these statements regarding Joseph that any adverse incident was impossible to him. On the same principles also, the promise of God to bring the Israelites into the land of Canaan might be shewn to have secured them from the commission of the sins which they committed in the wilderness, and from the judgments which therefore came upon them. Yet it is said that the Lord was with them all the while.¹ It were easy to point out many similar consequences from the interpretation of this phrase in the way in which Cardinal Wiseman interprets it. Yet this erroneous extremeness of interpretation does not so much appear when he states the interpretation of the phrase in general, but rather—where the fallacy of its introduction was more likely to be successful—when he comes to deal with the particular case in which its occurrence is so important.

Another favourite proof of the Church’s infallibility, and upon which Cardinal Wiseman insists, is derived from Matt. xvi. 18, “Upon this rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Allusion has been made to it already, and the reply to the argument for infallibility has been sufficiently indicated.² The other use made of this text to demonstrate the supremacy of Peter and to lay a foundation for the Popedom, I must refrain from entering upon. But it would seem as if the infallibility were a consequence of the “foundation upon Peter;” for Cardinal Wiseman says that “this sentence evidently implies that the Church is imperishable, *in consequence* of this foundation upon Peter, because the connexion between the two ideas of a firm foundation and a durable building is so close and natural that the usages of language oblige us to consider them as brought together only in consequence of that connexion.”³ He can scarcely have been aware how naturally

¹ See, for example, Deut. ii. 7.

² See p. 492.

³ Wiseman, Lectures on Principal Doctrines, I., 269.

his words were calculated to suggest an argument against his mode of interpreting the text. For he almost requires us to consider which may be the best foundation to build on, Christ or Peter,—which the surest and safest rock.

It were tedious beyond all endurance to examine in detail all the arguments which Papists profess to found upon texts of Scripture, in favour of the infallibility of the Church. It is enough to have seen of what nature they are by considering a few of the principal ones.

But here arises a very important question, to the discussion of which a whole section of the Controversial Catechism is devoted. The question is one which very naturally presents itself to the inquiring mind, and to which we cannot but be curious to know what reply the advocates of Popery make. Mr Keenan states it in the following words, in which he begins by paying himself or his Church a very unmerited compliment. "May not some reasoning Protestant here say, You have given a very plausible interpretation of these passages of Scripture in favour of the infallibility of the Church of Christ, but how are we to know that yours is the true interpretation,—that these texts mean exactly what you say?"¹

Nothing could be more to the purpose than this question. But the author of the Controversial Catechism does not immediately hasten to answer it. Having supposed that the "reasoning Protestant" spoke in laudatory language to him, he feels himself under a necessity of returning the compliment. "Here we have a sensible person to deal with," he begins; and then he dilates, in what we are to understand is a very pious strain, upon the necessity of asking grace and enlightenment, so that "the thick mist of long-fostered prejudice," "the effects of early education," may be removed,—a point upon which it is very common for Popish writers to shew great anxiety. And then, at last, he brings forth his strong reasons. Some of them, perhaps, the reader, whose mind is not duly prepared by all these

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vi., sect. 5.

compliments, is surprised to find that he has heard already; and for satisfaction on a point seemingly really difficult, he must be contented with trite reiterations and confident assertions. But let us glance at the reasons as they begin to be produced.

"First," says Mr Keenan, "*the following rule of criticism has been universally received: 'Every explanation must be clearer than the thing explained.'*"—And how does he proceed to apply this? By quoting again a few of the texts from which he has already endeavoured to extort proofs of the Church's, that is, the priesthood's infallibility: and then exclaiming, "Now what interpretation can be so clear as that which I gave these texts, that the Church of which they are spoken must be free from error?"¹ And for further confirmation of this ingenious argument he ties up a few more of his proof texts in another bundle, and breaks out into another similar exclamation. This is after the texts have been already adduced, and is in order to remove a difficulty *still remaining*!!

Mr Keenan finds his next reason in "the almost unanimous testimony and collective judgment of all ages, of all nations, of all Christian people." This is an argument already familiar—an old acquaintance and with the old dress. In referring to *all Christian people*, it may be questioned whether Mr Keenan is not guilty of the subterfuge of restricting the term to members of the Church of Rome, whilst it is impossible to suppose that he meant his Protestant readers so to understand him.

I shall not follow him through all his reasons. But the *fifth* deserves notice for a peculiarity which I shall not characterize. "That mode of interpretation is true which was adopted during the first five centuries, during which period even Protestants admit that the Church was pure and free from error."² The reader might suppose that *all Protestants* were here meant, or *Protestants in general*: whereas Mr Keenan can only mean *some* Protestants, and these only a few, who are neither very worthy nor very fond of the name.

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vi., sect. 5.

² Ibid.

But the Papist is not dependent upon texts of Scripture for proof of Infallibility. He has an argument from reason, which, according to Mr Keenan, is sufficient of itself. "So that in this overthrowing of its own authority, as in everything else, Scripture may be dispensed with,—a method which, however, is not more consistent than that upon which Cardinal Wiseman rests his dependence; for Scripture is brought in merely to cast itself out again, and Reason is called upon, only in order to the like purpose of self-destruction. It has been well said, that "it is certainly a very surprising thing for a Protestant to be disputed into Popery; for as soon as he is converted he must renounce the very means of his conversion; he must use his own judgment to turn Papist, and as soon as he is turned, he must renounce his own judgment and confess it to be of no authority." ¹

Mr Keenan, indeed, speaks of Reason as the handmaid of Scripture, but this is a mere unmeaning compliment,—a form of words such as the author probably thought Protestant ears might relish, and which could not do any harm.

Does reason, which is the handmaid of Scripture, speak out clearly in favour of infallibility?

Yes; very clearly and decidedly.

What does reason tell us of a fallible Church?

That, as such a Church may *teach error*, it is evidently unworthy of a good and merciful God." ²

It is distressing to read such things,—though the mere arrogance and absurdity would be amusing were it not for the serious considerations involved, which check the propensity to mirth. It is impossible not to think of the poor weak mortals upon whom the very confidence of assertion has imposed. It is impossible not to think of the reflection upon the goodness and mercy of God, and the impression necessarily left with those, who, without seeing their way through all the mists which hung around them, have yet discovered and cannot help believing, that the Church of Rome has taught error, and who therefore detest and deride

¹ Sherlock, Preservative against Popery.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vi., sect. 6.

her presumptuous claim. But the eager Papist seems incapable of taking into account the reflex action of his arguments in favour of infidelity; and accordingly Mr Keenan further insists that the idea of a fallible Church militates against the goodness and wisdom of God, "because a good God who has been so solicitous to save us, could not surely commit us to the blind guidance of mere human reason or opinion; nor could such an uncertain mean for our safety be devised by an all-wise Being." ¹ This is very like a prescribing to God: here at least we have the human mind venturing to scan and measure infinite wisdom; man's reason exalting itself upon a pinnacle where it may pronounce with confidence concerning what would or would not have been a wise proceeding on the part of God! And all this in order only to cast itself down again,—to abase itself before the infallible Church and submit to act no more!

It is not "a *fallible Church* which may teach error," which Protestants have for their guide, but inspired Scripture, the *infallible* word of God. But Mr Keenan recollects something of this, and accordingly we read, by and bye, that "the Scripture, privately interpreted, is made to teach every absurdity." ² Thus Scripture itself is made accountable for every error of interpretation which may be committed by a foolish, an uncandid, or a perverse and prejudiced mind. Yet there is considerable ingenuity in the attempt to prove that the infallibility of Scripture is not enough for us, and that without an infallible guide in the "teaching body" or priesthood of the Church, we must be left to wander amidst all the mists of error. "We admit," says Mr Keenan, "that Scripture is an infallible teacher, if your interpretation of it be infallibly right; but until you have it explained by an infallible interpreter, you must remain in doubt as to its true meaning; consequently, though in itself the Bible is infallible, with regard to you it is still a fallible rule, unless it be explained by an infallible interpreter; and an infallible interpreter supposes the existence of an infallible Church." ³

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vi., sect. 6.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

I think it very strange, that a man or set of men should come in between God and me, saying to me, "God has spoken, but we must also speak to you, or his speaking can avail you nothing,—you cannot understand him, but you can understand us."—I think it very strange that mortal men should come and say to me, "We can speak to you more intelligibly than God,"—or that they should pretend to reach the inward parts of their fellow-men, so that their words should not be liable to misconstruction and misapprehension, whilst misconstruction and misapprehension must always be to be dreaded in respect of the very words of God himself. And this is surely what Mr Keenan means, when he says, that "though in itself the Bible is infallible, yet with regard to you it is still a fallible rule, unless it be explained by an infallible interpreter." It seems fair to inquire not only how the infallibility is to be ascertained of the interpreter *in himself*, but also how his infallibility is to be ascertained *in regard to others*. It is not easy to see what security the Popish priesthood have to offer against mistakes of the meaning of their words, even although the revelation coming through their lips were admitted to be better in itself than that which came by prophets and Apostles, holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,—or although, which is the simpler way of stating it, their words were held to be better than the words of God, and more felicitously adapted to the expression of the intended meaning. If God speaks and yet a mistake of his meaning is possible on the part of the hearer, why may not the hearer still mistake though the speech come from the teaching body of the Church? If I cannot be sure of understanding the Apostle Paul, so that I may rest my faith upon his writings, how can I be sure of understanding Pope Pius IV., or the Council of Trent, or Nicholas Wiseman, or Stephen Keenan? After all, I may have been quite mistaken in supposing that Mr Keenan meant to teach the doctrine of the infallibility of the priesthood, though such was certainly my private interpretation of his sentences, and I have a similar private interpretation of a portion of Dr Wiseman's Lectures.

The decrees of the Council of Trent or the creed of Pope Pius IV. being put into the hands of a Papist, and accepted by him as the deliverance of the infallible teaching body, he requires of course the infallible teaching body *still* to teach him, so that error on his part may be infallibly prevented. Now, how is this to be done? or how is it pretended to be done? Mr Keenan does not profess to have inspiration himself, or to be himself personally infallible: neither does Cardinal Wiseman;—according to my private interpretation of their writings, they disclaim this:—it is the teaching body, collectively, that they hold to be infallible. Now, how is it to bring its infallibility to bear upon any human mind, or even upon any human ear? Mr Keenan speaks, but the collective teaching body is not present: it is only Mr Keenan. Or the Synod is met at Thurles: but still that Synod is only a fraction of the collective teaching body to which the infallibility belongs; and so the Synod is not infallible. And the members of the Church in general must still depend upon the teaching of their own priests in their own localities,—at Dundee, and elsewhere. So that Mr Keenan not being himself infallible, and therefore not able to give an infallible interpretation, either of the words, *This is my body*, or of the Council of Trent's decree respecting them, it might, upon his own principles as (apparently) they are laid down in his Catechism, be very reasonably doubted by any or all of his flock whether their Church ever taught any such doctrine as Transubstantiation, or whether it did not rather mean to teach that Mahomet is the prophet of God.

When Cardinal Wiseman says, that "by the idea of only one faith secured by an unerring authority," the *Catholic, i. e.*, Papist, "establishes the existence in religion of real *objective* truth, instead of the *subjective* in each one's mind," and "conceives the eye to be fixed on the correct prototype, rather than on the image broken and refracted and distorted through the imperfect medium of individual examination,"¹ he overlooks the necessity of an individual examination of all the deliverances of

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I, 79.

the unerring authority, and he overlooks the existence of *objective truth* in the inspired Scripture itself.

It is a terrible dilemma in which Mr Keenan tries to involve all Protestants :—

“Either you believe that you are *fallible* in the interpretation of Scripture, or you hold that you are *infallible*; if you say you are fallible, your faith is uncertain and vacillating, and consequently is not faith at all; but if you say you are infallible, then your absurd presumption drives you to assert, that the *whole Church* may err in her interpretation of Scripture, but that *you individually*, can interpret it with *infallible* certainty!!”¹

But it is rather himself that is involved in a dilemma. For how on his own principles can he be infallibly sure of the Church's infallibility, or of his interpretation of her infallible deliverances? His argument, moreover, is a mere play upon the word *fallible*. A man who makes no pretensions to infallibility, or to being above all possibility of the slightest error upon any point, may nevertheless be perfectly confident on some points, and his certainty on these points may be such, that, without the least fear, he can suspend upon it his salvation.

I have made so much use of Mr Keenan's Catechism, especially on this subject of infallibility, that it may be well to glance for a few moments at the arguments employed on the same subject by one of the most eminent Continental Popish authors of the day; lest any unfairness to the Popish cause should seem to be concealed in the somewhat exclusive reference to one or two writers,—one of whom, Mr Keenan, has been selected partly from motives of convenience, and partly because of the wide circulation of his Controversial Catechism,—the other, Cardinal Wiseman, because of the prominent position which he holds amongst the Papists of this country, and the anxiety with which he thrusts himself in a variety of ways before the eye of the British public. But passing over Milner, Challoner, Peter Dens, and others, let us turn to Perrone. In his *Praelectiones Theologicae* we have the arguments addressed to the students in the Jesuit College at Rome; and although they come before us with all the advantages

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. x., sect. 1.

of a respectable latinity and of a place in an elaborate work of two goodly volumes, yet when examined they are not less weak and ridiculous than those of any of the little books of the Catholic Book Society. One or two specimens must suffice.

His very first argument is from what he calls the absurdity of supposing that the Church can be fallible, and so can deceive men, seeing that the Church has been appointed by Christ to carry on in his stead [*imo et in ejus locum suffecta munus illud implere debet*] that work which he himself began, of enlightening the nations with the knowledge of the way of salvation,—or that Christ would confirm the divine mission of the Church by miracles, in order that it might thereby irresistibly lead men into error and false doctrine.¹ Here, first of all, it is assumed that the Church was appointed to come into the place of Christ in enlightening mankind,—which, if true, would certainly require on the part of the Church both the knowledge and the faithfulness which he himself possessed. But the notion—in the only form in which it is even seemingly to the purpose in this argument—is derogatory to the glory of Christ. It would make the Church to be the light of the world now, in a sense which would not admit of Christ himself as being *now* the light of the world. It allows nothing for the prophetic office of Christ in his present exaltation, nor for the work of the Holy Spirit in the saving enlightenment of men, except in so far as Christ and his Spirit may communicate light and knowledge to those (whoever they may be) in whom the infallibility resides. In the second place, it is assumed that the confirmation of preaching by miracles had a reference rather to the persons of the preachers, than to the matter of their preaching,—an assumption groundless and unreasonable in itself, and involving a necessity of more and more such assumptions in order to make out the bearing of the same confirmatory miracles upon the persons of those who are alleged to be the successors of these preachers. Yet, obviously, without this assumption as to the intention and

¹ Perrone, Praelect. Theol., II., 839.

meaning of the miracles referred to, the reference is of no avail for support of the doctrine of infallibility, as the miracles might be deemed a mere evidence of the truth of the particular doctrines in connection with the preaching of which they were wrought; which may be shewn by many Scripture proofs to have been their real intention and meaning,—for example, by the words of the Apostle Paul to the Galatians, when reproving them for their departure from the purity of the Gospel, in respect of the doctrine of justification, he says, “He, therefore, that ministereth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you, doth he it by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?”¹ And if these miracles were not intended to attest, and could not reasonably be understood to attest the infallibility even of the preachers of the gospel in the age in which they were wrought, much less can they be regarded as attesting the infallibility of any succession of men throughout all ages. And it would be requisite, in order to the reasonable employment of his argument, that the Jesuit professor should shew distinctly who they were whose persons and preaching the attestation by miracles in the first instance affected, a point which of itself would be found to be attended with many difficulties. I am aware, of course, that it may be said that the miracles of Christ himself had a bearing on his person, and not merely on the matter of his preaching. But why? Because the person of Christ was the very subject of his doctrine. This therefore does not affect the question before us. Nor would it be more to the purpose to point to the miracles wrought by the Apostles as bearing upon themselves personally in respect of their apostolical commission and authority. The nature of that commission and authority is not touched by any such argument, and it is as far as ever from appearing that the Apostles possessed infallibility. And it is to be borne in mind that their apostolical authority was claimed by them individually and personally, as may be very clearly seen in the Epistles of Paul, and did not belong to them merely in a collective capacity,—much less as members of a more

¹ Gal. iii. 5.

numerous teaching body. Moreover, miracles were wrought by many in the apostolic age as well as by the Apostles themselves.

I have dwelt longer on this argument than I intended, and perhaps than it deserved. After this, Perrone employs the usual arguments about the necessity of an ultimate and infallible judge for the settlement of controversies in the Church, and to prevent men from thinking and believing just as they like, [*unusquisque posset pro libitu sentire et credere*]. Then he goes on to say that the infallibility of the Church is no less necessary in respect of those who are without its pale than in respect of those who are within; for a Church destitute of infallibility would have no right to convert them, [*nullum enim infallibilitate destituta ecclesia ad eos convertendos jus haberet*], and would send missionaries in vain, either to unbelievers, or heretics, or schismatics,—because they might reply that they were in a similar condition with themselves, and might reason in this way, We may err or be deceived, and the Church may equally err or be deceived, when she comes forward as the witness of that doctrine which she alleges that she has received from God, &c., &c. The Jesuit professor does not think of an appeal to the inspired Scriptures, and as little does he think of any majesty and beauty in the gospel truth itself. He does not think of the infidels, and heretics, and schismatics as being perhaps induced to think and inquire for themselves, and so to receive doctrines which they find to be sufficiently proved and attested, but merely of their inquiring after an infallible authority to which they are to bow,—by which they are to be saved the trouble of thinking,—and which, as in the memorable case of a certain Duke of Brunswick, will undertake to stand between them and God, not only now but in the day of judgment.

These specimens of Perrone's arguments will suffice at least to shew that they are no better than those previously considered, and that there is no unfairness to the Popish cause, in the use which has been made of Mr Keenan's Catechism.¹

¹ In connection with this subject of infallibility, there is an argument in

I would gladly now have entered upon the consideration of an argument which Cardinal Wiseman derives from the actual success of missions,—or, as he tries to make out the case, from the actual success of the missions of the Church of Rome, and the want of success in those of the Protestant Church. But he devotes two long lectures to this subject, and I can scarcely afford more to it at present than a single paragraph. He argues that a promise of success from Christ's assistance having been annexed to the commission which he gave "to the Apostles

favour of the whole claims and pretensions of the Popish Church, gravely set forth by Mr Keenan, which is so eminently and supereminently preposterous, that I cannot conclude without quoting it. The reader has only to observe that the major premise in this syllogism is the important assumption that the true Church of Christ must be infallible, which being granted, the argument proceeds; though even in proceeding with it after this, Mr Keenan's manner is characteristic.

"Can you give one other proof that the Catholic is the true Church?—Were we destitute of every other argument, the following would be sufficient. That Church, and that Church only, can be the true Church of Christ, which openly avows and believes its own infallibility; for having once admitted that Christ's Church is infallible," (which admission of course Mr Keenan must somehow have fancied that his opponents make), "any Church teaching its own fallibility, teaches that it cannot be the Church of Christ; because, even though such Church were actually in itself infallible, by teaching its fallibility it teaches an error in dogma, and by this very fact becomes fallible." (Here a Church must be supposed, if the reader can, to be at once fallible and infallible. And thus the major premise is supported!! Then follow the minor and the conclusion.) "But the Catholic Church is the *ONLY* Church upon earth, which avows, believes, and teaches its own infallibility; therefore, the Catholic Church, is beyond all doubt, the true, infallible Church of Christ; and the Protestant Church by proclaiming her own fallibility, and liability to err, proves to a demonstration, that she has no right to the august title of Christ's Church." (Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 7.) Is this the logic of Maynooth? Then surely the British nation does pay for the performance of some curious operations on the human mind. But if any one had desired to write a *jeu d'esprit*, turning the Popish Church and its arguments on its own behalf into ridicule, could he have invented anything more proper for his purpose than the above specimen of the Controversial Catechism highly recommended by *Vicars Apostolic*, and in great repute amongst Papists both in Scotland and elsewhere?

and their successors," "it must be an important criterion of the true religion of Christ, or, in other words, of that foundation whereon he intended his faith to be built, to see where that blessing, that promise of success from his assistance hath rested,—and where, by its actually taking effect, it can be shewn to have been perpetuated, according to the words of our blessed Redeemer."¹ The subject is highly interesting, but there is a fallacy in the very essence of the argument,—the same as in Mr Keenan's argument from the numerical majority belonging to the Church of Rome. And as its mere external prosperity throughout many centuries will not prove that Church to be the true Church of Christ, neither will the numbers who have been baptised by its missionaries. If there were force in such an argument, Mahomedanism might at one time have claimed a right to employ it; and even at the present day, there are parts of the world in which it is rapidly gaining ground upon Paganism. But he who contemplates the phenomenon of the temporary prosperity and spread of Mahomedanism, in relation to the providence and the word of God, needs not to be staggered at the similar prosperity and spread of Popery. Nay, the weakness of Cardinal Wiseman's argument is evident from a moment's reflection on the events of the sixteenth century, and the possibility of similar events again taking place. But that argument is conducted in a manner calculated to provoke the strongest feelings of indignation,—marked as it is by an affectation of the utmost candour, and by an unfairness seldom exceeded, both in the selection and employment of materials. It might not indeed have seemed extraordinary that a Popish lecturer should have animadverted upon the frequency with which Protestant Missionary Societies speak "of hopes, of promises, of expectations," and that he should have taunted them with thus dwelling upon "what is going to be done, rather than upon what has been done."² But even in the year 1836, when these lectures were delivered, it was a mere misrepresentation to describe them as

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 163.

² Ibid., I., 172.

never speaking of what has been done. Still more would it evidently be so now,—yet if the argument under consideration be of any value at all, it must remain undiminished in value, nay, rather ought to increase in value throughout all ages.—It might excite no surprise that Dr Wiseman should sneer at the seven years during which those “simple persons,” “Mr Judson and his lady,” resided in Burmah without making a single convert,¹—although he ought perhaps to have bethought him of the text, “They that sow in tears shall reap in joy.”² But from a man so anxious to appear candid, some allusion at least might have been expected to the large numbers of converted Karens, to whom the American Baptist missionaries in these eastern regions have long looked as their joy and crown.—It might even have been accounted fair enough for him, (whether to the purpose or not,) to have quoted the statements of Protestant missionaries concerning the difficulties which lie in the way of the conversion of the heathen in India or elsewhere; but it could not well have been expected that he should have quoted as an “express acknowledgment that under existing circumstances there is no human possibility of converting the Hindoos,” a statement which, even as he quotes it, points to the necessity of dependence upon *God’s blessing*, and not upon *any means of success*.³—There would have been a propriety also in something like an examination of cases, when the idea was introduced that the *few* conversions which had taken place in India might be accounted for without credit to Protestantism by considerations of interest, “because there are always local or individual interests by which some may be led to embrace any system of religion, out of such an immense population.”⁴ We are accustomed to associate the use of the term *soupers*, or in fact the introduction of the idea which it has been invented to express, with nothing more exalted than the altar denunciations of the lowest class of Irish priests, or the yells of the bigoted mobs whom they recently stirred up to abuse Protestant minis-

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 184, 185.

³ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 181.

² Ps. cxxvi. 5.

⁴ Ibid., 187.

ters. But Dr Wiseman also knows how to employ this sort of vilification, unsustained by evidence, although he frames his sentences on a very different model from those of the intemperate Cahill. He does not think it beneath him to mention as “a well-known fact,” “that the new Christians in India are called *Rice Christians* or *Company’s Christians*, from the idea that their object in conversion is to gain support or patronage,”¹ and this, although he knew and makes it evident that he knew what disadvantages and hardships attended the profession of Christianity in India. He likewise endeavours to throw ridicule upon the efforts for the circulation of the Scriptures, by adducing statements concerning the fate of many copies applied to ignoble purposes, or remaining fruitlessly accumulated in warehouses. But he is not very careful in his selection of authorities, and besides occasional reference to the evidence of a Popish priest or a Popish periodical, even whilst he boasts of making his argument depend upon the evidence of Protestants themselves, he seems to think that if a man is *not* a Papist, all Protestants must accept him as a good enough witness on points connected with Bible circulation, and the prospects and success of missions. It was too easy to find men, not Papists, who would both attest the impossibility and the undesirableness of the success of missions in India,—men who might more fitly however be classed among heathens than among Protestants; and Dr Wiseman had evidence of the same kind ready at hand to prove that, all appearances notwithstanding, the missions in the South Sea Islands had really succeeded in nothing but evil. Of this evidence he has not scrupled to avail himself,—the evidence of men who could mock at piety, and who were exasperated to find that the success of the missionaries in the South Sea Islands had made it difficult or impossible for them to revel there in the sensualities which the descriptions of previous navigators had led them to expect. But it may be as well to shew, by a few quotations, what Dr Wiseman says on the subject of the South Sea

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 226.

missions. First of all, he endeavours to shew that no success there would much improve the case for Protestantism, because, says he,—

“It is a very singular fact, that this is almost the only instance on record of a nation having been the first to desire Christianity, and consequently of its having been willing to receive it under whatever form it should first come. It is a known fact, that the natives of those islands, from seeing the superiority of the traders of other nations, and principally of those from America, were led to ask for missionaries to propagate Christianity among them. This at once forbids our considering the establishment of Christianity there as the result of any principle of faith, presented to the acceptance of the individuals.”¹

Even granting the facts to have been as here represented, they might more reasonably be held to afford a foundation for the very opposite inference. It were to be wished that the character of traders and others belonging to Protestant countries, were universally such as to produce amongst the heathen who behold them, an impression favourable to their religion; and in so far as such an impression is produced, it were hard indeed if that religion might not be allowed the credit of it. Had the traders been generally Papists rather than Protestants, would Dr Wiseman have renounced on behalf of his Church all claim of this nature?—But the facts are misrepresented. It is evident enough that it is to the history of Christianity in the Sandwich Islands that Dr Wiseman refers; although instances of the same kind have recently been multiplied amongst the groups of islands nearer Tahiti, and have begun to be not unfrequent in various parts of the globe. But Dr Wiseman was no stranger to the fact, that the Protestant missions to Polynesia began with the Society, and not with the Sandwich Islands; the missionary operations in the former having been commenced in 1797 by the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, and those in the latter not till 1820, by missionaries from America: so far is his statement of the case from being correct. But what fol-

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 196.

lows is worthy of this commencement. The “outward success” of this South Sea Mission being disposed of as we have seen, Dr Wiseman, with that amiability and magnanimity which he delights to exhibit, would be “sorry to enter into a history of it, because it seems to present one of the most lamentable effects of misguided zeal that probably could be conceived.” He calls in his witnesses to make out some startling facts. The missionaries, it seems, have “made themselves masters of the whole temporal dominion of the islands,”—have “made the king and his people their slaves,”—and (“I am sure”—says the worthy prelate, in a parenthesis which rushes spontaneously from the deep generosity of his heart—“I am sure you would hardly believe it possible that men, under shelter of the word of God, and professing to teach the doctrines of Christianity, could have so acted,”) it even seems that they “have reduced the country to a state of such wretchedness, that persons who have since visited it, declare, that, instead of a blessing, the new religion has been its utter ruin.”—“They say,” the Cardinal proceeds, “that the system of Christianity enforced on the natives, has been such, as totally to change them for the worse; that, instead of an active open-hearted race, it has rendered them crafty, indolent, and treacherous.” Finally,—gathering courage from listening to his witnesses, whom, with a simplicity more remarkable than that which he admires in Mr Judson and his lady, he believes in every particular,—he says, “These are facts which have been published in this country:”¹—and in another place, returning to the same subject, he says, “*The Independents have laboured long and zealously, for the conversion of the teachable and uncorrupted natives of the Sandwich and Society Islands, and they have perfectly succeeded in ruining their industrious habits, exposing their country to external aggression and internal dissension, and disgusting all who originally supported them.*”²—These statements are absolutely marvellous as made by a man of common information and intelligence. I say nothing of the triumphant refutations more recently published,

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 197.

² Ibid., I., 260.

of the falsehoods of those voyagers to whom Dr Wiseman was indebted for his accounts of the actual state of things.—I point rather to the obvious consideration that no man not very anxious to have believed them, would ever have believed them at all,—and ask why there is no correction or retraction of them now,—and whether we are not to regard Cardinal Wiseman as guilty of the repetition of them now, in the face of overwhelming evidence, when they are found in the words above quoted in an edition of his Lectures so recent as the year 1851. But it is enough even to look to one feature in the statements which he makes, common to him with those by whom, in his simplicity, he was originally misled,—I mean, the assertion that the natives of the Sandwich and Society Islands were *uncorrupted* until the missionaries went amongst them. He speaks also of the “simplicity of character for which they were remarkable.” He has committed himself to this statement as to the facts of their original and unchristianized condition: and on this single point (very essential however to his whole case respecting these missions), he may safely be challenged to try the question of accuracy or inaccuracy, truth or falsehood. Nay, he knows, and he knew when he spoke and published his Lectures, and it is a fact too well established to be disputed for a moment, that the natives of these islands were vicious, profligate, and cruel to the last degree,—that there raged among them the most exterminating wars, and that there existed among them a licentiousness as abominable and systematic as ever defiled any portion of the earth, and in connection with it the most atrocious practices of abortion and infanticide. Yet Cardinal Wiseman dares to call these savages *uncorrupted*, and to ascribe to Protestant Christianity the blame of having corrupted them! It is needless after this to do more than refer to the progress of all the Christianized islands in the arts of life and civilization—to point to the prosperity of Tahiti until France and Jesuitism interfered with it, and to the rising importance of the Society Islands and the trade and even commencing literature of Honolulu. Cardinal Wiseman can venture to tell us

that the missionaries “have perfectly succeeded in ruining the industrious habits” of the people!

But if the reported success of Protestant missions does not disappear when inquired into, as Dr Wiseman would have us to think that it does, the greater reported success of Popish missions does not always bear the same test so well. It is matter of authentic and unquestionable history, what flaming accounts of the conversion of multitudes were sent home to Europe by the Jesuit missionaries from their great Madura mission in the seventeenth century,—and how fallacious these accounts ultimately proved. It is likewise matter of history, what base methods the Jesuits adopted to gain converts in India,—what a compromise was established between Christianity and Paganism, the people being allowed to retain their previous customs, merely substituting the Romish saints for the idols of their own mythology,—and how Robert de Nobili himself, the founder of the Jesuit mission, endeavoured to conciliate the favour of the Brahmins by representing himself and his companions as Sanyasi Brahmins from the north of India, descendants in a direct line from the god Brahma, and of a higher rank than any other Brahmins in the land,—how he produced in evidence of this a forged parchment,—how a fifth Veda was also forged with the same unscrupulousness,—how this system of imposture was kept up for more than a century; a Papal legate, who was sent out to inquire into the matter, being imprisoned through Jesuit intrigues in Macao, and dying there in prison, of what disease those who were the cause of his imprisonment best knew. And if these proceedings of the Jesuits were reprobated by the Court of Rome itself, yet the day is past when that fact could have been pleaded in favour of Popery; for the Jesuits once suppressed have been restored, and restored with peculiar marks of approbation as the best supporters of the Popish cause; and its present advocates in this country, and Cardinal Wiseman in particular, delight in defending their character and trumpeting their praise.¹

¹ See Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 217.

UNITY, SANCTITY, CATHOLICITY, and APOSTOLICITY, are the marks by which Papists are accustomed to say that the true Church may be known, and these they assert to belong exclusively to the Church of Rome. We have already seen in what manner they appeal to the alleged possession of these marks in order to determine that theirs must be the true Rule of Faith; and on some of the points thus brought before us enough has been already said. But we must still bestow a little attention upon this subject.

Concerning UNITY I shall add nothing to what is contained in the preceding pages, except to quote a passage from the Encyclical Letter issued by the present Pope at the commencement of his pontificate, which places the Popish view of unity in the clearest and most beautiful light, and is equally decisive on some other points,—although, on the question of infallibility, as it makes no mention of the “teaching body,” it might not unreasonably be supposed to indicate a different opinion from that advocated by our British Papists concerning their share in this endowment and the contribution which they might at any time expect to make to the infallible utterances. The following is the utterance from the Vatican:—

“Since where Peter is, there is the Church, and Peter speaks by the lips of the Roman Pontiff, and ever lives and exercises authority in the persons of his successors, and exhibits to those seeking it the truth of faith, therefore the divine word is evidently to be accepted in that sense which this Roman See of Blessed Peter has held and does hold, that See which is the mother and mistress of all Churches, which has always kept entire and inviolate the faith delivered by Christ our Lord, and has taught it to the faithful, pointing out to all the path of salvation, and the teaching of unblemished truth. This is indeed the principal Church, whence the Sacerdotal Unity takes its rise. This is the metropolis of piety, in which is preserved the whole and perfect body of the Christian religion, in which the primacy of the Apostolic See has ever dwelt, to which, on account of its superior headship, all other Churches must have recourse, that is to say, those which are among the number of the faithful, and with which he who does not gather must inevitably scatter.”

Unity, according to this teaching, is simply union with Rome.

The definition is a simple one; but thus viewed, the mark will be of little value as pointing out the true Church, or guiding to the true Rule of Faith. The Papal pretensions, which in the sentences above quoted are about as high as human pride could possibly conceive or frame, are also, it will be perceived, made to rest entirely upon Peter's primacy as their foundation, and upon the Pope's inheritance of that primacy. They vanish if the primacy cannot be established from its great proof text “Upon this rock will I build my Church,” especially if the rock cannot be proved to be Peter: they vanish if it cannot be proved that Peter was ever at Rome, or that he was first Bishop of Rome, or that the Pope is his legitimate successor. And with them vanishes the *Unity*.

There can be no doubt that SANCTITY is a good mark of the true Church of Christ, but it is one to which it may seem rather audacious for an advocate of Popery to refer, as, if history is in any thing to be credited, the want of sanctity has been a very prevailing characteristic of the Church of Rome. But our astonishment at finding this mark adduced, makes us all the more curious to know how the Popish advocate conducts his case. His method is ingenious, and consists in three things; he modifies the meaning of the term sanctity, he contradicts all evidence by strong assertions, and he insists much upon the abundance of the *means* of sanctity which it is the peculiar privilege of his Church to possess.—First, he modifies the meaning of the term. “Is the Protestant Church holy in her pastors?” asks Mr Keenan, and he answers:—

No; to this she can have no pretension; her pastors are mere men of the world, *not subjected to the restraints of Apostolic poverty, chastity, or mortification*. The burden of their religious duty seems to be the mere preaching of a sermon or two upon Sunday; whilst most of their time must be employed not in Apostolic duties, but in looking after their own worldly interest, and that of their wives and children.”¹

The man who thus writes, officiates as a Popish priest in the town where Robert M'Cheyne exercised his ministry. And

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. vii., sect. 5.

this is the description which he gives of one and all who are or have been pastors of the Protestant Church,—Owen, Baxter, Boston, Brainerd, Neff,—there is no exception. Nay, in anxiety to say the worst against Protestant ministers, he has succeeded in making assertions such as could not be excused even on the admission of a standard of holiness and of morality, in which the highest place is assigned to voluntary austerity and uncommanded mortifications, and according to which, fornication or concubinage on the part of a priest would be a far less heinous sin than his marriage.

But if Mr Keenan is unsparing in his condemnation and vilification of all Protestant pastors, he is equally unsparing in his laudation of all those of the Popish Church, making no more exception in this case than in the former. The force of truth would seem to have constrained him to do violence to his modesty.

Is the Catholic Church holy in her pastors?

They are all separated from the world and its gratifications, and dedicated entirely to promote God's glory and the sanctification of souls; no worldly cares intrude upon them; the Church is their spouse, and the people their spiritual children; they are ever, in a variety of ways, employed in the spiritual improvement of their flock; they watch with tender cares from the cradle to the grave, those committed to their charge; and as they have no wives or families to provide for, their hearts are in their duties; and whatever of this world's goods they may possess, is employed for the glory of God."¹

Yet historians assure us that this so called Catholic Church has been disgraced by unimaginable turpitude of life in *her pastors*,—that their lasciviousness has only been equalled by their rapacity, and that popes, and bishops, and abbots have exceeded all

¹ Keenan Controv. Cat., chap. vii., sect 5. Similar to this is Dr Doyle's laudation of the Irish priests.—"They are energetic, active, laborious, shrewd, and intelligent: THEY ARE THE MOST MORAL CLASS OF PERSONS NOT ONLY IN THIS COUNTRY, BUT, I THINK, EXISTING ON THE EARTH, &c., &c. . . . They are always employed; *there is nothing dull or quiescent about them.*" (Letters of J. K. L., 65.) This last statement, at least, may be unhesitatingly admitted.

the other great ones of the earth in their pomp and luxury. Nor is this the allegation of authors similar to those who have brought base accusations against Knox or Calvin,—men whose only reputation is founded upon the lies which they have coined and published,—but the uniform testimony of all historians of respectable character and authority,—confirmed also, in a way which places it more entirely beyond the reach of doubt, by the complaints of Papists who have sought to reform the more glaring abuses of their Church, and by the decrees of Synods and Councils directed frequently against abuses of the grossest kind, and which the very terms of these decrees prove to have been general. Now the Popish Church is equally to be tried by the conduct of her clergy or her members in past times and in the present, and by reason of her own high pretensions of unity and catholicity, we are entitled to fix upon any age or country and to apply the test of Sanctity. Must we forget all that we have learned? Must we shut out from our minds all uninspired historic records as well as the word of God, and reverse all their statements on the dictum of a priest or bishop, who comes forward to extol himself and all his brethren? Or with respect even to our own times, must we forget the recent exposure of an odious case of seduction and concubinage in the west of Scotland, in which it was too apparent, that these crimes might have been passed over with very gentle censure, had it not been for the bungling mismanagement which allowed them to attract the notice of the world? Must we forget the tricks and prevarications connected with the attempt to clutch Miss Talbot's magnificent fortune, and other attempts to clutch other fortunes? Must we forget the revelations of the Achilli trial, in which Mr Newman's witnesses from Italy gave such fearful representations of profligacy and debauchery as there practised within consecrated walls,—and in respect of which there is no escape from the alternative that if the witnesses spoke the truth, a known profligate and debauchee of the worst kind was advanced to places of trust and honour in the Church,—and that if they were not to be credited, the advocates of that Church must have been guilty of the

most extensive and atrocious subornation of witnesses in order to the destruction of the innocent,—the one alternative affecting the character of the Popish clergy just about as much as the other? Ere we can believe in the accuracy of Mr Keenan's pretty picture, we must forget these things, and many things besides; though perhaps, he may have some readers who regard it as a *tender care* which an Irish priest exercises over his flock when he flogs or cudgels some of its more refractory members. As for being "separated from the world and its gratifications," the very portraits of some of the Popish dignitaries, fondly exhibited to public gaze, tell a very different tale. And it may not be going too far to say that, although amongst the Romish priesthood even in the British isles there are sincere and shrivelled ascetics, there are also not a few whose very looks betoken sensuality and self-indulgence.¹

¹ The Popish priests of Brazil are described by a traveller—who, though a Protestant, was certainly no zealot in religion, and may rather be held as not manifesting a sufficient estimate of the importance of the distinctions betwixt Popery and Protestantism, but whose veracity is unimpeachable, and who had resided long enough in the country, and mingled sufficiently with the people in its various provinces, to make him a very competent witness,—as the most debased and immoral of mankind. "It is a hard thing to say," such are the words of this traveller, the late lamented Mr Gardner the botanist, "but I do it not without well considering the nature of the assertion, that the present clergy of Brazil are more debased and immoral than any other class of men." In another part of his volume (p. 187) we find an illustration of their character, and of the character of the people whom they teach. "Scarcely any of the better class [in Crato] live with their wives; a few years after their marriage, they generally turn them out of the house to live separately, and replace them by young women who are willing to supply their place without being bound by the ties of matrimony. In this manner these people have two houses to keep up. Such a state of immorality is not to be wondered at, when the conduct of the clergy is taken into consideration. The vicar, (*vigario*), who was then an old man between seventy and eighty years of age, is the father of six natural children, one of whom was educated as a priest, afterwards became president of the province, and was then a senator of the Empire, although still retaining his clerical title. During my stay in Crato he arrived there

¹ (Travels in the Interior of Brazil, p. 82.)

But the holiness of a Church is not to be inquired after in her pastors alone; it ought also to appear in her ordinary members. What then is the case with the Church of Rome? Dr Doyle made answer twenty-eight years ago, in regard to the Papists of Ireland.

*The Irish are, morally speaking, not only religious, like other nations, but entirely devoted to religion. . . . When it pleased God to have an Island of Saints upon the earth, he prepared Ireland from afar for this high destiny.*¹

Every newspaper in our days, or in those of our fathers, has contained abundant refutation of the falsehood.

It is curious to see how Popish writers get over the difficulty created by the unquestionable immoralities, not only of members of their Church, but of priests and bishops, and even of popes. First, they extenuate as much as possible. But this is not sufficient. Dr Milner therefore says,—

"I, as well as Baronius, Bellarmine, and other Catholic writers, have unequivocally admitted, that some few of our pontiffs have disgraced themselves by their crimes and given just cause of scandal to Christendom; but I have remarked that the credit of our cause is not affected by the personal conduct of particular pastors, who *regularly* succeed one another, in the same manner as the credit of yours is by the behaviour of your *founders*, who professed to have received an *extraordinary commission from God to reform Religion.*"²

Now the case is here wholly misstated, as to the damaging effect of any uncouth facts which might be established, upon

on a visit to his father, bringing with him his mistress, who was his own cousin, and eight children out of ten he had by her, having at the same time five other children by another woman, who died in child-bed of the sixth. Besides the *vigario*, there were three other priests in the town, all of whom have families by women with whom they live openly, one of them being the wife of another person." Such is the sanctity of the Church of Rome in Brazil. And according to her own pretensions of unity and universality, we may quite as properly look to Brazil for illustration of her sanctity as to Maynooth or to Dundee.

¹ Letters of J. K. L., 58.

² Milner, End of Controversy, Letter viii.

the interests of Popery and of Protestantism respectively; and it is only one of those assumptions with which we are already so familiar, involving the whole question at issue, to say that the reformers (who are evidently alluded to) were *founders* of the Protestant Church, and entirely false to say that they professed to have received *an extraordinary commission from God to reform Religion*. But waiving all this, let us only compare Dr Milner's answer to the objection from the scandalous lives of popes and others, with the argument at which we have already looked, which proposes to demonstrate the sanctity of the Popish Church, and the non-sanctity of the Protestant Church from the different characters of their pastors!

But with the difficult and disagreeable subject of the characters of the popes, Cardinal Wiseman deals in a much more ingenious manner than the prelate of the last generation. He lays down a distinction betwixt "the private individual character of pontiffs, and their public conduct," which however pertinent to the question of their *supremacy*, in connection with which it is brought forward, may be passed over at present as having nothing to do with the question of *holiness*. He admits "the possibility of a certain number being unworthy of their station,"—an admission, the consequences of which I shall not stay at present to discuss,—but adds, that "in a number of instances, there is more misrepresentation than could be found in any other part of history."—And then pointing to the number who have found a place in the calendar of saints, and of others (more recent) whose lives were very exemplary, he goes on to say that the middle ages are the only period from which such objections can be drawn, and to treat the objections as if they were all such as might arise from mistaken views of the history of the period and the incompetency of the objectors to judge, by their true standard, of measures then pursued.¹ He mentions recent works by German Protestants, vindicating Gregory VII. (or Hildebrand) and Innocent III. from many of the charges

¹ Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 292, 295.

often brought against them, but he adroitly keeps out of view the acts branded as criminal, and avoids the most distant allusion to those pontiffs whose crimes had less connection with the functions of the pontifical office, and whose lives were a disgrace to Rome and to mankind.

However, to return to the allegations against Protestants: if Protestants were all really as bad as he makes their pastors to be, Mr Keenan has a reason for it;—*there are no means of holiness in the Protestant Church*—"they have destroyed them all; they have rejected the soul of religion, in rejecting the holy sacrifice of the mass, and five of the sacraments;" and "even the two sacraments which they still retain are by them reduced to mere forms,—the mere giving of a name, and partaking of a little bread and wine."¹ But we need not so much concern ourselves about this; for the best proof of a Church's sanctity must be found in an examination of the facts of the case, and if we find the sanctity in fact wanting, it will not much change our opinion to be told of the abundant means of it which are possessed. We may rather be inclined to judge of the means by their effects. Yet when Popish writers would prove the sanctity of their Church, it is on the exclusive possession of the means of sanctity that they chiefly delight to insist.² And herein we have another instance of their favourite art of reasoning in a circle. For those things which most require the establishment of their claim to prove them, are the very things which they adduce in proof of the sanctity by which that claim is to be established.

But as Papists assert that their Church exclusively possesses the means of sanctity, and therefore argue that she must be holy; so they argue that the Protestant Church *cannot* be holy; not only because she wants what they are pleased to account the means of sanctity, but also because her doctrines tend to immorality, especially those which are usually termed Calvinis-

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 5.

² See, for example, Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xx.

tic.¹ "Holiness is incompatible with these immoral principles," says Mr Keenan. This is so favourite an argument against Protestantism, that almost all Popish writers seem glad to find an opportunity of bringing it forward again in every possible connection. It has been already noticed.²

Concerning the CATHOLICITY or UNIVERSALITY, which is given as the third mark of the true Church of Christ, I shall not attempt to add anything to what has been already said, when this catholicity or universality was considered in its alleged bearing on the question of the Rule of Faith. But I cannot avoid remarking that the use which Papists make in their arguments of their term *Catholic* ought to prevent Protestants from ever making a seeming concession to them by giving them this name, nor is it of much consequence whether the term Catholic or Roman Catholic be employed. The admission in which they exult is made as much in the one as in the other, if the terms are used with a reference to their strict signification. It is all well enough that Churches should be designated by others as they choose to designate themselves, so long as the designation is not referred to as importing more than their own opinion of themselves, and thus it is with all save the Church of Rome. When those who think to distinguish themselves by the name *Baptists* are so called by others, this convenient and courteous employment of the name is never regarded as implying anything concerning the truth of the opinion in virtue of which the name was assumed. When members of the Established Church of Scotland speak of the *Free Church*, no rational member of the Free Church turns round upon them and says, You admit in the use of that name, all that we had in view as to our position and principles when we adopted it. The contemptible pettiness of this sort of argument is one of the exclusive characteristics of the Church of Rome. It is thus employed by Dr Milner:—

"Is there not among the rival Churches, one exclusively known and

¹ See Keenan, Controv. Cat. ch. vii., sect. 5; Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xix; Perrone, Praelect. Theol., II., 750, 751.

² See Chap. I.

distinguished by the name of THE CATHOLIC CHURCH as well in England, Holland, and other countries, which protest against this Church, as in those which adhere to it? Does not this effulgent mark of the true religion so incontestably belong us, in spite of every effort to obscure it by the nick-names of *Papists*, *Romanists*, &c. . . ? What I mean is this; if any stranger in London, Edinburgh, or Amsterdam, were to ask his way to the *Catholic Chapel*, I would risk my life for it that no sober Protestant inhabitant would direct him to any other place of worship than to ours."¹

But let us also attend to Dr Wiseman. He enlarges on this point even more than Milner. One sentence however will suffice.

"The third characteristic is *Catholicity*. And here indeed, we have the advantage of the name itself."²

It is a curious predicament to which we are to be reduced. If we call the members of the Church of Rome *Catholics*, because they prefer so to call themselves, forthwith they take advantage of it to say that we concede them all that *they* employ the name to denote. If, finding our courtesy thus abused, we call them *Papists* or *Romanists*, they are greatly offended, and reprehend us for using nick-names. But why should these be accounted nick-names? They are founded upon nothing which is ever denied by those to whom we apply them: they are the most inoffensive terms that can be conceived, unless indeed it is to be held as an offence that we refuse to acknowledge the utmost pretensions of the Church of Rome. The term *Catholic* as employed by Protestants to denote that Church, seems to have come into use during last century and amidst religious indifference; it was not employed by the Reformers or their immediate successors, and it may be easily foreseen that a time is close at hand when its employment will again be rare.

We come now to the fourth and last of these marks of the true Church,—APOSTOLICITY. It seems unnecessary to spend much time upon it, as the question regarding it is really determined when one Church is found to receive the Apostles' doctrine and another to have departed from it.

¹ Milner, End of Controversy, Letter xxv.

² Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 319.

Popish authors themselves recognise this as an element, but only as an element in determining apostolicity. The apostolicity of a Church consists, Mr Keenan tells us, in her being "able to trace her *doctrine*, her *orders*, and her *mission*, to the Apostles of Christ."¹

That the Protestant Church is not apostolic in *doctrine*, he maintains on the ground of the differences of doctrine subsisting amongst Protestants; though how the error of one man should prove that a man who differs from him is also in error, it is hard to conceive,—or how the difference between them should prove anything but that at least one of them must be wrong on the point in which they differ. But if A, B, and C, differ in their opinions, it is very ridiculous of A to conclude in favour of his own opinion, *merely on the ground of the difference between B and C*. So far as any other argument is adduced in favour of the apostolicity of the Popish doctrine, it is nothing but a repetition of the old song, "We teach the same doctrine now which was taught in every century and country since the time of Christ; our doctrines cannot be traced to any man or set of men, &c., &c. We are the only Church that has existed in every age since the apostolic times."² All this has been sufficiently considered already. And this is surely a very round about way of determining apostolicity of doctrine, when we have the doctrines of the Apostles stated in their own writings, and can compare our doctrines with these.

In proof of the apostolicity of *orders* and of *mission*, in the Church of Rome, we have still the same boast of the antiquity of that Church and the recent origin of Protestantism, with references to the "uninterrupted chain of Roman Pontiffs, reaching from the present Pontiff, Pius IX., to St Peter," and the lists of the bishops who have occupied every See from the very beginning till now. This brings us to the question of Apostolical Succession, upon which I shall not enter. Puseyites and Papists have disputes with one another about their claims to apostolicity of orders, in which a true Protestant can side with

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 7.

² Ibid.

neither. Believing, indeed, that upon the ground of their common doctrine as to apostolical succession, the Papists have the best of the argument, and can easily cut down the Puseyite genealogical tree, a true Protestant must rather delight in the exposure of the historical fictions upon which Papists and Puseyites equally depend, and still more in shewing that the gospel warrants no such notions of apostolical succession. It is pleasant to see how vain are all their attempts to prove that they have it; but there is a far higher satisfaction in feeling that we can do very well without it, and in standing on an elevation from which we can look with mingled contempt and pity upon those who found upon it their claim to apostolicity. It concerns us little, that Puseyites and Papists repute us as mere laymen, if we know that we preach the gospel of Jesus Christ, and if the Lord accompany his word with his Spirit sent forth from heaven, convincing the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment, and making the fruits of conversion and sanctification and Christian consolation to abound.

Here also we come to the question of the *Supremacy of the Pope*, and of his right to be regarded as the *Vicar* of Jesus Christ upon the earth, "to govern the Church in the quality of visible chief or head." But upon this, as upon the cognate question of apostolical succession, I must refrain from entering, nor even attempt to exhibit the wilful confounding—with which Papists are so generally chargeable, and which is so essential to their cause—of the two Greek words, *πτεξα* (a rock) and *πτερος* (a stone) in the text (Mat. xvi., 18,) upon which the whole superstructure of Peter's primacy, the popedom, and the hierarchical fabric of the Church of Rome is made to rest.

To prove that theirs is the true Church, and that their rule of faith is the true rule of faith, it has been much the practice of Papists to misrepresent the Reformation and to vilify the Reformers. There arose, within the Church of Rome, about the time of the Reformation and shortly after, a class of men, whose names are now known only by reason of the lies which they invented,

and the effrontery with which they published them to the world, accusing Luther, Calvin, Knox, and other Reformers, of the worst immoralities and crimes. The positions which they held, and the eagerness with which their fabrications were received and circulated on the part of the Popish priesthood, entitle us to regard the infamy of their conduct as attaching not merely to themselves but to the Church, whose cause they sought to advance. The investigation and exposure of some of these slanderous stories in Bayle's Dictionary, checked for a time the frequency of their repetition; but they have begun to be again very prominently brought forward by some of the zealous advocates of the Popish cause in this country, who make a more or less cautious selection from the materials which the unscrupulous zeal of former times accumulated so largely. Much allowance must be made for the blinding prejudice which inclines a Papist to receive any slander against the Reformers as truth; yet no sufficient excuse can be found for the repetition of stories which there is not a shadow of reasonable evidence to support,—whilst it is certainly not an indication of candour that some portion merely of the original statements is repeated, those things being omitted which even the most ignorant and credulous could not in the present day be expected to receive.

It is perhaps well that Papists should make the use they now seem disposed to do of this argument from the characters of the Reformers: because wherever the nature of the case is in the least degree understood, it is calculated to excite the deepest disgust. Yet many of them seem to depend upon it as one of their most powerful means of securing the minds of their own people against the approaches of Protestantism, and even of drawing over Protestants. In a very interesting narrative recently published under the title of "The Morning of Life; a Memoir of Miss A——n, who was educated for a Nun,"—a narrative of the truth of which in all important particulars, the author of these pages has reasons for being perfectly assured,—it is stated that Dr Doyle, the Popish Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, (already frequently referred to, and one of the most

eminent and most gifted prelates of whom the Popish Church in Ireland ever could boast,) condescended to make use of this as his last great argument with two young sisters, his own wards, who were on the point of leaving the fold of Rome. "At length Dr Doyle said he would only lend them one more book, a great quarto volume, of which the only other copy in existence was in the Vatican library. If that did not shake their opinions he should give up the contest, and argue no more with them, but consider them quite irreclaimable. This book consisted principally of accounts of the private life of Luther and others amongst the Reformers, which were clothed in their blackest colours; grievous crimes were laid to their charge, and all their imperfections magnified."¹ There may be men who repeat such stories in ignorance of their falsehood; but it is hard to imagine that Dr Doyle believed them. He may rather be supposed to have thought that the end justified the means, and whatever the great quarto volume was which he put into the hands of these two young ladies, we have only to consider what sort of matter is presented in the pages of some of the Popish publications which deal most freely in these stories, to be convinced that it was nearly as full of filthiness as of falsehood.

It is an important circumstance that not merely one or two of the Reformers are accused, but that grave charges of immorality are brought against them all or almost all. If it is once demonstrated that any of these charges are fabrications, the way is clear for placing them all in the same class; and that they are all true is not easily admitted. In the attempt to defame the Reformation by defaming the Reformers, Papists have overshot the mark. And he who acquaints himself in any measure with the public history and writings of the Reformers, cannot but be slow to believe gross allegations respecting their private life. Here would be something like a miracle indeed, that doctrines and sentiments like theirs should proceed from flagitious men. Of the Jesuits whom Pascal exposes, the inventors and expounders

¹ The Morning of Life, &c., 22, 23.

of the doctrine of probabilities, the men who maintain that it may be right to swear a lie with a mental reservation, or a duty to commit murder in order to prevent one's reputation from suffering by slander, it is easy and very reasonable to believe anything, however bad. But the Reformers and they stand upon very different ground as to the anterior probability of vile or horrible imputations.

I shall not attempt to examine any of the charges brought against Luther, or misrepresentations of the history of the Reformation in Germany. Concerning Luther's character, reference may be permitted to the well-known vindication by Archdeacon Hare. It is curious indeed to mark the shifts to which recourse is had in order to traduce the great Reformer. For example, the inconsistency between sentiments expressed by him at one date and those expressed at another is exhibited as proof of the basest hypocrisy, as if any tolerably well-informed person could forget that his views were gradually developed as he came to understand more perfectly the application of those first principles which he had learned. His exaggerated and paradoxical modes of expression are eagerly seized, and turned to account, by being exhibited apart from that connection in which their true meaning is readily apparent.¹ And as there

¹ Moehler may here be quoted, for condemnation of some of his brethren. "Luther is very variable in his assertions. He too often brings forward the very reverse of his own declarations, and is in a surprising degree the sport of momentary impressions and transient moods of mind. He delights also in exaggerations, willingly runs into extremes, and likes what are called energetic expressions, in which oftentimes, when taken by themselves, his true meaning is certainly not easy to be discovered. The most advisable course, under these circumstances, is, by a careful study of his writings, to learn the key-note, which pervades the whole; individual passages can in no case be considered as decisive in themselves; and a sort of average estimate, therefore, recommends itself to our adoption." (Symbolism, I., 14.) A more correct estimate could not well be expected from a member of the Church of Rome, and at all events it tacitly condemns much that has both recently and formerly been written by Popish authors. Probably Mr Keenan had not adverted to this passage when he prepared his Catechism.

is an appearance of reference concerning such things as these, to his own works or to historic works of good reputation, allegations founded upon them, do, perhaps, sometimes produce an impression where the grosser kind of fabrications would be disregarded.

Keenan's Catechism exhibits a pretty lengthened argument from the history of the Reformation and the character of the Reformers. Of Calvin he disposes indeed much more briefly than of Luther, but here he really gives himself freer scope, and unhesitatingly adopts the worst lies that ever were fabricated, both concerning Calvin's life and concerning his death.

It would be impossible however to bestow a particular attention, within the limits of this volume, upon all that Mr Keenan has contrived to accumulate against the Reformation and the Reformers. As a selection must be made, I shall confine myself now to what relates to England and to Scotland, and even on these parts of the subject only to a very few out of many particulars. He who advances charges of the kind now under consideration has at least one great advantage over him who undertakes to refute them,—he can accomplish his purpose in comparatively few words. To make an accusation is easy, where no other proof is required than a reference to somebody who made it before; but to disprove it, or to shew how utterly deficient it is of proof when traced back to its origin, may often require both much trouble and many sentences.

Concerning the Reformation in England, the great authority depended upon by Mr Keenan is Cobbett's book, or rather his huge political pamphlet, entitled "A History of the Protestant Reformation in England and Scotland, shewing how that event has impoverished the main body of the people in those countries, and containing a list of the Abbeys, Priories, Nunneries, Hospitals, and other Religious Foundations in England, and Wales, and Ireland, confiscated, seized on, or alienated by the Protestant 'Reformation' Sovereigns and Parliaments,"—a work replete with virulence,—a storehouse of partial statements and perverted arguments, with other even worse matters, from which Popish authors

seem well contented to draw. It is curious to mark this instance of the association of Popery and Infidelity, and to see the priests of the Church of Rome thus welcoming as their ally the exhumers of Tom Paine's bones.

Keenan devotes a section of his *Controversial Catechism* to the subject of the English Reformation. It consists of fourteen questions and answers, and every one of these, except the two last, contains a reference to Cobbett's *History of the Reformation*. In every instance, also, this is the sole authority.

It is thus that Mr Keenan begins. Referring to what he is pleased to assume as the established conclusion of his previous section, he says:—

“The German Reformers were not then messengers of heaven, but emissaries from a very different quarter; is this also true of the leading English and Scottish Reformers? What say you of Cranmer?”

“He was chief adviser of Henry VIII., the greatest monster that ever disgraced Christianity, in all the sacrileges and murders he committed: his name should be everlastingly execrated. The cold-blooded, perfidious, impious, blasphemous caitiff expired amidst the flames he had himself kindled. (Cobbett, *Letter ii.*, n. 64, *Hist. Reform.*)”¹

What an outpouring of invective! and all this before anything has been substantiated to warrant one of these opprobrious terms! And it may be remarked that Mr Keenan seems to think very complacently of Cranmer's expiring amidst flames; but that he himself kindled them, is, perhaps, a little too hastily taken for granted.

It is utterly ridiculous to charge the Protestant religion with the character of Henry VIII. That character was formed in another school. Protestants as well as Papists believe his change of religion to have been a mere matter of convenience. That the English Reformation was promoted, in outward respects, through his desertion of the Church of Rome, is unquestionable; but every enlightened Protestant must regret the influence which he exercised over its spiritual character and progress. It is not for us to pronounce upon the reasons of God's providence; “his

¹ Keenan, *Controv. Cat.*, ch. iii, sect. 6.

footsteps are not known.” We cannot tell why he permitted the Reformation to be suppressed in Spain,—or to be mixed with turbid elements by the malign influence of Henry VIII. in England, or even afterwards by his daughter Elizabeth. It is not necessary for Protestants to attempt the vindication of either. Does not God sometimes employ base instruments for the accomplishment of his high and holy ends? Did he not employ Saul for the deliverance of Israel? and were not even the lusts of Samson connected with instances of divinely and miraculously accomplished triumph over the Philistines? It is a mere figure of rhetoric by which Henry VIII. is designated the greatest monster that ever disgraced Christianity; but however bad he was, and he certainly was very bad, it can scarcely be made a just ground of reproach against any of the Reformers that they availed themselves of his political protection,—and if some of them spoke of him in too favourable terms, or failed to testify against his deeds of wickedness, or allowed themselves to be connected with him in proceedings unworthy of their principles and character, we are not called upon to justify them any more than we are called to justify David, or Peter, or Abraham in all the instances of their conduct.¹

And not only was the character of Henry VIII. formed in the Popish Church,—but in the doctrines of that Church, generally speaking, he also continued and died. He held the doctrine of transubstantiation to the last, and put the best Protestants of his kingdom to death for denying it, whilst he put to death also one or two Papists for denying his and maintaining the Pope's supremacy. And to what influences had Henry's character been subjected in the Church of Rome? Papists make much ado about his divorce from Catherine of Arragon, his brother's widow, whom he had married. But they forget to tell us that in marrying her at all he only acted upon a dispensation from the Pope, purchased with money, permitting him to do what, even in the

¹ See, on the subject of this paragraph, M'Gavin's reply to Cobbett, entitled, “*The Protestant Reformation Vindicated.*”

Popish Church itself, is regarded as contrary to the express law of God. "If Henry ever had any right sense of moral obligation," it is well remarked by M^rGavin, "this must have tended to weaken it or to destroy it altogether."¹ "It is not surprising," says the same author, "that after this, one who had unlimited power and the wealth of a kingdom at command, should have become a monster in wickedness."

But I shall only remark, in conclusion, that the Reformation existed in England, and had made great progress, before Henry found it convenient to cast off his allegiance to Rome. And therefore the assertion of Cobbett, that the Reformation was engendered in beastly lust and brought forth in hypocrisy and perfidy,² is a manifest and palpable falsehood, worthy only of a Jesuit, or of the man who could enlist in the ranks of Papists without adopting their religion, to advocate their cause and to echo from the lips of some Popish priest the assertion that the Catholic religion, (meaning thereby the Popish,) was the only religion known to our own forefathers for nine hundred years.³

Like the use made of Cobbett's History, as an authority concerning the English Reformation and the character of Cranmer, is the use made of Tytler's History with regard to the Scottish Reformation and the character of Knox. To this subject also Mr Keenan devotes a section, (a much longer one than in the former case, as was to be expected in a work intended chiefly for Scotland,) and as in the former case he had almost exclusively quoted Cobbett, so here he almost exclusively quotes Tytler. There is a shew of argumentative fairness in referring to a Protestant historian, but it disappears when Mr Tytler's strong prejudices are considered, and the perpetual manifestation of them in this very part of his history,—his hatred of the very name of Knox, and his utter want of sympathy at least with all that was distinctive and characteristic in the Scottish Reformation. He is indeed just such a historian as Papists might have

¹ Protestant Reformation Vindicated, Letter vi.

² Cobbett, Hist. Ref., Letter iv., (p. 111.)

³ Ibid., Letter i., (p. 8.)

longed to see, respectable enough to give apparent value to a statement sanctioned by his name, yet imbued with a hostility against the Presbyterianism of Scotland almost as intense as their own, one in whose pages they could find facts falsified and motives misrepresented according to their own method, and if not the outpourings of unmeasured rage such as Mr Keenan himself has supplied, yet at all events the frequent employment, perhaps more dangerous to the cause of truth and more unworthy of the dignity of history, of the cold and courteously uttered sneer.¹

Mr Keenan thus opens against Knox.

"Cranmer and his associates in the English Reformation were anything but men sent of God to reform his Church; was Knox, the founder of Presbyterianism, a man of the same stamp?"

"According to our latest and best Scottish Protestant historian, he was a dreadful compound of vice, as you shall shortly be convinced."²

There is art in this reference to Tytler as our latest and best Scottish Protestant historian, though the use made of Cobbett's History in the previous section is of itself proof sufficient that it was not merely, nor at all, for the qualities thus mentioned, that Tytler was specially selected.

But the way in which Mr Keenan uses his sole authority is somewhat curious. To the question, *What does Beza say of Knox?* he sets down the following answer,—

"That he was condemned as a heretic and degraded from the priesthood, (Tytler, vol. VI., p. 3.) This accounts for his reforming propensities."³

The reader would not readily imagine that Tytler, the authority quoted, unceremoniously rejects Beza's statement. "The fact asserted by Beza, of his having been condemned as a heretic, and degraded from the priesthood, rests on no certain evidence."⁴ M^rCrie indeed admits the fact on the evidence of

¹ See North British Review, for Nov. 1845.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. iii., sect. 7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Tytler's History of Scotland, VI., 3.

Beza, who was likely enough to be well informed on such a point.¹ But in rejecting it, Tytler contrives to throw discredit also upon another statement, to which he does not find it convenient to refer, which M'Crie also admits upon the same authority,—that Cardinal Beaton employed assassins to waylay Knox. Perhaps Mr Keenan was not aware that he was restoring this statement to its place in veritable history. He seems to have wished to give an unfavourable aspect to Knox's career by accounting for the commencement of it in a way not very honourable to him; although in reality the question is one not in the least degree affecting Knox's reputation, and it is merely ridiculous to say that his being condemned as a heretic and degraded from the priesthood, "*accounts for his reforming propensities.*" What an easy way the Church of Rome would have, according to this view of her representative in Dundee, of keeping all her children to herself! She must also be in the habit—if we may infer anything from his words except his own anxiety to abuse Knox—of condemning them as heretics and degrading them from the priesthood before they exhibit any *reforming propensities*!

Concerning the slaughter of Beaton, Mr Keenan says more as to Knox's participation in the responsibility of that act than Tytler's words express, though perhaps not more than they were meant to insinuate. It being admitted on all hands that Knox regarded the fact of Beaton's death with satisfaction, it has been argued with some shew of plausibility that he made himself accessory to it, by taking shelter amongst the conspirators in the castle of St Andrews; but it is to be remembered that his own life was eagerly sought upon account of his religion by the Cardinal's successor in the Archbishopric, as it had been sought by the Cardinal himself, and that he was obliged to conceal himself and to provide for his safety by removing from place to place.² Although Knox did not look upon the death of Cardinal Beaton as a murder, even those who most strenuously condemn his opinion, have no right to rank him amongst the perpetrators

¹ M'Crie's Life of Knox, I., 38.

² Ibid., I., 43, 44.

of the crime. But Mr Keenan delights in speaking of them as "the murderers," and evidently wishes to attach this designation, even upon account of this transaction, to Knox himself.¹ It is thus that he proceeds:—

"What took place in the castle of Saint Andrews in 1546?

"Knox, who had retreated into the castle, and joined the murderers, declared with these murderers, that they would give up the castle the moment they received a Papal absolution from the murder of the Cardinal; and yet, while he was emitting this declaration, he and they were writing to Henry VIII. that he should try to delay the absolution, that they only wished to gain time, and that they had no notion of giving up the fortress. What hypocrisy, for an emissary from heaven! (Tytler, vol. VI., p. 8)."²

Now something like this story Tytler certainly tells, but with one important difference from that version of it which Mr Keenan ascribes to him. *He in no way connects Knox's name with it.* If Mr Keenan had not made a mistake in this particular, he would not so readily have found reason for his exclamation, "What hypocrisy for an emissary from heaven!"

The correctness of the story it may be left to others to discuss, and the moral character implied in it. At present we are concerned only with the attempt to defame Knox. However, it may be remarked, that there is not even a probability that at this time he directed the counsels of those amongst whom he sought refuge when hotly pursued for his life by the emissaries of a Popish persecutor.

Some of the charges against Knox are sufficiently serious: some of them are purely ridiculous. Of the latter class is the attempt to fasten upon him the imputation of cowardice. This attempt is oftener than once repeated by Mr Keenan. It may be enough to take notice of the first instance.

"Had Knox the merit of being even a courageous apostle of error?

¹ When Sir Archibald Alison in his history, (chap. xxvi.,) justifies Napoleon's poisoning of the sick at Jaffa, however we may reprobate the sentiments of the historian, we do not think of looking upon him as himself guilty of the crime.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., chap. iii., sect. 7.

"Oh no! he was very unlike St Peter or St Paul; he was reported to the Queen as a seducer; he fled; and Tytler says, 'he betrayed some want of the ardent courage of the martyr.' (Tytler, VI, 80, 81.)"¹

Mr Keenan does Tytler no injustice in this quotation.—*"Judging with all charity,"* says the historian, with what in the circumstances may well be called a loathsome affectation of impartiality, "it must be admitted, that whilst his writings at this season had all the impassioned zeal, his conduct betrayed some want of the ardent courage of the martyr." The dislike and prejudice which dictated this verdict, appear too plainly when it is viewed in connection with Mr Tytler's own statements in the preceding part of the same sentence and in the sentence next before it, that "possibly by retiring he saved his life," and that "the rage of his opponents was about to assume a deadly aspect." "By retiring at this time," says Dr M'Crie,² "he not only preserved his own life, and reserved his labours to a more fit opportunity, but he also averted the storm of persecution from the heads of his brethren."—It is as needless to inquire into Mr Tytler's notions of courage, as it is needless seriously to defend John Knox from the imputation of cowardice. "There lies he who never feared the face of man," said the Regent Morton at his grave. Mr Tytler's judgment could only be vindicated if we were to suppose the ardent courage of the martyr to be best manifested in a senseless rushing upon danger. But if it is disgraceful to Mr Tytler to have brought this charge against the memory of the illustrious Reformer, it by no means follows that it is equally disgraceful to Mr Keenan to have copied it. At his hands nothing else could have been expected: nor does he vary from his ordinary self when he entirely omits to consider the commandment of our Lord to his disciples, that they should flee from persecution, or when in making mention of St Peter and St Paul, to say how unlike to them John Knox proved himself by fleeing, he fails to advert to such circumstances as Peter's

¹ Keenan, Controv., Cat., chap. iii., sect. 7.

² Life of Knox, I., 191.

withdrawal from Judea to Cesarea,¹ or Paul's being let down from the wall of Damascus in a basket.²

But there is a singularity in Mr Keenan's way of telling this story about Knox's flight, which deserves a moment's attention. "He was reported to the Queen as a *seducer*." What does Mr Keenan mean? The word is ambiguous. Was it purposely so? Would he have his readers to imagine that some scandalous story had broken out, of a kind of which he makes no plain assertion? If he meant only to convey Tytler's meaning, why did he not more fully quote Tytler's words, "*a seducer of the people?*" The expressions are not exactly synonymous.

A graver charge is that of participating in and counselling murder. This is again and again advanced. One instance is remarkable, for the light in which it presents before us, when examined, not only Mr Keenan, the Popish controversialist, but Mr Tytler, the *Protestant* historian.³

"Did Knox counsel murder?"

"When the holy sacrifice of the mass was to be offered in the Queen's chapel, Knox inveighed so bitterly against it, that the furious Master of Lindsay, in armour, rushed to the door, declaring that the priests should *die the death*. This madman was prevented from executing his purpose by Lord James, who opposed him at the door of the chapel, for which Lord James was ironically and bitterly reprehended by Knox. (Tytler, vol. VI., pp. 237, 238.) At a subsequent period the death of a Papal envoy was resolved on by the murderous family of Knox, and he was saved only by the peremptory remonstrance of the Earl of Mar. (Ibid., 263.) 'Knox and his brethren,' says Tytler, '*excited feelings of resentment, and his endeavours were seldom accompanied by sound discretion or Christian love.*' (Ibid., p. 269.)"⁴

Yet in all this, were it all true, there would be no proof that Knox counselled murder. A speaker may use unguarded language, which excites even more than he intends, the passions of his hearers, without being guilty of counselling murder; or

¹ Acts xii., 19.

² Acts ix., 25.

³ "KNOX, THE MURDERER," says Mr Keenan, in his treatise on the Veneration and Invocation of Saints, &c., and appends a note, "*See the Protestant historian Tytler.*"

⁴ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. iii., sect. 7.

what shall we say of even the more guarded of those inflammatory harangues in which the present priests of Ireland abound? But Mr Keenan boldly adduces this as proof that Knox counselled murder! The quotation from Tytler at the close (correct enough, although abridged) is so manifestly nothing to the purpose, that it requires no further remark. Of the story of the papal emissary, it needs only to be said, that the connection of Knox's name with it is all Mr Keenan's own, and nothing more condemnatory could be said, even although it may be observed that he makes no direct charge against Knox, but only against his "family," the Protestants of Scotland. The first instance to which he refers is worthy of a little more consideration. It concerns us not at the present moment to inquire how far the Reformers of Scotland were in error when they maintained that idolatry should be punished with death as amongst the ancient Jews, and that the performance of the mass was therefore to be prevented. We have nothing to do with their apprehension that the toleration of this "idol" in the land would draw down upon it God's sore judgments, nor with the question whether they had not adopted the very principle of persecution from which they had themselves so recently suffered. We have only to consider the facts of the case, comparing them with Mr Keenan's statements, and to examine a little into the statement made of them by Mr Tytler himself. "It was even argued by Knox," says this historian, "that the Jews were more tolerable in their tenets than the Romish Church: he would rather see, he said, ten thousand French soldiers in Scotland than suffer a single mass. And when the Master of Lindsay, a furious zealot, heard that it was about to be celebrated, he buckled on his harness, assembled his followers, and rushing into the court of the palace, shouted aloud that the priests should die the death. The Lord James, however, opposed this violence, placed himself at the door of the chapel, overawed the multitude, and preserved the lives of the chaplains who officiated, for which he was bitterly and ironically attacked by Knox."¹ And here Mr Tytler

¹ Tytler, VI., 237, 238.

quotes as his only authority, Knox's History of the Reformation. How different the account there given! deficient in many circumstances, such as the *buckling on of harness* and *rushing into the court*, but particularly in the bitter and ironical attack which we naturally turn to it to seek. "But the Lord James," says Knox, "the man whom all the godly did most reverence, took upon him to keep the chapel door. His best excuse was, that he would stop all Scottish men to enter into the mass. But it was and is sufficiently known that the door was kept that none should have entress to trouble the priest."¹ Here is no bitter and ironical attack. And Mr Tytler might have found from the pages of the work to which he referred, that even the saying of Knox which he quotes, about rather seeing ten thousand armed enemies in the realm than one mass, was not uttered until a week after that scene, which he describes with such graphic circumstantiality, when Knox in preaching inveighed against idolatry. He might also have seen that Knox had used his influence in secret conference with earnest and zealous men, rather to mitigate than to encourage their fervency.² If Mr Tytler's mode of using his manuscript authorities in the State Paper Office be not different from that in which he has used this part of Knox's printed history, they required to be searched again by others, that we may know the import of their testimony.

It was to be expected that Mr Keenan should repeat Tytler's story about the connection of Knox and Craig with the murder of Rizzio. "Tytler," he says, "establishes this fact beyond a doubt."³ It was to be expected that Mr Keenan should be quite satisfied. I shall not attempt to enter into the discussion of this point. It is unnecessary to exhibit any further illustration either of Mr Keenan, or of his great authority, the "Protestant" historian. The reader who desires to see it will find a thorough examination of Tytler's whole case against Knox and Craig in a very admirable article, entitled "Mary

¹ Knox (Wodrow Society's Edition), II., 271.

² Ibid., 276, 277.

³ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. iii., sect. 7.

Stuart and her Times," in the North British Review for November 1845.

I refrain from touching upon the subject of Knox's conduct towards Queen Mary,—so often made the ground of very unjust reproach against him, not only by the advocates of Popery and of despotism, but by sentimentalists, with whom it probably has more effect in determining them to a dislike both of Knox and of his religious opinions, than all the attempts which have been made to prove him a participator in murder. It would be interesting to investigate the causes of that feeling of romantic interest and of personal affection with which Queen Mary is still regarded; and how far it acts as a spell to draw imaginative and enthusiastic persons into errors, seriously affecting, even at the present hour, their whole views and conduct.

The malevolence of Popery has always raged against Knox. Archibald Hamilton, the author of a "Dialogue concerning the Confusion of the Calvinistic Sect," did not hesitate to assert that when Knox fled from England after the accession of Queen Mary to the throne of that country, he first excited a dangerous rebellion against the Queen, by teaching the unlawfulness of female government,—and that the Queen, having marched against the rebels, defeated them with great slaughter; upon which Knox, stained with their blood, fled to Geneva, carrying along with him a rich noblewoman!¹ The same veracious author dilates upon the multitude of Knox's notorious adulteries and incests. We are told that he defiled with his adulteries almost every house which he entered: and we have similar authority for believing that in Geneva the devil went "familiarily up and down the town," buying the souls of poor indigent men for a small sum of money. Mr Keenan speaks of the Reformer's character in terms so strong that he would almost seem to have read Hamilton's lies and believed them, or those of his successors, Nicol Burne, and James Laing, who even exceeded him in their wicked falsehoods. Mr Keenan calls Knox a "*dreadful compound of all vice*"—a "*hypocrite*"—a "*convicted hypocrite*"—a "*hoary hypocrite*"—

¹ See M'Crie's Life of Knox, I., 120, note.

a "*cowardly hypocrite*"—a "*very model of hypocrisy*"—a "*participator in murder*"—a "*sacrilegious participator in murder*"—a "*murderer*," &c., &c. There is a singular bitterness and gnashing ferocity in the style which he employs, crowding into his pages epithets like the above, and attempting to sustain them by references to Tytler's History. He does not quote Archibald Hamilton, nor repeat Archibald Hamilton's stories. Quotations from Tytler were more likely to be credited; and Tytler's account of Knox is certainly bad enough, though it proves upon examination dishonourable only to himself. But Hamilton and his fellows were highly approved in their day; their works were recommended by Popish dignitaries,—one of Hamilton's being pronounced "very orthodox, and worthy of being ushered into the light for the profit of the Church,"—whilst Popish authors on the continent of Europe copied and spread their slanders.

Mr Keenan may perhaps listen to a word of advice. No man ought to adopt the charges and stories which he has adopted regarding Calvin, and more particular reference to which shall not here at present be made, unless he be prepared also to copy Nicol Burne's story regarding the "young woman, in my Lord Ochiltree's place," who fell almost dead because she saw John Knox's "master, Satan, in a black man's likeness, with him, through a bore of the door."—The argument from the History of the Reformation and the character of the Reformers recoils upon the Church of Cardinal Beaton, Archibald Hamilton, and Nicol Burne. For the tree shall be known by its fruits.

In conclusion of this chapter, it may not be inappropriate to advert to the Popish doctrine of *Exclusive Salvation*.

Dr James Butler, in his Catechism, having emphatically asserted that no one can be saved out of the true Church, proceeds to make his meaning quite clear, by informing us that the Church is called Roman, "because the visible head of the Church is the Bishop of Rome, and because St Peter and his successors fixed their see in Rome."¹

¹ Butler's Cat., Lesson x.

Many Popish writers in this country, having written in part for Protestant eyes, and knowing how odious this doctrine is esteemed, have been much more cautious in their statement of it. Gother makes an exception in favour of those, whose being out of the communion of Rome "is owing purely to their being deprived of the means of knowing the truth, which they would gladly embrace if they knew it:" and Milner makes a similar exception in favour of "invincible ignorance,"—although it has been conclusively shewn that they have no authority of their Church for making such exceptions, which are plainly contrary to the well-known decree of Pope Boniface VIII., and of the third Lateran Council, *declaring, asserting, defining, and pronouncing*, "that it is necessary to salvation for every human being to be subject to the Pope of Rome," and to the obligation under which every Popish priest comes at his ordination to maintain and promote the faith set forth in the creed of Pope Pius IV., as the "Catholic faith, out of which no one can be saved,"—that faith including transubstantiation, purgatory, the veneration of the Virgin and of images, an acknowledgment of the "Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church" as the mother and mistress of all Churches, nay, all that has been declared "by the sacred canons and ecumenical councils, and especially by the Holy Synod of Trent."¹ Cardinal Wiseman follows in the same strain, wondering at the misconceptions and misrepresentations which have created so much prejudice against his Church,—urgently calling attention to his limitation of the exclusive rule to those only who *culpably*—"mind, *culpably*"—reject the doctrines of the Church; nay, enlarging his liberality to the utmost, to hope that "even in the separated tribes" there may be "a host of sincere enquirers and conscientious observers, who have not *knowingly* bent the knee to error."² Mr Keenan also qualifies his condemnatory sentence, though his qualification is very differently expressed. "For those who are not in the true

¹ See Cunningham's Notes to Stillingfleet, chap. xxxv.

² Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 326.

Church," he says, "that is, for those who are not joined to the soul of the Church, there can be no hope of salvation."¹ And in a chapter devoted to the *charge of uncharitableness*, he tells us that "all those sincere people belong to the soul of the Church, who being baptized, and believing in the great fundamental truths of Christianity, and who are prevented from believing it in its details, not by carelessness, nor temporal interest, nor human respect, nor the spirit of obstinacy, nor by malice, but simply because they never doubted, and never had sufficient means of knowing the truth, which they would embrace at once and with gladness, could they *only* discover it,—all these belong to the soul of the Church and will be saved, if they lead good lives and do not violate God's law."² The reader may consider what hope of salvation can be founded upon leading a good life and not violating God's law! But irrespective of this, it may be doubted whether the seemingly liberal concession in fact concedes anything. Its charitableness would certainly not include any one who has ever considered any of the doctrines of the Church of Rome and rejected them, whom also Dr Wiseman would certainly not excuse from *culpability*. Moreover, it extends only to baptized persons, and Mr Keenan himself tells us "that every Protestant has much reason to doubt whether he be baptized."³

It is worthy of notice that this evanescent exception to the otherwise unqualified doctrine of exclusive salvation, is not at all to be found in the Catechism of Scheffmacher, upon which Mr Keenan's is based. The Jesuit professor plainly and without reserve says, that "out of the true Church there is no possibility of salvation," and says nothing about any possible con-

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. vii., sect. 1. The meaning of the term *soul of the Church* will appear from these propositions stated and maintained by Perrone, (Praelect. Theol., II., 710, 714), "*Omnes et soli justī pertinent ad ecclesiae animam*," and "*Ad corpus ecclesiae, seu ad visibilem ecclesiam, spectant omnes Christi fideles, tam justī quam peccatores*." But of course the term *invisible Church*, as understood amongst Protestants, is of very different signification.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxvi.

³ Ibid., xxii., sect. 2.

nection with the soul apart from the body of it. It is curious to observe how our British atmosphere seems to favour large developments of Popish charitableness.

But Mr Keenan says, "It is not only not uncharitable, but very charitable in Catholics to declare to the world what is laid down in Scripture, which teaches that sects, and heresies, and schisms, are sins which exclude from heaven."¹ Now this argument is founded upon a sound and good principle,—although in the very mode of stating it, violence is done to Scripture truth. However, there ought to be no hesitation in admitting that it is charitable to teach all truth, and especially to warn sinners of their danger, that they may be brought to faith and repentance; and no genuine Protestant can have any sympathy with the false charity which would represent all men as in a likely enough way to be saved irrespective of all differences of religion. But the question is, What is truth? And the charge of uncharitableness against Papists is not merely for *proclaiming*, as Mr Keenan seems to imagine, but for *holding* that there is no salvation beyond the pale of their own Church, or for those who dispute *any one* of its doctrines, or who refuse allegiance to the Pope of Rome.

Here again, Papists are always ready to say, You maintain the very exclusiveness with which you charge us. Cardinal Wiseman even represents it as impossible for a Church to have a code or rule of faith at all, without the implicit maintenance of some such doctrine. "If not," he says, "what constitutes the necessity of doctrine in reference to the revelation from God?"² Thus he seems to think the way cleared for his applying without fear of reproach, to the whole doctrines of his own Church, the words "He that believeth not shall be condemned." Yet nothing can be more obvious to any one not wilfully blind, than the difference between the limitation of that text to faith in Jesus Christ, and the extension of it equally to everything in

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxvi.

² Wiseman, Lect. on Principal Doct., I., 324.

the creed of Pope Pius IV., or in the decrees of the Council of Trent.

Mr Keenan also tries to retort the charge of uncharitableness. He puts the question, "Do Protestants expressly teach the *very doctrine* they unjustly blame in us, *exclusive salvation*?" His answer is long; but it consists entirely of extracts from Protestant Confessions and Catechisms. A specimen may suffice, to shew how the extracts are made, and how they are dealt with: and perhaps the fairest way is to take the first. "The sixteenth article of the *Old Confession* says, 'That there is *one Kirk*, out of which *Kirk* neither life nor eternal felicity is to be hoped for.'1 The *Old Confession* here quoted from is that of the Church of Scotland, adopted in 1560. The difference betwixt the doctrine which it teaches and that of exclusive salvation taught by the Church of Rome, is as wide as the difference of the senses in which the term Church is employed. In the one case it is the company of persons visibly and formally associated,—in the other case it is "a companie and multitude of men chosin of God, who rightlie worship and embrace him by true faith in Christ Jesus."² Mr Keenan has succeeded in extracting words, the sound of which may seem to warrant him in saying that they contain his own "very doctrine" of exclusive salvation; but he has succeeded in shutting his eyes to the whole context from which alone he could have learned the meaning of these words, and has taken care not to extract the definition, given in the same section of the Confession, of the principal term employed. In fact the Popish doctrine is, that salvation is confined within a certain visible and formal pale, whereas the "*Old Confession*" connects it with faith in Christ, and limits it only within such a pale as is marked by the operation of the Spirit of God producing faith and piety in men's hearts. For "*this Kirk*,"—says the Confession in words almost immediately following those which Mr Keenan sees and quotes,—

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxvi.

² See the Confession, in Calderwood's History of the Kirk of Scotland, II., 26, 27.

"this Kirk is invisible, knowne onlie to God, who alone knoweth whom he hath chosin; and comprehendeth as weill, as said is, the elect that be departed, commonlie called the Kirk triumphant, as those that yitt live and fight against sinne and Satan, or sall live heerafter."¹

The rest of the extracts are similar to this; and by these means Mr Keenan reaches the conclusion, "That those pretended lovers of charitable doctrine must be very blind, who look for such in any Protestant communion."² But what are we to think of the blindness which only permits a man to see half a sentence of a Confession of Faith, and shuts out the context that might help him to the comprehension of its meaning?

What an outcry would be raised against any Protestant denomination, considerable enough to engage much of the public attention, if it were to adopt a doctrine similar to this Popish one, and to limit salvation to those who are within its own pale! But the Church of Rome can still succeed in gaining a reputation for liberality, although in her is realized all that was ever alleged or fancied of bigotry, and her sentence of damnation is clear and strong against all who do not agree with her in all things. It is not, after all, so strange that her advocates should put forth claims to such a reputation on her behalf, as that any portion of mankind should be found simple enough to admit them.

¹ See the Confession, in Calderwood's History, as above.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxvi.

CHAPTER VI.

MORALITY.

THE CONFESSIONAL—PERSECUTION.

I cannot conclude without devoting at least a brief chapter to the subject of Popish morality, although of this subject it is impossible for me to give even a complete outline, and I must be contented with merely touching upon a few points of it here and there. These I shall select as they present themselves in such Popish works as have already been chiefly dealt with. It would be fair enough to seek illustrations of Popish principles in Popish practice, and to bring together here all the facts bearing upon this subject which have come to light in course of the last ten or twenty years,—in some of which the character not of mere ordinary priests but of high dignitaries, has been directly compromised. And a work of this kind, a history of the Popish Church in this country for twenty years or upwards, would be both interesting and important at the present moment. But after all, evidence of this kind possesses greatest importance when viewed in connection with evidence of another kind; and when the actual morality of Popery in any particular age or country is seen to be in accordance with its theoretical morality. Indeed, it might almost be deemed sufficient to enquire into the theoretical morality itself.

The connection which subsists between legalism and immorality is not only manifested in the Church of Rome by the character of priests and people, but is made still clearer by the development of a very unsound moral system in the writings of her theologians. It is natural enough that he who thinks to gain spiritual rewards by his own merits should endeavour to mitigate the demands of God's law, and to accommodate it, in some measure, either to his own inclinations or to his own abilities.

On the distinction betwixt mortal and venial sin, already considered in a former chapter, I shall not again enlarge. Its tendencies are sufficiently obvious. To represent many sins as trifling and insignificant is certainly not calculated to enforce the precepts or considerations which are directed to the object of restraining men from the commission of them; and we have seen how common such a way of speaking is, and how far such representations are carried by the theologians and advocates of Rome. What notions they have indeed of sin in general may be too certainly inferred from their whole doctrine of human merits and the efficacy of human sufferings, as well as from the expressions which they occasionally employ—for an example of which may be taken the following sentence of an *Act of Hope* in the *Key of Heaven*, where, although the author perhaps imagined that amidst the turgid nonsense of his style, he was exalting to the utmost the mercy of God and the value of the blood of Christ, yet it is obvious that the real tendency is to extenuate man's iniquity.

"I, who am an abyss of nothing, invoke thee, who art the abyss of all goodness; for though my sins are innumerable and very grievous, yet they are but light and trivial when compared to thy boundless mercy and the infinite ransom of thy blood."

It is also worthy of notice that the devout Papist is encouraged to regard it as a very unlikely thing that he commits mortal sin in any case, or that he has need therefore to have re-

¹ Key of Heaven, 177.

course to any other expiation than that which suffices for mere venial offences. Father Quadrupani thus discourses in his *Spiritual Consoler*:—

"To constitute a mortal sin, three circumstances must be united; 1st, The matter must be grave. 2dly, The mind must have a full knowledge of the culpability of the act which it commits, or of the omission which it permits, or of the danger of the occasion of sin to which it exposes itself. 3dly, The will must decide with an entire consent, and a criminal preference for the forbidden act, the culpable omission, or dangerous occasion.

"These reflections may serve to reassure your soul, if the fear of having sinned mortally should trouble you; for it is with difficulty these three conditions are found in unison in a soul which truly fears God; but perfect security can come, and ought to come, from obedience only."

This is spiritual consolation such as Popery supplies, healing the wound of the soul slightly, and speaking peace where there is no peace. And nothing can be more manifest than the tendency of such instructions to encourage all looseness and disorderliness of life.

Moreover, if the patient feels his sickness so sensibly, that he cannot easily be healed and comforted by all the consolatory considerations suggested to his mind, he is told to have confidence in the opinion of his physician when he pronounces it to be merely a phantasy; and the priest has rules laid down for him with great minuteness by the learned doctors of his Church, who have speculated over all possibilities of lust and sin, by which he may determine whether in any case revealed to him in confession, there has been that full consent of the will which is requisite to make sin mortal.² And so Father Quadrupani says:—

"When your director, upon the explanation you have given him, pronounces that you have not consented, you ought to rest satisfied with his decision, fixing yourself there in undisturbed tranquillity, repulsing all fear of not having been well understood, or of not having sufficiently explained yourself. For these fears are a new artifice of the demon, to ravish from you the merit of obedience, and as it has been remarked above, to dwell in such inquietude is a very serious failing, and renders all direction

¹ Quadrupani, *Spiritual Consoler*, or *Instructions for Pious Souls*, ch. ii.

² See Dens, *Theol.*, I., 305, "*Regulæ in dubio consensus.*"

impossible, as you cease to see God himself in the person of your director."¹

Saint Alphonsus Liguori also—besides declaring that sins committed against a man's own welfare are venial in their own nature²—exhibits great solicitude to prevent priests, when acting as confessors or directors, from falling into the great error of hastily condemning sins as mortal, and so burdening and oppressing the consciences of those to whom they are in the place of God. "*Valde periculosum est confessariis damnare aliquid de culpa gravi, ubi certitudo non elucet.*"³

Very similar in character and tendency to the doctrine of venial sin is the doctrine of attrition, or that imperfect sorrow for sin, arising out of no regard to the glory of God, but merely from a consideration of the deformity of sin and the fear of punishment, which, when conjoined with confession to a priest and his absolution, is represented as a sufficient substitute for contrition or godly sorrow. But upon this I shall not attempt to enter at all. And for the further examination of the subject of Popish morality, it may probably be found, for the present purpose, the best way, as it will also be the easiest, to look into a few Popish books in succession, and to inquire into the morality which they teach. I shall say nothing of the morality which they otherwise *exhibit*; the reader will, however, judge of it for himself according to the specimens brought before him, not only in the present but in former chapters.

Let us begin with Keenan's Catechism of the Christian Religion. Here, it must be acknowledged, we have little of that

¹ Quadrupani, *Spiritual Consoler*, ch. ii.

² *Peccata contra bonum proprium commissa ut plurimum sunt venialia ex genere suo: ut v. g. inutilis, et vana concupiscentia, vana oblectatio, prodigalitas, curiositas, superfluitas cultus, et vestitus, nugæ, otium, excessus in cibo, potu, somno, risu, usu conjugii, timore, tristitia, appetitu pecuniæ, laudis,* &c. (Lig., *Theol. Moral.*, I., 263.) If the saint afterwards admits most sins against the decalogue to be mortal, he means no inconsistency: it only shews how he understands the decalogue.

³ Lig., *Theol. Moral.*, I., 263.

grossness of morality which Pascal censured in the Jesuits, and of which we shall by and bye see sufficient specimens in the works of Dens and Liguori. The reflections which arise from a comparison of this fact with Mr Keenan's assertion, that all "Catholics" teach the same morality, have already found a place in connection with the Popish unity. But still the morality of this Catechism is very different from that of the Bible. The whole system is vitiated by the elevation of the commandments of the Church to a level with the commandments of God.

"How can we know that we are really devoted to God by faith, hope, and charity?"

"If we keep his commandments and those of his Church, we have reason to believe that we are devoted to God alone. 'By this we know that we have known him, if we keep his commandments.'—1 John ii. 3, 4; Luke x. 16.

"What inference do you draw from all this?"

"That to live a Christian life, we must avoid vice and practise virtue; and, consequently, we must observe the commandments of God and his Church. This is the sum of Christian morality."¹

Here the sole connecting link between the commandments of the Church and Christian morality is in the citation of the text, Luke x. 16, of which the words are these, "He that heareth you heareth me; and he that despiseth you despiseth me; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me,"—words which, if regarded in the light of their context, as surely they ought to be, will be seen at once to have no relation whatever to the subject, but to concern only the preaching of the gospel,—"*The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you,*"—which the seventy disciples were sent forth to preach. There is no proof whatever of their having any reference, temporary or permanent, to any authority to establish ordinances or to issue commandments: and it is a mere attempt to impose upon men by the sound of words, to lay hold of these and apply them, in the way that Papists do, to the authorization of commandments nowhere written in the Scriptures. Moreover, it may well be deemed a strange thing, if the obedience of the commandments of the Church enter so

¹ Keenan, *Cat. of Chr. Rel.*, I., 157.

essentially into Christian morality, that the Apostle John, in that place which also Mr Keenan quotes, passes them by entirely unnoticed, saying only, "Hereby do we know that we know God, if we keep his commandments;" and in the same way also in the verses following, speaking of the keeping of his commandments and the keeping of his word; and again and again in other places of the same epistle, speaking only of the commandments of God as if the keeping of them alone were the whole sum and substance of Christian morality.¹

But, passing on to that part of Mr Keenan's Catechism where he proceeds to speak of the commandments of the Church, we find him acknowledging that ("in order to be saved") it is enough to obey God, but establishing the commandments of the Church in their high place by the declaration that "we do not obey God if we do not obey his Church."² And here he tries a new connecting link, Matt. xviii. 17; which, according to the use and wont of Papists, he asserts to mean that the Church has received power from God to give us commandments, and that we are ordered to obey her, and that those who disobey the Church are to be reputed as heathens and publicans. It has already been observed how unreasonable is all such use of this text, which has only to do with offences arising among brethren.

With such arguments have Papists been accustomed, from one century to another, to vindicate the authority of the Church and its commandments, which even the Council of Trent manifestly exalts to an equality with the commandments of God, pronouncing an anathema on any one who shall say that the justified man is not required to obey *the commandments of God and of the Church*, but only to believe, as if a bare and absolute promise of eternal life belonged to the gospel, without the condition of keeping the commandments.³

"What greater insolence can be imagined," says Chemnicus, "than to set the traditions of men upon the same level with the divine commandments,—nay, to prefer them to the divine com-

¹ See 1 John ii. 3, 4, 5; iii. 4, 22, 24; iv. 2, 3.

² Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 251. ³ Conc. Trid., Sess. vi., can. 20.

mandments, and so to prefer them, that it is pronounced to be a greater crime to violate human traditions, than to break God's commandments?"—"Go on," he adds,—“go on, thou purple beast, thou man of sin and son of perdition, fill up the measure of that which is written in the second chapter of Second Thessalonians, that all good men may know thee by thy colours! Exalt thyself above all that is called God or that is worshipped! Set thyself as God in the temple of God, shewing thyself that thou art God! say, as it stands in the fourteenth of Isaiah, ‘I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God; I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation: I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High!’ May God soon cause that other verse likewise to follow: ‘Yet thou shalt be brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit!’ Amen. Amen.”¹

That the commandments of the Church are really exalted above the commandments of God, will readily appear, if we only consider how many transgressions of the Ten Commandments are excused as merely *venial*,—how many sins of impurity for example, are placed by Popish moralists in this class,—and how many thefts, which are held to be of small consequence upon account of the smallness of the matter; whilst it is declared to be a *mortal* sin not to hear mass on a Sunday or holiday of obligation,² this being what is required in the very first of the commandments of the Church. Or we may consider the actual though not avowed abrogation of the second of the Divine commandments.

Mr Keenan makes a very extraordinary distinction, in regard to degrees of heinousness, which may help to shew us on what grounds Papists proceed in their classification of sins as mortal and venial. Having defined sins of frailty to be those which “have their cause in the weakness of human nature,” saying also, that “such, for example, are the sins we commit when

¹ Chemnicii Examen., 177.

² Most Rev. Dr James Butler's Catechism, Less. xx.

carried away by violent temptation, or the force of confirmed habit; such habit having been often previously repented of"—and having defined sins of malice to be those which we commit when "in cold blood, we violate the law out of pure and deliberate ill-will," he proceeds to tell us that sins of malice are of their own nature greater than sins of frailty, the circumstances being equal; but that "the contrary may be sometimes true; thus to curse from pure malice is a greater sin than to curse from frailty; whilst on the other hand, to steal a gooseberry from pure malice is not so great a sin as the profanation of the Lord's name, or the Lord's day, by frailty."¹ According to this theology the quantity of matter concerned is a more important consideration than the state of the sinner's heart. And in fact, Popery does its utmost in many ways to obliterate that distinguishing feature of Christianity,—that it is a religion of the heart, and requires us above all things to serve God with the heart.

It is remarkable how in stating what are called the seven capital sins, Popery has invented a classification which has no relation whatever to the Two Tables or the Ten Commandments of the Divine Law. The seven capital sins, Mr Keenan says, are "pride, covetousness, lust, gluttony, envy, anger, and sloth."² The same enumeration is given by Popish theologians in general: but there is an important difference in another respect. Mr Keenan says, the capital sins are so called, "because each one is the source of many other sins," but that they may be either mortal or venial; mortal, when the matter of the sins is serious and the consent complete; venial, when the matter is of less importance, or the consent not full and deliberate.³ But we have already seen⁴ that Dr James Butler, in his Catechism, enumerates these seven sins as the "*chief mortal* sins, commonly called capital and *deadly* sins,"—and that in the Key of Heaven they are mentioned simply as "*the seven deadly sins*." Now, although Mr Keenan and Peter Dens,⁵ and other theologians

¹ Keenan, Cat. of Ch. Rel., I., 163, 164.

² Ibid., I., 165.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See above, pp. 134, 135.

⁵ Dens, Theol., I., 347.

who write large books and have space and leisure to enter into particulars, explain the subject of the capital sins in a way which makes it possible for them to be venial rather than mortal, yet it is plain enough from the instances above cited, that there is a briefer, simpler, and more popular teaching, which warrants the statement that "according to the common catechisms," the mortal sins are acts of pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, or sloth.¹

Mr Keenan treats at some length of the seven capital sins, and then he proceeds to deal in like manner with the *virtues*, which are divided by Papists into two classes, theological and moral; the theological virtues being defined to be "those which immediately regard God," and being expressly these three, faith, hope, and charity; the moral virtues being "those which regulate our morals,"—"a great number," Mr Keenan says, "which may however be reduced to four principal virtues, which are called cardinal, because they are the foundation of the other virtues."² In his chapter on charity, he makes some statements which it may be well to consider. He begins by informing us that charity "is a gift of God, by which we love him, for his own

¹ Dr Cunningham's note to Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract., ch. vii.

² Keenan, Cat. of Ch. Rel., I., 175, 176.

It is curious to observe how Popish authors delight in this sort of numerical statement, of which perhaps it may be said that it is more convenient for the memory than helpful to the understanding. But in large catechisms like Mr Keenan's, it is carried far beyond the point at which an ordinary memory can find any convenience in it, and like the complex divisions and subdivisions with which some preachers of a former age were wont to encumber their discourses, it seems calculated only to produce or aggravate confusion. For example, in treating of pride, the first of the *seven capital sins*, Mr Keenan tells us that there are *four* different kinds of pride, which he proceeds to state: then he says that sins ordinarily produced by pride "are *nine*,—vain-glory, disobedience, self-praise without use or necessity, hypocrisy, against which Jesus has so often spoken; disputes, which have neither truth, nor charity, nor necessity to excuse them; obstinacy in one's own opinion, in spite of truth, justice, and authority; discords, schisms, and animosities; the love of novelty in religious matters; and ambition, so often condemned in the gospel." (Cat. of Ch. Rel., I., 166.)

sake, above all things, and our neighbour as ourselves, for God's sake."¹ But failing, even here, to distinguish betwixt charity, as it ought to be, and charity in that imperfection in which it exists in hearts where the flesh still lusts against the spirit, and the law which is in the members wars against the law of the mind; and influenced by the erroneous notion of man's necessary ability to keep the commandments which God has given him, he proceeds to abate the requirements of the Divine law in respect of the love of God himself.

"What do you mean by loving God above all things? That we should love him more than ourselves, and more than every thing in the world; and this we do, when we would renounce all that is most dear to us, rather than offend him."²

But this is obviously very far short of the Divine requirements as stated in the Holy Scripture, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind,"³—with regard to which, there are surely none upon the earth who can say at any time, "And this we do." But Mr Keenan proceeds still further in unintended illustration of that propensity already adverted to, of all legalists to soften down the Divine law, that it may not so manifestly transcend even their notions of their own abilities.

"In order to love God in the proper manner, is it necessary that we should, in all our thoughts and actions, be occupied with him alone?—It is only in heaven that this can be; while we are in this world we will love God, if we comply with two obligations imposed upon us by the above precept—the first is, never to love any creature more than God, and to be habitually disposed, at all times, to love him above all beings, as a good child is ever disposed to love his parent, and to give him every mark and proof of that love; the second is, that we make frequent acts of the love of God, to keep that divine fire ever burning in our hearts, that we may never be deprived of it, and this holy exercise is the chief duty of every reasonable creature."⁴

Now it is neither a doctrine of revelation nor of reason that the saints in heaven are to be occupied with God alone in all

¹ Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 191.

² Ibid.

³ Matt. xxii. 37.

⁴ Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 192.

their thoughts and actions to the exclusion of all his creatures; whilst on the other hand no Christian can doubt that a perfect love of God will always animate them, as a most intimate fellowship with God will always delight them,—that by this love they will always be actuated, as to this fellowship all things will contribute. And this would certainly be realized even upon earth if we were enabled constantly to walk with God, perfectly observing the rule, "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God."¹ But how different is this rule,—or that of loving God with all our heart, and soul, and mind,—from Mr Keenan's rule of never loving any creature *more* than God! What a different standard is that ideal standard of Christian perfection, once realized and only once in the man Christ Jesus himself, after which the true believer strives, from Mr Keenan's ideal standard of making frequent acts of the love of God! This Popish ideal of perfection has been brought down to a nearer conformity with what a fallen, corrupt creature might think possible or agreeable.

It is a slight departure from the order proposed,—but here I may be allowed to anticipate a little, and to turn to the pages of those great doctors, Peter Dens and Liguori, for a little further illustration of that part of Popish morality which immediately relates to the love of God. In Liguori's Moral Theology we are told that the love of God [*charitas Dei*] is a love of friendship, by which we wish God's welfare [*quo Deo bene volumus*] and desire all good things for him [*omnia bona ipsi cupimus*], because of the supreme and infinite perfection of his Divine nature!² But this monstrous definition we may view as partly mitigated by the explanation of Peter Dens, who, after a similar account of the love of God, says, that a man wishes well to God [*bona vult homo Deo*] in respect of the perfections of his own nature, by delighting in the thought that he has these perfections.³ But the mode of expression, nevertheless, is monstrous

¹ 1 Cor. x. 31.

² Lig., Theol. Moral., I., 307.

³ Dens, Theol., II., 187.

and inexcusable.—The student of Liguori is further informed that a man is bound to love God above all creatures, in an appreciation of God above all creatures, but NOT as to the strength of the love [*non quidem intensivè, sed appretiativè*], for although this also is becoming, it is not in the commandment [*etsi enim hoc etiam deceat, non tamen est in præcepto*],—which, if it is capable of being expressed in any plain words, would seem to mean this, that we are only required to esteem God above all creatures in the judgment of our minds, but that we are not required to love him above all creatures with our hearts. However, to the credit of Peter Dens, and of Steyaert, Daelman, Danes, &c., whom he quotes, (who, however, are in this matter opposed by Wiggers, Sylvius, Billuart, &c., so precious and interesting in all its particulars is Popish unity,) it must be told that he expresses a different opinion upon this point from Saint Alphonsus Liguori, and maintains that a man is bound to love God above all creatures *intensivè*, as well as *appretiativè*—although afterwards, for the quieting of scrupulous consciences, he says it may be prudently judged that a man who does love God above all things *appretiativè*, also loves him above all things *intensivè*, although he does not perceive or feel it.¹ But as Liguori is evidently in higher repute with the Papists of Great Britain at the present day than even Peter Dens, it may be presumed that they more generally adopt his view of this subject. It is fair to add that even Liguori includes in what he calls his love of appreciation, a willingness rather to suffer loss of all things than to offend God.

But his teaching is still more marvellous when he comes to the question, *When the commandment to love God is binding upon us*. And here Dens and he are very well agreed. It is probable, according to Liguori, that the commandment to love God is binding,—1^{mo}, When a man has just obtained a sufficient knowledge of God as infinitely good, and the author of all good, to whom he owes all things; 2^{do}, When there is danger of his falling into a hatred of God, unless there be an act of love; 3^{tio},

¹ Dens, Theol., II., 217.

When a man is called to contrition, as when he is dying or about to celebrate mass, and has no confessor at hand (for contrition includes an act of charity); 4^{to}, If he thinks that he can in no other way overcome a serious temptation, especially in the article of death:—to which is in all seriousness subjoined the remark, that some add the article of death absolutely, “*because then the safest way is to be chosen*.”—But in respect of the first of these times or occasions, authorities are quoted without disapprobation, for the opinion that a man does not sin mortally, although after having come to that pre-requisite knowledge of God, he does not immediately obey this commandment, but puts it off for a considerable time [*notabiliter*], although it were even for more than a year. So that the commandment is certainly not made to press hard upon any one; being evidently, moreover, regarded as one which, in its own nature, it is by no means pleasant to obey. And for further encouragement of any one who begins to doubt whether he shews it the necessary respect, assurance is given him in the work of the sainted Liguori, that if he does not positively remember that he has omitted to obey it, he may hold that he has obeyed it sufficiently [*tenere possis te satisfecisse*].¹ Peter Dens, in treating of this subject, distinguishes between the commandment considered negatively, and the commandment considered positively. Negatively, he admits that it is always binding, because it is at no time lawful to do anything that is contrary to the love of God; but positively, he thinks it is only sometimes binding, although he inclines to greater frequency than Liguori does, and seems to think that it were well to obey it once a-day,—yet he is quite clear upon this point, that to obey it every day is not of weighty obligation [*obligatio gravis*], that is, that the neglect does not amount to mortal sin!² How error is here heaped upon error—how error is here implied in error—it would be no easy task minutely to declare. But the general view is appalling.

One other brief extract I may now make from Mr Keenan's

¹ Lig., Theol. Moral., I., 307, 308.

² Dens, Theol., II., 214.

Catechism itself, concerning the commandment, "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, &c.*"

"Is the violation of this precept always mortal?—It is so, when the act of violation is such, as that we prefer the creature to the Creator; it may, however, be venial, when the violation is in a very small matter, which does not extinguish in our hearts the love of God."¹

I pass over many things in Mr Keenan's Catechism, of which I would gladly have taken notice, concerning the virtues, theological and moral, and also in the exposition of the decalogue. But I cannot pass over his full and decided assertion of the *dispensing power*. It is in the exposition of the Third (which Papists call the Second) Commandment that this subject is introduced. We are told that it is a great sin to violate our vows, and Scripture is very appositely quoted to prove this.² But then comes the question, "Can any one on earth dispense with a vow?" And the answer is, Yes,—and if Scripture is not quoted to prove it, St Thomas (not the Apostle) is. Mr Keenan next asks, "To whom does it belong to change vows or dispense with them?" The answer to this question must be given in full.

"To those in the Church who have received the power of loosing and binding, and to each according to the degree of his jurisdiction, as limited by the Pope, or the canon law of the Church. The Pope exercises the general power of dispensing in all cases, where such power belongs to the Church, and he has this power, in any or every place, because his jurisdiction is universal. The bishops exercise this power in their own dioceses only, and in those cases only which are not reserved to the Pope. Priests have no power to dispense with vows, or to change them, unless specially authorised by a superior, who has power to do so."³

Nothing can be clearer than the inference from this, that the Pope has power to absolve subjects from their oath of allegiance to sovereigns,—or sovereigns, like him of Naples, from their oath of fidelity to the constitution,—or Papists of any class from any oaths whatsoever by which they have bound themselves to

¹ Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 193.

² Ibid., I., 223.

³ Ibid., I., 223, 224.

heretics. And if it be not clear from the premises that Popery may be charged with holding the abominable principle that no faith is to be kept with heretics,—yet at least it is clear, that the Pope or a bishop, in whom this dispensing power may be lodged, or any priest to whom it may be conveyed by a superior, is quite able to absolve from obligation, even of an oath, and much more of a promise made in such case, if he shall esteem it more *for the good of the Church to do so*, and even to convert it into a duty to act in a way opposed to the oath, in which the heretic might fondly fancy himself to have some security. It costs a Papist little to insist upon the sanctity of a promise, or even of an oath, and the sinfulness of violating it, when he has this facility of getting quit of all its obligation, if his spiritual superior deems it to be for the honour of God, the necessity or utility of the Church, or his own greater spiritual good to release him. "God, by the superiors of the Church, renounces his right," says Peter Dens, "and thus the obligation ceases of its own accord."¹ It is certainly, at all events, a matter which may admit of being called in question, whether persons holding such principles ought to be entrusted with the ordinary rights of citizenship. They cannot be accounted safe members of civil society.

It is also in his exposition of the Third (Second) Commandment, that Mr Keenan declares blasphemy to be "a word or oath injurious or insulting to God or his saints," arguing that the insult given to the saints is really given to God.² It is well known to every one at all acquainted with the history of Popish persecutions, what horrid use has been made of this extension of the crime of blasphemy.

It was to have been expected that Mr Keenan should exalt the praise of virginity and so depreciate matrimony, which he does in his exposition of the Seventh (Sixth) Commandment,³ thus introducing a very dangerous element into the system of morality, and one of very various operation. It was also to

¹ Dens, Theol., II., 346. (See Dr Cunningham's Note to Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract., ch. xix.)

² Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 225.

³ Ibid., I., 236.

have been expected that he should, as is common with Papists, rest the change of the Sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, entirely upon the authority of the Church, which he would therefore represent as in this matter modifying the commandment of God.¹ It was perhaps scarcely to have been expected that he should insist so strenuously as he does upon *Sunday* sanctification,—telling his readers that they must abstain from servile work and devote themselves to the duties of religion, namely, the serving and worshipping of God, avoiding all sinful theatres, dances, plays, and profane amusements, and occupying such portion of the time as is not required for the offices of the Church, in prayer, spiritual reading, and works of charity. I will not conclude, without evidence bearing on the special question, that this is merely Popery accommodating itself to the state of feeling on the subject of the Sabbath prevalent amongst all serious Protestants in this country, although this would be quite in accordance with the Popish practice. And a similar suspicion might also not unnaturally arise from the omission of all allusion to any day but Sunday in Mr Keenan's exposition of the Fourth (Third) Commandment; for, as we have seen, this commandment in the Popish catechisms of other countries, sometimes assumes a form with which such an exposition would be incompatible, and which includes equally all the festivals of the Church. But if Mr Keenan do, indeed, strongly hold this strict rule of Sabbath sanctification, he may find no small number of priests and doctors of his own Church to contend with. For, even in this country, it is usual for them to express themselves very differently upon this subject. In "The Young Catholic's Guide in the preparation for Confession," the "Third" Commandment is explained as commanding us "to hear mass on Sundays, and to spend a portion of the day in prayer, in reading good books, and to refrain from all unnecessary servile work,"—and in the subjoined questions for self-examination, although they descend to great minuteness in what

¹ Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 227.

relates to the hearing of mass, there is not a word about any profanation of the day by idle words or thoughts, or vain amusements, save in connection with the attendance at mass alone.¹ Dr James Butler indeed says that this commandment requires the Sunday to be spent in prayer and other religious duties, and that the hearing of mass is not sufficient to sanctify the Sunday, but "*a part of the day*" should also be given to prayer and other good works,—how large a part he does not inform us.² Father Quadrupani tells us, that "a visit of politeness, a promenade, or an innocent amusement, are amongst the things which may have relation to God, and serve also to sanctify the feasts"—amongst which Sunday is included—"when they are undertaken with a view to please him." He tells us also that "too much dissipation and too much prayer are excesses which must be equally avoided!!"³ And amongst the *Additions* to the chapter or instruction on Sundays and festivals, in which these things are contained, is the following story:—

"St Charles Borromeus, while one Sunday amusing himself with some priests at a game of chess, one of them suddenly struck with the thought of death, said, What should we do *now*, if in an hour we were told that we should appear before the tribunal of God? One said, that he would take his breviary, and finish his office; another, that he would run to his confessor, and so of the rest. When it came to St Charles's turn, he said, smilingly—'Well, for *my* part, I should finish this game of chess; I began it to please God, and I do not think I could just now do anything which might be more pleasing to him.'"⁴

But leaving this subject of the Sabbath and its sanctification,—concerning which a few sentiments from Liguori will yet fall to be introduced when we look into the Moral Theology of that great saint,—let us pass with Mr Keenan from the commandments of God to the commandments of the Church. He tells us—

¹ Kenny, (Principal of St Mary's Collegiate School, Richmond, Surrey,) Young Catholic's Guide, 12, 13.

² Dr James Butler's Catechism, Lesson xvii.

³ Quadrupani, Spiritual Consoler, ch. vii.

⁴ Quadrupani, *ut supra*; Dublin translation. In the translation published in London, this story is prudently omitted.

"The chief general precepts of the Church are to sanctify Sundays and holidays, and to hear mass on these days, to confess our sins at least once a year to our own pastor, or to a priest appointed by him, to communicate at least once a year (about Easter) in our own parish Church, to fast in Lent, on Ember days, and Vigils, and to abstain from flesh-meat on Fridays."¹

He adds, that "until of late, in these kingdoms, Saturday was also a day of abstinence." He also adds that there are other commandments of the Church, "such as that of paying tithes; that prohibiting marriage at certain times of the year, and within certain degrees of kindred." But, "as these regard not the whole faithful," he does not think it necessary to explain them; nay, he says, "we would be endless if we entered into all the precepts of the Church, as they regard particular states and conditions,"—which is no doubt a very encouraging general account of them. I shall not attempt to follow him into the subject of festivals in general, and the power of the Church to establish them, nor through the sections which he devotes to particular festivals, such as those of the Trinity, Advent, Christmas, the Circumcision, Epiphany, the Presentation of Jesus and Purification of the Blessed Virgin, Palm-Sunday, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Holy Saturday, &c., &c., &c. Nor shall I examine in detail any thing that he has set down regarding the observance of any of the commandments which he specifies. Nothing can be stricter than these commandments as he explains them, and the rules for their observance are precise and minute. We have already seen that according to Popish theology the transgression of some at least of these commandments is pronounced to be mortal sin. The author of the *Young Catholic's Guide* is very careful to instruct children, that if they are old enough to do it, and neglect to communicate at Easter or thereabouts, it is a mortal sin. He is at no such pains to impress them with a fear of disobeying any of the commandments of God.

But it is proper to notice that there are considerable differ-

¹ Keenan, *Cat. of Chr. Rel.*, I., 253.

ences in the lists given by Popish authors of the commandments of the Church. Mr Keenan, as we have seen, tells us that the enumeration of them would be endless; but he professes to give those which regard the whole faithful, and proceeds to treat of them as the First commandment of the Church, the Second commandment of the Church, &c., to the Sixth. Now it may surely be taken for granted that the lists given in smaller catechisms than his, and without qualifying remarks, contain those commandments which regard the whole faithful, and contain them all. But the lists do not agree with one another. For example, in the *Catechism of the Most Rev. Dr Reilly*, published at Dublin, by Richard Coyne, publisher to the Roman Catholic Bishops of Ireland, in 1834, the commandments of the Church are given in the following doggrel:—

1. "Sundays and holidays, mass thou shalt hear.
2. All holidays sanctify through the year.
3. Lent, Ember days, and Vigils thou shalt fast.
4. Fridays and Saturdays, flesh thou shalt not taste.
5. In Lent and Advent nuptial feasts forbear.
6. Confess your sins at least once every year.
7. Receive your God about great Easter day,
8. And to his Church neglect not tithes to pay."¹

In the *Most Rev. Dr James Butler's Catechism*, the commandments are six, and neither in their order, nor in the matter of them, does his list agree either with that just quoted, or with Mr Keenan's. But like Dr Reilly, he gives greater prominence to the support of the clergy, than Mr Keenan does: and it may be doubted whether a *little* catechism giving Mr Keenan's six commandments and no more, would have been found quite as suitable as theirs for general circulation in Ireland.

"Say the six commandments of the Church.—1. To hear mass on Sundays, and all holidays of obligation.—2. To fast and abstain on the days commanded.—3. To confess our sins at least once a year.—4. To receive worthily the Blessed Eucharist at Easter, or within the time appointed.—

¹ Quoted by Dr Cunningham, *Note to Stillingfleet, Doct. and Pract.*, ch. xxv.

5. To contribute to the support of our pastors.—6. Not to solemnize marriage at the forbidden times, nor to marry persons within the forbidden degrees of kindred, or otherwise prohibited by the Church, nor clandestinely.”¹

This list is also given in other catechisms: but sometimes the Sixth of these commandments is omitted.

From the commandments of the Church, we have still to follow Mr Keenan to the *Evangelical Counsels*. For Popery, having softened down the divine law in some measure to accommodate it to man, dreams of a perfection which is beyond its requirements, and so makes new room for human merits. Mr Keenan thus expounds the doctrine of his Church.

“What do you mean by Evangelical Counsels?—Certain good actions which Jesus Christ has proposed to us, and to which he has exhorted us, without laying us under any obligation to practise them, such is the difference between the precepts and counsels of the gospel. The precepts are of obligation, we cannot be saved without observing them; but we are not bound to practise the counsels, under any penalty, except we have engaged ourselves by a vow, to observe them.—What are the principal counsels of the gospel?—The principal are chastity, poverty, and obedience. . . . By chastity we understand a voluntary renunciation of marriage, that we may live in perpetual continency,—by poverty, we mean a voluntary renunciation of riches and this world’s goods, that we may imitate the poverty of Jesus Christ,—by obedience, a voluntary renunciation of our own will, that we may be guided by the advice of a prudent superior, to whom we subject ourselves.”²

I shall enter into no examination of the evidence by which these *counsels* are supported. I shall do nothing more than advert to the fearful illustration which the whole history of monasticism gives of the practical working of this attempt to reach a perfection in the Christian life higher than what is required by the commandments of God. But let the reader consider what a perversion of the very idea of morality is implied in the exclusive application of the term *chastity* to a voluntary celibacy,

¹ Most Rev. Dr James Butler’s Catechism, Lesson xx.

² Keenan, Cat. of Chr. Rel., I., 298, 299.

and how the bounds of real purity and virtue are thereby altered and obscured. Let him consider, also, the necessary effect of the introduction into the moral system of the other elements here named—*poverty* and *obedience*, to what a degradation of humanity both tend, and what power, far exceeding that of a master over his slave, the counsel of obedience is calculated to place in the hands of the priesthood.

But, now, let us turn to another book,—although the examination must be still more cursory,—and surely a more unobjectionable choice could not be made than that of the *Lives of St Alphonsus Liguori and other Saints*, edited by Dr Wiseman.

In this interesting volume we are told of *pious thefts*,—an improvement upon the pious frauds which the world has often heard of. In the *Life of St Francis Di Giralomo* it is said:—

“How pleasing to God was his liberality, an extraordinary prodigy once manifested. One day his mother caught him (so to speak) in a pious theft, in the act of carrying away, to distribute among the poor, some bread belonging to the household.”¹

And—to abridge the story—the young saint repelled the reproof of his mother, and a miracle shewed that his *pious theft* had the approbation of God!

After the death of this pious thief, a portion of his own precious person became the subject-matter of another pious theft. In this instance the reader shall have prodigy and all.

“The infirmarian being desirous of keeping some relic of so holy a man before he laid him out in the sacerdotal habit, pared off a piece of the hard skin of the sole of his foot. But the pious theft soon became apparent, though he used every effort to conceal it; for the blood began to flow from the wound too freely, as not merely to stain the linen, but to fill a phial holding three or four ounces; which portion being preserved, retained during three months its ruddiness and liquidity, and wrought many cures.”²

In the *Life of this St Francis*, we are told of many excellent qualities which belonged to him. But the Jesuit fathers thought proper to try his virtue, during his noviciate,—a sort of proceed-

¹ *Lives of Saints* of 26th May 1839, p. 59.

² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

ing which in itself implies great wickedness, and which they went about in a manner very illustrative of Jesuit morality.

"It yet remained to try the pure gold of his virtue in the furnace of afflictions and crosses. Wherefore the superiors commenced upon him a series of severe trials. A lay brother, either through affection for his person, or respect for his sacerdotal character, used to carry water daily to his apartment; and Francis, for allowing such a service to be performed for him, was severely called to task, and not only charged with it as a crime, but condemned to expiate it by a humiliating penance. So also it fared with everything he did, which could, by any force of construction be distorted into an offence against the rules; and if any offence was committed, suspicion was sure to fall upon him, or punishment devolved upon his shoulders."¹

Of course, we are given to understand that St Francis came triumphantly through the trial. But it does not seem to have occurred to Dr Wiseman that the whole proceeding here described was simply diabolical. And yet no thesis could be more easily maintained.

In admirable harmony with what has just been quoted, is the story told of a young man who had led a very wicked life, but with whom, before he died, torture was employed, though ineffectually, as a means of bringing him to repentance.

"A stroke of apoplexy brought him to the verge of death, but not to a sense of his guilt or of the dreadful danger he had incurred. Wherefore, to give him a foretaste of the chastisement that awaited him, in the hope of awaking him from his apathy, hot water was applied to the soles of his feet, and fire to his hands, which he no sooner felt, than he began to shriek and rage like a very demon, yet was not one whit the better disposed."²

Can it seem wonderful to Cardinal Wiseman that the young man was not one whit the better disposed? It is written that the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel,³ and this story seems to have been intended for an illustration of it.

This volume contains also remarkable illustrations of some of the *virtues* and *evangelical counsels*. We read of a saint whose

¹ Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 65.

² Ibid., p. 95.

³ Prov. xii. 10.

zeal was such, "that he would readily have consumed therewith the whole world,"¹—to which, if any other meaning can be attached than that he would have gladly burned all the heretics which the world contained, I would be glad to know what that meaning is.—St John Joseph of the Cross excelled in chastity and modesty. "Never during the sixty years of his life, was he known to look any one not of his own sex in the face;"² whilst better still, if possible, St Pacificus of San Severino would never converse with strangers, or even with his own sister, for more than a few seconds.³—The humility of the same saint was exemplified in his delighting to perform menial offices in the convent.⁴ It was exemplified also on his deathbed by his choosing, as a garment to be buried in, "according to the custom observed among the Alcantarines," one that had been worn for sixty-four years, and was so patched that its original features were no longer discernible."⁵—But the evangelical counsel of *obedience* seems, above all things, to have been the study and delight of these saints. It might seem as if Cardinal Wiseman's little volume were chiefly intended to recommend it. We read of St Pacificus, that he completely resigned his own will, and subjected himself to a perfect unhesitating obedience,—and when a superior had sent him on foot, notwithstanding sickness and inability, to say mass at a place two miles and a half from the convent, Pacificus instantly set off in the rain, and walked at a round pace (for, of course, miraculous assistance was ready in a case of such eminent obedience), and when the superior afterwards regretted what he had imprudently done, the holy man replied, "It was God, and not you, father, that sent me!"⁶—Obedience to ecclesiastical superiors is even exalted above direct obedience to God. For, as the story is told, St Veronica Giuliani "received a direct injunction from God to fast for three whole years, upon nothing but bread and water. But Almighty God, wishing at the same time to put her obedi-

¹ Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 140.

² Ibid., p. 144.

³ Ibid., p. 204.

⁴ Ibid., p. 145.

⁵ Ibid., p. 160.

⁶ Ibid., p. 205.

ence to her superiors to the test, caused them all to refuse her their permission, without which she could not put the divine command in practice!"¹ To crown all, however, this St Veronica could not even die without the command of her confessor, "that so the obedience, which had been so perfect in life, might be crowned even on earth, by opening for her the gate of heavenly bliss."²—The moral tendencies of the volume may be further illustrated by comparing what relates to this obedience, with what relates to filial obedience. It is recorded as not at all discreditable to St Veronica, that when she was a young woman, and her parents wished her to be married rather than to enter a convent, she not only opposed their wishes resolutely, but behaved unkindly to them in order to turn away their affection from her. "I spoke as little as possible," she says, "because I knew that my father took great delight in hearing me talk," &c.³

What a dreadful war Popery wages against all the natural affections, may be learned from an incident in the tale already frequently quoted,—Geraldine. A widow, called to *consecrate herself to God*, bends over the body of her newly deceased husband once and again, to cut off a lock of hair as a memorial, but is each time prevented by a mysterious terror: it would have been too much contrary to the spirit of self-denial and mortification. For she has been called to make *a perfect holocaust of her first and dearest earthly affections*.⁴

Let us now turn to the *Glories of Mary*, and without subjecting it to any thorough examination, let us take such illustrations of morality as most readily present themselves. It is surely fair to inquire what moral tendency the stories which it contains of miracles and prodigies can have, supposing them to be fully believed. Apart from all question of idolatry or superstition, some of them seem expressly calculated to encourage profligacy. The following is an example:—

¹ Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 258.

² Ibid., p. 271.

³ Ibid., p. 236.

⁴ Geraldine, III, 169.

"A young man in Perugia promised the devil, that if he would enable him to attain a sinful object he had in view, he would give him his soul, and he gave him a written contract to this effect, signed in his own blood. When the crime had been committed, the devil demanded the performance of the promise; and for this purpose led him to the brink of a well, at the same time threatening that if he did not throw himself in, he would drag him, body and soul, to hell. The wretched youth, thinking that it would be impossible to escape from his hands, got on the little parapet to cast himself in; but terrified at the idea of death, he told the devil that he had not courage to take the leap, but that if he was determined on his death, he must push him in. The young man wore a scapular of *the dolours of Mary*. The devil therefore said, 'Take off that scapular, and then I will push thee in.' But the youth, discovering in the scapular the protection still vouchsafed him by the divine Mother, refused to do so, and at length, after much altercation, the devil, filled with confusion, departed, and the sinner, grateful to his sorrowful Mother, went to thank her, and, penitent for his sins, presented as a votive offering to her altar in the Church of Saneta Maria la Nuova, in Perugia, a picture of what had taken place."¹

It is plain enough that the belief of this story is calculated not only to encourage confidence in the Virgin, but such confidence in the wearing of a bit of rag called a *scapular of the dolours of Mary*, that a man may be warranted in saying, I can sin as I please, and yet avoid the consequences; so long as I only wear this scapular, I am safe.

The following is also a very fair specimen of the quality of these Popish stories, which Cardinal Wiseman and the Redemptorist Fathers of Clapham are now recommending to the devout acceptance of the British public. It is perhaps the more interesting as it is connected with the history of that very great saint, Saint Dominic, and seems to be designed for the special purpose of commending his "beautiful invention," the Rosary.

"Father Eusebius Nieremberg says, that in a city of Arragon, there was a beautiful young lady of noble birth, named Alexandra, who was courted by two young men. Out of jealousy they one day fought, and both were killed. Their enraged relatives, considering the young lady as the cause of this sad event, murdered her, cut off her head, and threw it into a well. Some days afterwards, Saint Dominic passing by the spot, and inspired by

¹ Liguori, *Glories of Mary*, 421.

God, went to the well, and cried out, 'Alexandra, come forth.' In an instant, the head of the murdered woman came up, and remained on the edge of the well, and entreated the saint to hear her confession. The saint did so, and in the presence of an immense concourse of people, drawn there by the wonderful event, gave her communion. He then commanded her to say for what reason she had received so great a grace. Alexandra replied, that when her head was cut off she was in mortal sin, but that, on account of the Rosary she was in the habit of saying in her honour, the most Blessed Virgin had kept her alive. The animated head remained for two days on the edge of the well, so as to be seen by all, and after that the soul went to purgatory. A fortnight afterwards, Alexandra, beautiful and shining like a star, appeared to Saint Dominic, and said, that the Rosary, recited for the souls in purgatory, is one of the greatest reliefs that they meet with in their torments; and that, as soon as ever they get to heaven, they pray earnestly for those who have performed this devotion for them. As soon as she had said this, Saint Dominic saw her happy soul ascend, with the greatest joy, to the kingdom of the blessed."¹

What is the moral here, but that a person regularly saying the Rosary in honour of the Virgin Mary may commit even mortal sin, without fear of hell?

I shall extract only one other legend, and so pass from the Glories of Mary.

"In the mountains of Trent there lived a famous robber, who, when he was one day admonished by a religious to change his life, replied, That for him there was no remedy. 'No,' said the religious; 'do what I tell you; fast on Saturdays in Mary's honour, and on that day never molest any one, and she will obtain you the grace not to die at enmity with God.' The poor robber followed this advice, and even bound himself to it by a vow; and that he might not break it, he, from that time forward, always went unarmed on Saturdays. It so happened, that one Saturday he met the officers of justice, and rather than break his vow, he allowed himself to be made a prisoner without resistance. The judge seeing that he was an old grey-haired man, wished to save him from death; but having already received the grace of compunction from Mary, he said that he wished to die in punishment for his sins. He then, in the hall of justice, made a public confession of all the crimes of his life, and this he did with so many tears, that all who were present wept. He was beheaded, and a grave being dug, was buried with little ceremony. But afterwards, the Mother of God, accompanied by four virgins, was seen to take the body

¹ Liguori, Glories of Mary, 196, 197.

from that place, and wrap it in a rich cloth, embroidered with gold. They then carried it to the city gate; there our Blessed Lady herself said to the guards, 'Tell the bishop in my name, to give honourable burial, in such a church, to this man; for he was my faithful servant.' This was done. All the people thronged to the place where they found the body, the rich pall, and the bier on which it was placed. Cesarius relates that from that time all the people of that district began to fast on Saturdays."¹

From this story it appears that a man may spend all the other days of the week in robbery, and yet be a faithful servant of Mary, and in a very likely way of reaching heaven at last, if he only fast on Saturdays in Mary's honour, and molest no one on that day.

Father Quadrupani's Spiritual Consoler, or Instructions to Pious Souls, begins with the praise of *obedience*.

"Those who obey the priest of the Lord, do not obey a man; they obey God, who has said, 'Those who hear you hear me.'"

"Fear not lest your director should mistake in what he prescribes."

"Obedience, above all things, is necessary to a Christian."²

But I refrain from making further quotations from Father Quadrupani, in order to bestow more attention on those greater lights, St Alphonsus Liguori and Peter Dens; and as Liguori seems at present to be in highest repute, I shall consult principally his Moral Theology, and only make an extract or two from Dens for further illustration of points thus brought before us. Moreover, it is proper to remark, that bad as Dens is, Liguori is decidedly worse; the moral atmosphere around him is still more pestilential. The reader will remember, as the reason for the prominent place assigned to his writings in the present inquiry, how highly they are commended by Cardinal Wiseman. He is also the patron saint of the order of the *Redemptorists*, which he founded, and has followers in the Church of Rome who call themselves *Liguorists*, and *Sons of Liguori*.³

¹ Liguori, Glories of Mary, 504, 505.

² Quadrupani's Instructions, ch. i.

³ Collette, Romanism in England Exposed, 152.

The first thing that claims our particular regard when we look into Liguori's Moral Theology, is his defence of the doctrine of *Probabilism*, so fearfully exposed by Pascal in his Provincial Letters. And of this Dr Wiseman in his Lives of the Saints of 26th May 1839, makes particular mention, in a note in which he gives an account of Liguori's works, as if it constituted a principal merit of his Moral Theology.—

"In this work," we are told, "he explains his system of probabilism, on which he has written much in his various writings. It was attacked by Father Patuzzi, a Dominican, who published, in 1764, under the name of Adelphus Dositheus, a work entitled, *La causa del probabilismo riprodotta da Monsig. Liguori e convinta*; and the Saint replied by his *Apologia della Dissertazione*, which he afterwards fused in his larger work on Moral Theology.¹

There have always been in the Church of Rome antagonists of probabilism, who have pointed out its monstrous character; and it would be wrong to suppose that all the members of that Church in this country maintain it. But it is very evident that it has the approbation of those who take the lead in her cause, and appear prominently as her advocates.

Liguori's views on probabilism are unfolded in the very first treatise of the first book of his Moral Theology, which is entitled "*Of Conscience*."

In this treatise he begins with a general examination of the subject of conscience, in its bearing upon morals or questions of casuistry,—and then proceeds to the subject of "a doubtful conscience," and finally to probabilism. Some of the doctrines propounded even in the first chapter, tend to obliterate all proper distinction between right and wrong. For example, it is asserted that he whose conscience is invincibly erroneous—that is to say, cannot be convinced of error by common and ordinary diligence—does not sin in acting according to his conscience, although the action be wrong in its own nature!—nay, is sometimes bound so to act!!—nay, farther, it is more probable than

¹ Lives of Saints of 26th May 1839, p. 55, note.—The Dissertation here referred to is the first named in the same note as amongst the chief works of St Alphonsus. It is "*upon the moderate use of the probable opinion*."

otherwise that he acquires merit!!!¹ The reasonings on this point are worthy of the doctrine which they are intended to uphold. But I omit them and proceed to the chapter on "a probable conscience," to which is appended a "*Moral System* for the choice of opinions which may rightfully be acted upon," or "Dissertation on the Moderate use of Probable Opinion." Opinions are in the first place classified with ridiculous care according to the amount of their probability: they are either slightly probable, or probable, or more probable, or most probable, or morally certain, or safe, or more safe!² And it is explained that there is no safety in acting upon probabilities in matters of fact, or of faith, which are reckoned with them, but only in questions of law;—in which, however, it is laid down as certain, on the authority of Pope Innocent XI., that a man is not entitled to act upon an opinion which is only *slightly probable*, nor upon one which is evidently, and certainly, *the less probable*,—but it is laid down as equally certain that he is entitled to act upon an opinion which is *most probable*, according to the classification above exhibited.³ It is further asserted that of two contrary opinions, that which is the *less safe* may be rightfully followed, when it is equally, or nearly equally probable,—inasmuch as that opinion which is for liberty as opposed to law, brings in a grave doubt whether a law exists prohibitory of the action, and at all events, such a law cannot be said to be sufficiently promulgated, and a law not sufficiently promulgated cannot be held to be binding, and a doubtful law is of no obligation.⁴ Nay, a law in order to be binding upon any man, must be promulgated in such a way as to be certain and manifest to him,⁵ or, according to "the angelic Doctor," Saint Thomas, "No man is bound by any precept, except through his knowledge of that precept [*Nullus ligatur per praeceptum aliquod, nisi mediante scientiâ illius praecepti*]" :⁶ and St Alphonsus condemns the weak fancy of some author

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 3.—Dens states a similar doctrine, though less extreme. Theol., I., 396.

² Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 20.

³ Ibid., I., 25.

⁴ Ibid., I., 27, 28.

⁵ Ibid., I., 30.

⁶ Ibid., I., 35.

who has ventured to say, that where it is doubtful whether there is a law, it must also be doubtful whether there is liberty.¹ In reply also to certain objections, St Alphonsus says, that in a case where there are two opinions of equal weight, although the general law is certain enough, as, Thou shalt not kill, or Thou shalt not steal, yet in respect of that particular case, it is doubtful both as to its existence and its promulgation, and a man's liberty is by no means to be restrained by it.² And in further reply to the same objector, who had advanced in his objecting an acknowledged canon, *In dubiis tutior via eligenda est*,—that in things doubtful the safer way is to be chosen,—St Alphonsus tells him that it is by no means certain that this canon relates to speculative doubts, but the more common opinion is, that it relates only to what he calls practical doubts, or as he immediately explains himself, doubts concerning matters of fact.³ Alphonsus therefore makes it the very basis of his moral system that a doubtful law is not binding,⁴—upon which he argues at great length, the whole purpose of his arguments being apparently to overthrow that rule declared by the Apostle Paul in these words “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin.” And he adduces an imaginary example, for illustration of his meaning, and to shew the operation of his principle. “We have a law,” he says, “forbidding usury: But when the probability is equal upon the one side and the other as to a particular contract, whether it is usurious or not usurious, then no certain law appears prohibiting it.”⁵ In which case, therefore, his principles leave a man at liberty to enter into such a contract. It may indeed be in its own nature contrary to the divine will, but on this subject very horrid language is used, borrowed from the “angelic doctor” and “prince of theologians,” St Thomas, that we are not bound in all things to conform our wills to the will of God, but only in so far as he has willed or required us to do so,⁶—the application of

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 36.² Ibid., I., 37.³ Ibid.⁴ Ibid., I., 39.⁵ Ibid., I., 56.⁶ Ibid., I., 63, and the dissertation, *passim*.

which, in the case supposed, would seem to be, that a man may warrantably and of choice do what he thinks *may be* in it own nature contrary to the will of God.

St Alphonsus is so much occupied with the discussion of his principles, that he does not say much about the way in which an opinion is rendered probable, more probable, &c. He writes, however, as one who takes it for granted that the opinions of grave doctors and theologians may suffice to give the amount of probability in any case which is requisite for the preservation of liberty.¹

A clear and succinct statement of the doctrine of probabilism, just as it is set forth at large by Liguori, is given by Peter Dens, who also expresses himself very justly concerning its nature and consequences,—for Dens, though his own notions of morality are often very base and perverted, was no probabilist. It is thus that he takes up the nicest point in the whole system,—the attempt which the most ingenious probabilist doctors have made to shew that according to their rules, a man always acts with a moral certainty of the propriety of the action.

“Do not the probabilists also require a moral certainty of the propriety [*honestas*] of an action?”

“Yes; at least the more recent of them, as Ferullus, La Croix, &c., for they say it is unlawful to follow in practice a probable opinion simply as such, but that the man who acts must form a certain judgment of the propriety of his own action.”²

This is what Liguori also says, and the following statement by Dens of the system of Ferullus and La Croix may be regarded as a correct exhibition of his likewise:—

“In what then do the probabilists differ from us?”

“In this, that although they require a prudent and practically certain judgment of the propriety of the action, they yet teach that this judgment may be formed from an opinion merely probable, not indeed, as they say, immediately, but by means of a reflex principle, such as this, ‘What is speculatively probable, is practically safe,’—or this, ‘In a doubtful case, the condition of him who possesses his liberty is the better condition,’—or

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 75.² Dens, Theol., I., 406.

this, 'A doubtful law merely existing, is not sufficiently promulgated, and a man is invincibly ignorant of it, and therefore it is not binding.'"¹

Here it is hard to say which most demands admiration,—the baseness of the moral system itself, or of the craft by which its authors have attempted to disguise it. Dens goes on to argue against it, on the ground of the uncertainty of the *reflex principles* which are introduced as the bases of the judgments determining the propriety of actions. Into this and the other branches of his argument we need not follow him; and a mere allusion is enough to the happy illustration which is thus presented to us of the boasted unity of the Church of Rome, especially in the moral principles taught by its doctors. But the following brief exhibition of the consequences of probabilism may also be quoted, and beyond this quotation from Dens, I shall not say a word upon this subject.

"FINALLY, PROBABALISM MAY BE JUSTLY CONDEMNED BY AN A POSTERIORI ARGUMENT; BECAUSE IT HAS INTRODUCED INTO CHRISTIANITY HORRID MONSTERS OF DOCTRINE, MAKING PARRICIDES, ADULTERIES, PERJURIES, &c., TO BE LAWFUL."²

Proceeding now to a different part of Liguori's first volume, for anything like an analysis of his work is out of the question, we find him stating the two opinions which exist in the Church of Rome as to the extent of the Pope's dispensing power; one party maintaining that by the power delegated to him by God, he can grant dispensations, when it is expedient, as to some of the divine precepts,—and others denying this, on the ground that no such power has been delegated to him by God; which last opinion Liguori himself thinks is the more probable, but he quotes two doctors who say the former is sufficiently probable. However, St Alphonsus Liguori says, *it is certain that the Pope and prelates can dispense as to vows*, because in this they act in place of God.³ And in this Dens is not behind him, as has been already remarked.

¹ Dens, Theol., I., 406.

² Ibid., 411.

³ Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 189.

It is almost needless to say that Liguori, in treating of sin in general, sets aside as sinless all that the will does not fully consent to, for this is the well known doctrine of the Church of Rome, which seems intended to save its members from all necessity of crying out like the Apostle, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" Yet the statements which he makes are strong, and his illustrations interesting. *That which is sinful must be voluntary*, he says, and through defect of this condition, "no act, which is neither in nor from the will, is a sin, unless the will accept it,"¹—whether it be internal or external; and of internal acts of this sinless kind he gives examples,—namely, infidel, blasphemous, or obscene thoughts, and motions of the flesh, and here he expresses himself so grossly, that without a more evident cause I shall not set down his words.—But there is another condition requisite to the sinfulness of any act, and from it are deduced inferences which may startle even those who are perfectly aware that what has been stated above is a common part of Popish theology. *That which is sinful must be free*, and through defect of this condition, "very vehement emotions of anger or of concupiscence excuse in some measure from sin, because by them the use of the reason is perturbed, and liberty is taken away." Thus also, whatever may follow from drunkenness is sinless, if in nowise foreseen! It would be sinful, however, if foreseen, and if due diligence were not used to prevent it; but if due diligence were used to prevent it, and it happened after all, it would be sinless. And if the negligence which led to the drunkenness were only venial, or the neglect of due precaution,—then whatever may happen can be only a venial sin, because it was not free in itself, but only in its cause, and can have no greater guilt than its cause has.² This is not the doctrine generally held by the magistrates in our police courts and other courts; but it seems to be pretty common amongst the offenders who appear at their bars.—There is still a third condition requisite in order that any act may be sinful,—*he who does it must advert*

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 227.

² Ibid.

to the wickedness of it. And here there are distinctions, too many and too nice to be gone into at present; and I shall not ask the reader to attend to the meaning of such terms as *motus primo primi*, *motus secundo primi*, and *motus deliberati*. This is a vast field for casuistic ingenuity, and many an opinion dangerous to morality has been brought forward. But I rather pass on to notice the solution given of that "great question agitated amongst the doctors,"—whether a man sins seriously, who "keeps himself in a negative condition, and does not positively resist the motion of sensual appetite concerning an object so prohibited that to indulge the appetite would be mortal sin." There are three opinions, but Liguori says the true one is, that he sins venially, but not mortally, where there is no danger of the consent of the will.¹

Leaving this subject, which, however, both Dens and Liguori pursue at great length, and in connection with which they contrive to fill their pages with a marvellous amount of filthiness; and looking into a chapter on the commandment of loving our neighbour, we find amongst many strange questions, this proposed for solution, "Is it lawful to permit or persuade to a lesser evil in order to the prevention of a greater?" and the answer is, that according to the more probable opinion, it is lawful,—for example, to persuade a man to steal or to commit fornication in order to prevent him from committing homicide. The reason assigned for this opinion is, that he who so persuades him does not seek evil but good, namely, the choice of the lesser evil.²

In treating of the Second (Third) Commandment, St Alphonsus makes many curious distinctions concerning what is and what is not blasphemy. Three specimens may suffice. He says it is not blasphemy when the word is changed or cut off in the middle, at least he gives this opinion as probable, and quotes no fewer than five grave and learned authorities!—he and they approving of minced oaths;—it is not blasphemy to say "By the life of God" or "of the Saints;" it is not blasphemy to say

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., I., 235, 236.

² Ibid., I., 345.

"This is as true as God."¹ He seems to have entirely forgotten our Lord's rule, "Let your communication be Yea, yea, Nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."²

Concerning oaths, St Alphonsus displays great anxiety for the relief of those erring consciences which imagine themselves bound by such expressions as "By my faith," "On the faith of a Christian," or "*Expono caput meum*," "*Amputentur mihi aures*" (which, *euphoniae gratiâ*, I keep in Latin as I find them.)³ And doubtless, this must be reckoned a saintly tenderness towards those who having used such forms of speech, have been afterwards troubled with the apprehension of having perjured themselves. It is not an oath, the Saint also informs us, to say "By my conscience," or "On my conscience"; but he thinks it is an oath to say "By my soul." The reasons of this nice distinction are curious, but I must pass them over. It will be manifest however, that the Saint's moral system allows a freedom of speech which all Protestant systems condemn.

But the "framing of iniquity by a law" becomes still more apparent, when we read that "TO SWEAR WITH EQUIVOCATION IS NOT WRONG, WHEN THERE IS JUST CAUSE FOR THE EQUIVOCATION ITSELF; because, where there is good reason for concealing the truth, and it is concealed without a lie, there is no irreverence in the oath. And even if it be done without just cause, there is no perjury, because, according at least to a certain sense of the words or mental reservation, the person swears what is true."⁴ By this we may understand what trustworthy witnesses Papists are in our courts, and especially Popish priests and bishops.

St Alphonsus proceeds to explain this subject at some length, and we must follow him a little in his interesting explanation. There are three kinds, he says, of equivocation or amphibology, but they all agree in this,—that the statement made may possibly bear, in virtue of some word or of its structure, two different meanings; and in these ways he says it is the certain and com-

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 2. See also Dens, Theol., IV., 167, 168.

² Matt v. 37. ³ Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 28, 29. ⁴ Ibid., II., 35.

mon opinion of all doctors [*certum est et commune apud omnes*]¹ that for a just cause it is lawful to make use of an equivocation in any of these ways, and to confirm it with an oath.² The reason is, he says, that in so doing we do not deceive our neighbour, but for a just cause we permit him to be deceived. And a just cause, he adds, may be any proper object contributing to the preservation of things good for the soul, or useful for the body!

Could there be viler rascality? That the reader may have the case perfectly before him, let him look at two or three specimens of equivocation or amphibology, as St Alphonsus gives them for illustration of what is *lawful*. The words *This is Peter's book* may signify either that Peter is the author or that he is the owner. A man who is afflicted with disease may be said to be very well, *as to the health of his soul*. If a man is questioned about anything which he wishes to conceal, he may reply *I say No*, and quite innocently, because this form of speech may either mean *I say that the thing is not so*, or *I say* (that is *I pronounce*) *the word No*.—Is this contemptible? But it is also extremely wicked. And yet Cardinal Wiseman recommends the writings of this scoundrel, and publishes a life of him as a *saint*. He is one of the most recently canonized at Rome, and is in the highest repute amongst Papists both in Italy and in Britain.

Let us follow St Alphonsus a little farther. He cannot admit the opinion of those who hold that if a man swear equivocally without a just cause it is a mortal sin. If it is objected that such a man calls upon God to witness the truth of what is not true, St Alphonsus replies that it is true according to his sense!³ By and bye, he maintains that it is never lawful to make use of a mere mental reservation (*purè mentalis*), but he deems it lawful enough to make use of a reservation not merely mental,

¹ And even here the Saint lies, and does injustice to many of his own Church. Peter Dens himself condemns this baseness. (Dens, Theol., IV., 191-194.)

² Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 35.

³ Ibid., II., 36.

(*non purè mentalis*). He pretends to find examples in the Bible; but it is unnecessary to attempt an exposure of the perversion to which Scripture is for this purpose subjected. The reference to it only adds to the wickedness of the opinion expressed. He gives examples of reservation *not merely mental*. "A confessor may affirm even upon oath, that he knows nothing of a sin which has been revealed to him in confession, meaning [*subintelligendo*] that he knows nothing of it *as a man*, but not *as the minister of Christ*." Nor does it make any difference here, although he be further asked, if he knows of it as a minister of Christ: for the confessor must always be supposed to speak as a man and not as a minister of Christ!¹ Likewise, a poor person who has hidden some property for his support, may reply to a magistrate, that he has nothing!² And if a man, swearing something that is false, can add in a low voice words that make the statement true, it will pass in the morality of St Alphonsus,—but only, for the Saint is strict in his moral code, if what is said in a low voice *can* be noticed by the other party in any way, although he do not perceive the meaning of it.³ This case, it is obvious, requires clever management, but the Saint does not give directions for accomplishing the trick successfully. Perhaps Cardinal Wiseman's next publication will supply them.

In treating of the Third (Fourth) Commandment this great Popish theologian does not hesitate, of course, to make the present observance of the Lord's Day rest entirely upon the authority of the Church, and so to equalize it with other festival days. And having proposed the question whether an internal worship of God is commanded in this commandment, he resolves it in the negative, stating this at least as the opinion which has the greatest weight of authority. "For although the sanctification of the soul is the end of the commandment," says he, "yet the end of the commandment does not come within the commandment."⁴

He points out with some care what we are to understand as the

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 38.

² Ibid., II., 39, 40.

³ Ibid., II., 43.

⁴ Ibid., II., 112.

servile works forbidden on Sundays and other festivals. It is not a servile work and therefore not forbidden, to divert one's self, to dance, to play upon musical instruments, to travel on foot or horseback, in a carriage, or in a ship, or to do anything which is requisite in order to these things.¹—Is it lawful to grind corn in a mill upon festival days (Sunday of course included)? Yes, if the mill be driven by water or wind, but not if it be driven by cattle, which requires much labour. Such is the reply of Sanchez, but other doctors have improved upon it, and with sufficient probability infer from it, says St Alphonsus, that when the human labour required is not great, it is not unlawful, or at least not very unlawful, [*non sit illicitum, saltem graviter*] even to drive the mill by beasts.² Herein these Popish doctors seem like the Mohammedans in the fable, who ate up the hog.

We may now turn to another commandment, "Thou shalt not kill."

Here a question is raised concerning the killing of a thief, who steals something of great value, which being settled in the affirmative, leads to another question as to the amount of value rendering such homicide lawful.³ It is also granted that there may be cases, although very rare, in which it may be lawful for a man of rank to defend his honour by the death of one who very grievously insults him.⁴

As to the remaining commandments, it is easy to select from Liguori's exposition of them things as monstrous as those already exhibited. Pope Innocent IV. had condemned, amongst many other prepositions of the Probabilists, one expressed in these words:—"Male and female domestic servants may take secretly from their masters, for compensation of their own work, when they judge it to be more than the wages which they receive." Even this Papal condemnation is no serious obstacle to the probabilism of Liguori. It only sets him upon more refinements

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 118.

³ Ibid., II., 200, 202.

² Ibid., II., 119.

⁴ Ibid., II., 198.

and distinctions. He discovers cases in which it is lawful and cases in which it is not lawful for servants thus to help themselves. He says it seems probable to him and other doctors of recent times, that a servant may on his own judgment compensate himself for his work, if he confidently (*certè*) judge that he deserves larger pay,—only, however, if the domestic or other hired servant, be a prudent man, of tender conscience and well qualified for forming a correct judgment, and if he be certain of the justice of the compensation, without any danger of hallucination (*remoto omni hallucinationis periculo*),—conditions which, indeed, the saint admits, are of very rare occurrence. As to the condemnation of the proposition above quoted, he says, it was deservedly proscribed, because it was expressed in too general terms.¹

He raises the question, amongst many others, concerning restitution,—whether a man is bound to make restitution who intends to burn one man's house and burns another man's house by mistake. He gives two opposite opinions, but dwells at great length, and with evident approbation, upon the arguments in favour of the opinion that the man is not bound to make restitution. Restitution—he says, amongst other things—is not due for a mere material injury, but the injury must also be formal or voluntarily injurious. The event, in fact, as he says, is accidental, in respect of the man whose house is burned,—and as to the other man, he has sustained no loss.²

Taking specimens almost at random, we come upon the following. The question is asked, whether or not a person who being aware of the obligation of a contract wills to contract, but wills not to bind himself, remains bound by the contract. Authorities are cited for opposite opinions: but the more probable opinion, says St Alphonsus, is, that the man is not bound,—because this condition, being contrary to the substance of the contract, invalidates the contract.³

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 307, 308.

³ Ibid., II., 446.

² Ibid., II., 380, 381.

We find it permitted even to priests and monks to play with dice, if it be only for a short time, and for recreation's sake, and without scandal.¹ For playing with cards there is still greater license, unless there may happen to be in some place a special prohibition.² Not only is it declared lawful to play at games for money under certain rules and restrictions, but "to play for the recitation of a psalm or a Lord's prayer is not a sin nor an irreverence."³ Perhaps, indeed, the danger of scandal might make it very sinful, except in a very quiet corner, in Westminster or Dundee. But that is quite another question, and the principle just quoted must abate our wonder at the story of Tetzel's companions playing for the salvation of souls, or for their deliverance from purgatory.

In connection with the subject of oaths, enough has already been adduced to shew what Liguori's morality is in respect to truth and falsehood. Yet let us briefly advert to his rules concerning dissimulation as to *the faith*. He says,—

"In no case is it lawful positively to deny the faith either by word or sign, because Christ has said *Whosoever denieth me before men, &c.* But although it is not lawful to lie or to pretend what is not, it is, however, lawful for just cause to dissimulate, that is, to cover the truth (*tegere veritatem*) by words or other ambiguous and indifferent signs, and when there is no necessity for confessing it."⁴

He goes on to say,—

"When you are not questioned concerning the faith, it is not only lawful, but often it is better for the honour of God and the benefit of your neighbour, to conceal the faith than to confess it, as, when you do more good by lurking [*latens*] amongst heretics, . . . &c."⁵

As to the "Sixth" [Seventh] Commandment, Liguori treats of it at great length, excusing himself because (he says) the transgressions of this commandment are the most frequent matter of confessions. But this is, in reality, no tolerable excuse for that minuteness of attention which he bestows, as does also Dens, and as, indeed, the Popish doctors do in general, upon all pos-

¹ Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 570, 577, &c.

² Ibid., II., 570.

³ Ibid., I., 298.

⁴ Ibid., II., 577.

⁵ Ibid., I., 299.

sible forms, and circumstances, and modifications of iniquity. I shall quote nothing by way of example or illustration; but the crimes which these Popish doctors describe and treat of are such as only minds habituated to all depravity could even imagine: and yet they are dwelt upon as if the authors delighted in it: the ostensible reason being that the confessor must know every circumstance in order to judge of the case, and must have rules for judging of these circumstances. A little reflection shews what must be the fruits of confession,—whether to the confessor himself, called to occupy himself in the contemplation of all possible and all actual impurity,—or to the poor creatures, especially the youth of both sexes, who go to confess their sins in such an ear as it were into the ear of God, and to be questioned by a man of mind so trained, who comes to deal with their hearts and consciences, as it were, in the place of God. The very manuals for youth, intended to assist their preparations for the confessional, are calculated to suggest impure thoughts, and to draw their minds to subjects, to dwell upon which is defilement. Kenny's Young Catholic's Guide, for example, contains a list of such questions, calculated to lead the young person to communicate to the priest particulars concerning which no wise parent would ever inquire, but in reference to which he would only, at most, address general warnings to his child. It is fearful to think of a Popish priest, such as we know Popish priests to be, acquainting himself by means of the confessional with the very thoughts which ought never to be known save to the person in whose mind they arise and to God himself,—with what a child could never reveal to a parent, nor a wife to her husband. But *he* must know it all. And—lest a young person should not be prepared for the narration of what, however, must be told,—to Kenny's questions for preparatory self-examination is subjoined this direction, "If you find any difficulty in acknowledging any of these sins or any similar fault, *tell your confessor that you feel this difficulty*, and ask him to assist you, and then answer his questions with candour and simplicity."¹ What sort of ques-

¹ Kenny's Young Catholic's Guide, 19.

tions these are likely to be may be seen in the *Schemata Practica* of Peter Dens. In one of these the penitent is supposed to say, "Habui cogitationes impudicas." Then follow these questions, with many others, "Au dedisti eis causam vel occasionem per auspectum, alloquium, &c.?—Au conatus eas rejicere?—Quamdiu in eis haesisti voluntariè?—Quoties id accidit?"¹ This is but the beginning. What can be the relation subsisting out of the confessional betwixt the confessor when he ceases to be *as God* and the young women whom he is accustomed to question in this way? And there is nothing to hinder him from descending even to far greater minuteness than any *Schema Practicum* can indicate, or than it might be thought proper so to indicate. But I shall not enlarge on this subject. One sentence only I shall quote from Liguori in illustration of auricular confession, and that quotation I shall make in Latin, reluctant to make it at all, yet feeling compelled to do so. "Non obstante periculo pollutionis, licet audire confessiones mulierum."² It is an odious and fearful picture which these few words exhibit before us. And books like Liguori's exhibit nothing so much as the odious gloatings of lust.

I shall add nothing more on this topic of Popish morality save a few remarks concerning PERSECUTION. And omitting many things which I had intended to notice, I shall confine my attention to what one or two Popish writers have said in connection with the subject of THE INQUISITION. Here Popish writers in general, at least in this country, seem to find themselves in great embarrassment. It is very interesting to observe how they shuffle and prevaricate, contradicting themselves and one another, and have recourse to the strangest expedients either to clear the character of the Inquisition or to make us believe that the Inquisition was an institution in no way belonging to the Church of Rome, and for whose proceedings that Church is

¹ Dens, Theol., VI., 347.

² Liguori, Theol. Moral., II., 265.—A similar quotation might be made from Dens, Theol., I., 299.

in no way responsible. Some of them adopt both these lines of defence. They seek to modify our notions of the Inquisition and its proceedings, and to persuade us that it was always a mild and equitable tribunal, or, at least, much more mild and equitable than we have been accustomed to imagine; but, at the same time, they shew a great anxiety to assign all the honour of its reputation to the civil government of the countries in which it was established, and renounce all claim to it upon the part of the Church.

Keenan has a chapter on the Inquisition in his *Controversial Catechism*, separate and distinct from his chapter on Persecution; both chapters being his own and not Scheffmacher's. He begins thus:—

"Is not the Inquisition a state engine employed by the Catholic Church for the purpose of persecution?—No; the Church has not, and never had, any connection with the Inquisition farther than this, that *some of her members*,¹ through mistaken zeal, resorted to this cruel and unwarrantable means for the purpose of suppressing immoral, blasphemous, and infidel doctrines."²

We shall return to Mr Keenan by and bye. In the meantime let us turn to another author. We see that Mr Keenan begins by condemning the Inquisition,—although as he goes on he makes it evident enough that his disapprobation of it is not very strong. But a pamphlet has recently been published by an aged ecclesiastic in Scotland,—already mentioned as the chaplain of a Popish nobleman, and the author of "*Otium Octogenarii*,"—in which the Inquisition is not only defended but extolled. The pamphlet is entitled "A Coroner's Inquest and Post-Mortem Examination of the Inquisition,"³ and is altogether a remarkable production. Few men of education, and no man of refined feeling, could have condescended to the use of a style so replete with vulgar insolence and flavoured with slang expressions. *To humbug* is a favourite verb with this author, and *fly-blown*

¹ The Italics are his own.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxii.

³ Glasgow, published by Hugh Margey, 1851.

an adjective of which he delights to make metaphorical application. It is worth while to notice these things in passing, as indications of what Popery is calculated to effect wherever it has full sway, and what tone it gives to the minds even of those who may be supposed to have been best educated and to have enjoyed the greatest advantages of polished society,—society, in which of course, they not only receive but impart. Some other little things deserve also to be noticed, in order that we may form a proper estimate of the character of this pamphlet, of which there is no reason to think that the Papists of this country are ashamed. It is coolly asserted that “the Confession of Faith, the standard of religion” in Scotland, “lays it down as an article of faith *that the public magistrate hath full power to coerce, even by death*, the disturbers of the external peace and order of the Church,”¹—and reference is boldly made to “Confession of Faith, chap. xx., sec. 4,”—though notwithstanding this parade of exact quotation, the whole assertion is a falsehood, no such power of putting to death being, either in that or any other place of the Westminster Confession of Faith, ascribed to the civil magistrate. Those who have met with a few instances of this kind, will better understand what to make of strange assertions which they sometimes find in Popish controversialists, and quotations which they have not opportunity to verify.²—Again, in another part of the pamphlet, in an argument directed to the purpose of shewing that Protestants have no right to reproach Papists with persecution or with the spirit of persecution, being equally persecutors themselves, we have a long account “on the testimony of Kerroux, a Dutchman and a Protestant,” of cruelties practised on the unhappy Catholic peasantry in some part of Lower Germany or Holland, by one Sonoy or Snoy, the Prince of Orange’s general,—cruelties such, says the author of the pam-

¹ Coroner’s Inquest, &c., p. 56. The Italics are in the pamphlet.

² Dr Wiseman has been repeatedly charged with the grossest perversions in his references and quotations. But the thing is quite common, and seems not to be accounted wrong!

phlet, in his own style of eloquence, “as only the head of a demon could have invented, and only the heart of a brute (a Dutch brute) could have executed.” But we may be excused for suspecting that the pen of the historian as well as the heart of the general must have been indebted to the genius of some singularly inventive head, when we read in the long enumeration of these cruelties, the following extraordinary words, “Wasps were put on their belly, and when they had stung them, the stings, of a finger’s length, were pulled out!”¹—Wasp stings of a finger’s length! We are tempted to laugh,—yet the whole subject is too serious for laughter. He was a man of common understanding who wrote this: but Popery had done its work upon that understanding. It seems indeed as if by a wonderful arrangement of Providence, some one anxious to make out a case against Protestants, had been allowed to fall into the indiscretion of this obvious falsehood, thereby to stamp falsehood upon his whole story: and then another is blind to the absurdity, and copies it!

Insisting that the Inquisition was a tribunal belonging to the State and not to the Church at all, this author hazards a statement which probably may be new to most readers:—

“The Inquisition, then, is nothing else but a *Jury Court*, and the Inquisitors are nothing else but *jurymen*, appointed to decide in certain ecclesiastical cases; but to decide on them in as far as the state and society are interested. Remember, I say *the state and society*. For in as far as religion is concerned, the Church has not only disavowed its rigours, but opposed them. The Inquisition, I say, is a regular jury.”

And of this statement he proceeds to make use in a way of argument:—

“Now, I am not aware that we are in the habit of reckoning our jurymen monsters of cruelty or shedders of blood. The jurymen says, according to the evidence, the panel at the bar has, or has not sinned against the

¹ Coroner’s Inquest, &c., pp. 79, 80. Milner makes some allusion to these cruelties, resting on the authority of the same historian, but he says nothing of the wasp stings. (End of Controversy, Letter xlix.)

law, and he leaves the judge to pronounce the sentence, to award the penalty."¹

This is almost as preposterous as the story of the great Dutch wasp stings.—We need not stay to enquire whether any solitary point of analogy can anywhere be found. A Jury Court in which the jury is perpetual, would be an anomaly indeed,—every case tried by the same set of individuals, and every case tried in private,—the accused not confronted with the witnesses, and their very names withheld from him, as this author himself admits.² And the admission, reluctantly made, is no doubt very good evidence. But it does not follow that we should be equally ready to give him implicit credence (as indeed he does not seem to expect it, for he himself says it would not be believed in this country if attested on oath, and never did man entertain a more reasonable opinion), when he asserts that "the Crown chooses for Inquisitors men of such sterling *conscience and honour*, and so rigorous are they in *testing the character of the witnesses*, that no man in an inquisitorial country ever dreamed of foul play." "I speak as knowing,"—he says. Alas! he forgot how difficult it might be to get an acquaintance with some of the dreams or even waking thoughts of men in an inquisitorial country, such as Spain, of which he principally speaks. There is a tyranny so fearful that men become afraid not only to speak, but even to think, perhaps even to dream. Nor was this author at all the more likely to become acquainted with some of the thoughts and dreams even of Spain, for his living nearly twenty years under the windows of one of the two Supreme Courts of the Inquisition in that country, and being on such intimate terms with the head Inquisitor, that there seldom passed a week in which he did not spend some hours in his house, nay, being so highly in favour in some influential quarter, that he might have been an Inquisitor himself.³ All this, however, if it makes us disregard a little his *contradictions* of other writers who have liked the

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 19.

² Ibid., p. 26.

³ Ibid., p. 17.

Inquisition worse than he, makes his intentional or unintentional *corroborations* of their statements more valuable. It is not unsatisfactory to glean a little information from a Popish priest who was so long familiar with Inquisitors and with the working of the Inquisition, and to find some of the worst charges against it confirmed by his mode of defence. Indeed, it is almost enough to convince any man that no tolerably plausible defence of the Inquisition can be made, when recourse is had to the expedient of identifying it in its nature with an English Jury Court. A curious Jury Court! At first "a secular court with clerical assessors," but afterwards, in its mature and perfect form, "*a jury of Clergy*, to explain the law, with power to their foreman to pronounce sentence in cases which clearly called for correction, and in cases which might involve the penalty of death or the loss of life and limb, to remit the sentence to the secular courts."¹ The functions of a jury are here considerably enlarged.

The sentence, in the most serious cases, was to be remitted to the *secular courts*. Yet, "it is false that the Inquisition is a clerical or religious tribunal," says this same author in a former page, in his anxiety to exonerate the Church from the blame of its misdeeds, if any there were. What, then, was or is the Inquisition?

Even this author, who shews the utmost anxiety to throw discredit on the statements of Dr M'Crie's History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reformation in Spain, does not venture to contradict his assertion that the secular courts, to which the cases involving loss of life or limb were remitted by the Inquisition, had no power to pronounce any other sentence than that which the Inquisitors had already determined. It sounds well to say that the Inquisition was not competent to pass sentence of the loss of limbs or of death. Accordingly, Mr Keenan says so.² And he seems to think that nothing more can be necessary than to prove the truth of this statement, in order to shew

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 33.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxii.

that Protestants in general have been utterly misinformed with regard to the Inquisition. But to what does it really amount? There is a necessary explanation, which the writers who make the statement are careful to withhold. Let us take it in the words of Dr M'Crie. But before perusing his words, and in order that they may be the better understood and estimated by readers unfamiliar with the tricks of Popery,—in order also that the Popery of the Spanish Inquisition and the days of Philip II. and of Valdes, may be the more evidently identified with the Popery of our own age and country,—let us in the first place take a sentence or two from Milner's End of Controversy.

"But what need of more authorities on this head," says Dr Milner, on the subject of religious persecution, "since our canon law, as it stood in ancient times, and as it still stands, renders all those who have actively concurred to the death or mutilation of any human being, whether Catholic or heretic, Jew or Pagan, even in a just war, or by exercising the art of surgery, or by judicial proceedings, *irregular*; that is to say, such persons cannot be promoted to holy orders, or exercise those orders if they have actually received them. Nay, when an ecclesiastical judge or tribunal has, after due examination, pronounced that any person accused of obstinate heresy is actually guilty of it, he is required by the Church expressly to declare in her name, that her power extends no farther than such decision: and in case the obstinate heretic is liable, by the laws of the state, to suffer death or mutilation, the judge is required to pray for his pardon."

To pray for his pardon! Abominable hypocrisy! But now let us attend to Dr M'Crie. He is describing the course of proceedings at a Spanish auto-de-fe. "After this they were formally delivered over to the secular judges, to suffer the punishment awarded to heretics by the civil law. It was on this occasion that the Inquisitors performed that impious farce which has excited the indignation of all in whose breasts fanaticism, or some worse principle, has not extinguished every sentiment of common feeling. When they delivered the prisoner into the hands of the secular judges whom they had summoned to receive him, they besought them to treat him with clemency and

¹ End of Controversy, Letter xlix.

compassion. This they did to escape falling under the censure of *irregularity*, which the canons of the Church had denounced against ecclesiastics who should be accessory to the inflicting of any bodily injury. Yet they not only knew what would be the consequence of their act, but had taken all the precautions necessary for securing it. Five days before the auto-de-fe, they acquainted the ordinary royal judge with the number of prisoners to be delivered over to him, in order that the proper quantity of stakes, wood, and everything else requisite for the execution, might be in readiness. The prisoners once declared by the Inquisitors to be impenitent or relapsed heretics, nothing was competent to the magistrate but to pronounce the sentence adjudging them to the flames. . . . The statutes adjudging heretics to the fire had been confirmed by numerous bulls of popes, which commanded the Inquisitors to watch over their exact observance. And in accordance with this, they, at every auto-de-fe, required the magistrates to swear that they would faithfully execute the sentences against the persons of heretics, without delay, 'in the way and manner prescribed by the sacred canons, and the laws which treated on the subject.'"¹ But Dr Milner and his brethren would have us to believe that all the burning and cruelty, if there were any, were the work of the king and the ordinary secular judge; the Inquisitors,—gentle, holy ecclesiastics,—only giving over the prisoners into their hands and praying them, (not hypocritically, of course,) to treat the poor heretics with much commiseration. "The judge is required to pray for his pardon!" But of course it was obliging of him to give timely notice to the other judge, that he might have the faggots ready, in case his secular heart should be so hard as not to grant the prayer for pardon.

As the last victim of the Spanish Inquisition who was burned alive, at least publicly, suffered at Seville so recently as the 7th of November 1781,² on a charge of heresy, the author of the Coroner's Inquest, who spent so many years in such inti-

¹ M'Crie, Reformation in Spain, p. 279.

² Ibid., 339.

macy with Inquisitors, could perhaps, if he were so inclined, give us interesting information as to particulars not yet to be found in the pages of any historian. Perhaps he could tell us how the prayer for pardon was made, and how it was treated by the secular judge, and how the whole arrangements were made for the august public solemnity, which, notwithstanding the intercession of the Inquisitors, had so tragical a conclusion. It is interesting to consider that we have one amongst us still, even in this heretical country, whose memory must be stored with anecdotes of autos-de-fe, and inexorable secular judges, and that we have now an author writing in defence of the Inquisition who perhaps has drunk in charity from the lips of the very Inquisitors that presided on the above-mentioned day, and who may possibly even have been present when the poor woman (for the victim was a woman) died amidst the fire. But it is more important to observe how perfectly accordant the spirit of his work is, with that of other writings most popular among the Papists of this country at the present time.

Let us return to Mr Keenan. To the question, Why such an engine as the Inquisition was ever employed at all, he makes answer :—

“The rulers at that time were, in their wisdom, impressed with the idea that it was the best mode of suppressing sacrilege, profanation, apostasy, magic, and other crimes, which are corporally punished in every country, whether Catholic or Protestant. How many *witches* did the Calvinist ministers burn in Scotland? (Lyon’s Hist. of St. Andrews). How many Papists did they persecute and prosecute? (Arnot’s Hist. of Edinburgh).”¹

Now what an audacious assertion is this,—if it were made by itself, and not slipped in amongst other assertions, possessing a greater measure of truth,—that *apostasy* is corporally punished, *in every country, whether Catholic or Protestant!* And what a pitiful argument for justification or palliation of the Inquisition’s proceedings, is that derived from the burning of witches in Scotland! But it is a favourite one with Popish authors, and may be heard from the lips of almost every Papist who ventures

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxii.

into discussion with a Protestant. The venerable defender of the Inquisition, the author of the Coroner’s Inquest, has also a great deal to say about the burning of witches. To all which it may be replied that it has nothing to do with the subject of religious persecution. Whatever part ministers or even Church courts may have taken in it, and however culpable they may be deemed, there was certainly no persecution for conscience sake. If all the alleged witches were innocent not only of the crime laid to their charge, but also of the crime of seeking to impose upon the superstitious fears of the people around them, by pretending to powers which they did not possess,—a crime whose reality and magnitude will be acknowledged even by those who have no hesitation in denying that there ever was any other reality in witchcraft,—this at all events is clear enough, that those who condemned them believed them to be guilty of a great crime,—not only of what they believed to be a great crime, but of what, on the supposition of its reality, all must agree in regarding as a great crime, and one which merited the severest punishment. It is strange enough, moreover, for *Popish* writers to ridicule the idea of witchcraft as a crime, considering what their own most approved books contain, however it may suit their present purpose of vilifying Protestant Churches. There is nothing by which Popery shews itself more wretchedly destitute of any decent argument, and contented to adopt a vile one, than by this reference to the burning of witches in Scotland, as a set off against the burning of heretics.

The reference to the persecution of Papists by Protestants in Scotland is not much better, continually repeated as it is by one Popish writer after another. Waiving for the present all question as to the amount of intolerance with which Scottish Protestantism is really chargeable,—waiving all question as to the defence or excuse which may be made on grounds of civil policy, for what at first seems merely a religious intolerance repugnant to all real Christian liberty and charity,—and all question whether the conduct of Papists, and especially of Popish priests in the times of alleged Protestant persecution, was not

such as to make them dangerous neighbours and subjects, or whether their principles are not such as to make them dangerous still,—it may be enough to meet Mr Keenan's question of *How many Papists did the Calvinist ministers persecute and prosecute in Scotland?* with another question, What Papist did they ever put to death? or rather, What Papist was ever put to death for his religion in Scotland? Nay, what Papist was ever tortured by rack or pulley, or boot or thumbikin, or any other of those hellish inventions which have made the Inquisition eternally infamous, with an infamy in which, notwithstanding all pretences and excuses, the Popish Church must consent to participate?

But Mr Keenan has still more to say in order to clear his Church from the charge of persecution.—

“Did not the Catholic people at Madeira persecute lately Dr Kalley and Maria Joaquina?—No; but the Catholic people at Madeira would not tolerate an insolent apothecary from Kilmarnock to violate the laws of their country, which, under severe penalties, forbid blasphemy. Had that personage confined himself, not to the vending of corrupt Bibles and outrageous blasphemies, but to his legitimate province, the vending of pills, the authorities would not consider him worth their attention. The medical, however, did not seem to pay him so well as the religious pill, though no doubt both were equally noxious.”

Along with this we must take the next question and answer.—

“Have Protestants been guilty of a persecution exactly similar to this?—Various persons, such as Carlisle, have been lately imprisoned in London for blasphemy; and the Presbyterians of Scotland have shewn equal zeal, for they have now, or lately had, two persons in prison in Edinburgh for the same crime. Thus do Protestants blame Catholics for what they themselves think it a duty to do.”¹

It is difficult to maintain a perfect coolness in discussing statements and sentiments such as these. Look here! ye liberals, who are anxious to keep on brotherly terms with the priests of the Church of Rome,—behold what manner of spirit

¹ Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxii.

they are of! These are the men whom you are ready to embrace,—whom we are reckoned bigots for not embracing likewise,—to whose sweet plausibilities you listen unsuspectingly whilst they plead for liberality and charity, and whom you welcome into your houses and into the company of your wives and children. Read again the sentences which have just been quoted, and understand what Popery is in Scotland at the present hour. The veil is lifted up by an unwary and unconscious hand,—and if you be not wilfully and judicially blinded, you can remain in your delusion no longer.

“To elucidate truth is the object of free discussion,” says Mr Keenan in the preface to his *Controversial Catechism*, “and to all who are *properly qualified* for the task ample scope should be given.” “Catholics,” he proceeds to say, “as regards their doctrines, court publicity; because they are fully aware, that the more these are tried and examined, the stronger will be the conviction of their truth in the mind of the sincere inquirer.” But it is worth while to observe what sort of “free discussion” Papists approve, and what sort of trial and examination they wish their doctrines to be subjected to. “Catholics, as regards their doctrines, court publicity,” no doubt: but the publicity is all one-sided;—it is for *their* doctrines and arguments alone. The simple reader of Mr Keenan's sentences might understand them otherwise, but that of course would be entirely the reader's own fault. The Popish newspaper in Glasgow is called *The Free Press*, and no doubt Papists are ready to take advantage of the freedom of the press where they require it for their own purposes,—that is, where they have not the power in their own hands; but if they mean us to believe that they really desire freedom of the press where they can impose restraints upon it, then the pretence, which the name of this and some others of their papers may seem intended to support, is one whose falsehood all history demonstrates, and which only the most impudent of mankind could make, whilst the press remains fettered in Madrid and Rome. Free discussion is a fair phrase for Scotland: but what meaning has it when applied to Spain or Italy?

What meaning has it when applied to that Madeira, from which Dr Kalley was compelled to flee, for teaching no other religion than the very Protestantism of Kilmarnock and Dundee, which Mr Keenan would persuade the Protestant people of these towns that he desires to meet on the fair field of free discussion? Would any Protestant, however highly educated, be held *properly qualified* in Tuscany?—or here, if the Popish priesthood were but in power again? When free discussion is allowed in Tuscany, then Miss Cunningham may distribute copies of the Pilgrim's Progress and Protestant tracts at Lucca, and Count Guicciardini may return to Florence, and dwell in his own house in peace, and the people of that city may hear from his lips and from the lips of his fellow exiles the gospel of the grace of God. But meanwhile let no Popish orator dare to mount a platform in this country and prate with unblushing front about liberty of conscience and free discussion.—But Mr Keenan is cautious. "*Properly qualified!*" The properly qualified persons evidently in his eye, the only persons to whom "ample scope" should be given for *free discussion*, are those whom he is pleased to describe in the preceding sentence as "the lawful pastors, whom Christ commissioned to feed his lambs and his sheep with the bread of life and the word of God." However, he forgets his caution when he comes to the names of Maria Joaquina and Dr Kalley. It is wonderful how the mention of these names seems to excite the greatest commotion in the breasts of all the Popish priests of Scotland. The aged gentleman who defends the Inquisition, and might have been an Inquisitor himself, seizes every opportunity of letting us know how warmly he sympathizes with their persecutors. He speaks of the Portuguese as "telling Dr Kalley to mind his gallipots, instead of turning preacher of a new religion, and maddening the poor Madeirans into the ordinary accompaniment of new religions,—rebellion."¹ Elegant,—no doubt! and as much in accordance with truth as with taste! Again, we are told about people

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 10.

clamouring for Dr Kalley, "who thrust his head into the lion's jaws," but having no sympathy for the helpless piety of the Nuns of Minsk, the victims of Russian cruelty;¹—for whom however it may safely be said that the Protestants of this country did feel warm sympathy in so far as they believed their story, which, because of a certain "habit and repute," not very creditable to the Church of Rome, most of them regarded with strong suspicion. But enough of this. These little quotations speak for themselves, and are better than any argument.

Mr Keenan however must not yet be dismissed. It is marvellous how coolly he identifies the prosecution and punishment of the basest blasphemers and atheists, who have insulted all religion and laboured to sap the foundations of morality and of society, with the persecution of persons whose only offence was that they refused to acknowledge the Virgin Mary as the Mother of God, or to worship her or any of the saints, or to prostrate themselves before a wafer, and denied that it was transubstantiated into the body, soul, and divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. These were the "outrageous blasphemies" for which Dr Kalley was driven from Madeira, and for which Maria Joaquina was condemned to death. But what a bitterness is in that language of contempt which Mr Keenan employs! "An insolent apothecary from Kilmarnock." This excels Billingsgate. And then, "Had that personage confined himself, not to the vending of corrupt Bibles and outrageous blasphemies, but to his legitimate province, the vending of pills, the authorities would not consider him worth their attention." (The grammar, it may be remarked by the way, is illustrative of that superior education of which this author elsewhere boasts on behalf of the Popish clergy.²) And what intense malignity in the sneer at Dr Kalley's religion, and the accompanying insinuation on a different subject! "The medical, however, did not seem to pay him so well as the religious pill, though no doubt both were

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 11.

² Keenan, Controv. Cat., ch. xxxv.

equally noxious." Here are two insinuations indeed; both base, cowardly, and contemptible;—one about the *paying*, as if the motive must needs have been a mercenary one, and the other, viler still, about the quality of the "medical pill" itself.

Yet this Catechism is recommended by Popish dignitaries in Scotland, and has been republished with like recommendation in America; so that the extracts above made may be regarded as exhibiting not only the sentiments of Mr Keenan, but equally those of a number of higher ecclesiastics.

The defender of the Inquisition in his "Coroner's Inquest" quarrels with Dr M'Crie for following Llorente in his statements regarding it, and in particular regarding the number of the victims whom it burned alive. Nevertheless, as we have partly seen, in many important circumstances affecting the character of that tribunal and its proceedings, his pamphlet affords valuable corroborations of Llorente's statements, and of those of the other writers by whom it has been described, but upon whose testimony Papists have continually laboured to throw discredit. We need not stay to discuss the character of Llorente and the independent credibility of his testimony. But let us enquire a little into the fact regarding the numbers burned alive.

"Both Llorente and his copyist tell those who will take it on their word, that in the brief space of the first year, it burnt 2000 individuals—giving us to understand that they were all burned for religion. And that from that time, down to the Reformation, it burned in all, not fewer, according to Dr M'Crie, than 13,000; and according to Llorente, 17,000."¹

So says the author of the Coroner's Inquest. Had he looked more carefully into either Llorente or his copyist, he might have seen that he had no right to represent them as giving different accounts of the numbers burned *alive* during the period from 1481 to 1517, to which they refer, and during which the Inquisition was chiefly occupied with cases of persons relapsing into Judaism and Mohammedanism, the natural consequence of the forced conversions which had been so largely effected in

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 58.

Spain. But, insisting on the inadmissibility of Llorente's evidence, and proceeding to demand names, dates, places, last speeches, and other particulars, he declares that the whole of what Dr M'Crie relates on this subject, "*is a bundle of fly-blown jargon, fable, fiction, and falsehood.*" And he has much more in the same strain, till at last it occurs to him that these Moors and Jews must have been burned for *bigamy, polygamy, and apostasy*,—but this is merely a happy thought of his own;—however, it enables him to *suspect* that if the number who suffered for these crimes were deducted, "the number of those who suffered for religion will be zero or thereby."¹ What distinction he makes in this case, between suffering for apostasy and suffering for religion, does not appear.

But Dr M'Crie does not quote Llorente for his statement that "in the course of the first year in which it was erected, the Inquisition of Seville, which then extended over Castile, committed two thousand persons alive to the flames, burnt as many in effigy, and condemned seventeen thousand to different penances."² He quotes Mariana, a Jesuit, free from all suspicion of disliking the Inquisition or abetting heresy, and whose history was published after due revision with the approbation of his order. And turning to the place cited, I find indeed some difficulty as to the exact period during which the 2000 incremations are said to have taken place, and cannot make quite sure that Mariana means to speak of the first year of Torquemada's inquisitorship,—on which point Dr M'Crie may perhaps have drawn something from his other authorities. But Mariana expressly states that Torquemada's proclamations having held out some hope of pardon, seventeen thousand persons of both sexes and of all ranks and ages came forward of their own accord to confess their guilt, and that two thousand were burned with fire, and a larger number fled into the neighbouring provinces. "From this commencement," he goes on to say, "the institution

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 63.

² M'Crie, Reformation in Spain, p. 104.

grew to such authority and power, that nothing in the whole Christian world was more formidable to the wicked, to the singular advantage of the state, affording an immediate relief from impending evils by which other provinces were distressed,"—"a relief granted by heaven," says the pious Jesuit, "for against such dangers human prudence was insufficient."¹

This point being ascertained as to the two thousand who perished by fire, and even giving to Mariana's statement all possible latitude of interpretation as to time, and supposing it to be a mere approximation as to numbers, we really need not concern ourselves as to the number of thousands, more or less, who were burned from that period to the days of the Lutheran Reformation. No inquiry into particulars of this kind can much affect our opinion of the Inquisition or its defenders.

But this chapter of Mariana contains matter of a different kind, very much to our present purpose. It conclusively sets aside the convenient guess of the author of the pamphlet already quoted, that many of the victims of the Inquisition were punished for polygamy and bigamy, crimes to which Moors and Jews might readily be supposed to be prone. It would seem strange, except in a Popish controversialist, that such a guess should have been made by any man with that chapter of Mariana before him. For the historian distinctly says, that many of the faithful began to be infected by associating with the Moors and Jews who were numerous in the country, and that many apostatized from the Christian faith which they had adopted on renouncing their hereditary religion,—that this evil reached the

¹ It may be as well to give Mariana's own words, "*A Turrecremata edictis proposita spe veniæ, homines promiscuæ ætatis, sexus, conditionis, ad decem et septem millia ultro crimina confessos memorant: duo millia crematos igne, majori numero in vicinas provincias fuga dilapsos. Ab hoc initio res in hanc auctoritatem crevit atque potestatem; qua nulla pravis hominibus toto orbe Christiano formidabilior est, reipublicæ universæ majori commodo; præsens remedium adversus impendentia mala quibus aliæ provinciæ exagitantur, cœlo datum; nam humano consilio adversus tanta pericula satis caveri non potuit.*"—Mariana, *Hist. Hisp.*, lib. xxiv., cap. 17.

greatest height in Seville, where also the severest penalties first began to be inflicted, the graver forms of the offence being visited with the punishment of the stake after long incarceration, and persons less guilty being branded with an infamy reaching to their families and descendants, whilst no small number, after confiscation of their goods, were consigned to perpetual dungeons and chains.¹

This may be deemed almost enough on this subject, but I must still call attention to a remarkable passage of the recent pamphlet in vindication of the Inquisition, having reference to its treatment of the Reformers.—

"Luther," we are told, "*like every other turbulent spirit*, knew that the Inquisition would bar his path at every step; but he thought that by clandestine manœuvres, or openly bearding it, he would set it at defiance. We read of the most strange schemes adopted by him and his followers for introducing their venomous books, by enclosing them in waterproof cases, and sending them to Spain in casks of spirits, &c.; and when this failed he sent his apostles—men of real flesh and blood, and men, some of them of the most daring temper, and others of the most crafty and insinuating kind."²

Here we may pause to observe the use made of epithets which there is nothing adduced to justify,—a common trick with Popish writers. Of the venomous quality of the books we may form our own opinion from what we know of translations of the Bible and Protestant religious publications in general. For the daring of the men we may give God thanks, that he animated them with holy courage to incur the danger of the dungeons, chains, racks, pulleys, and autos-de-fe of the Inquisition, and that he enabled many of them not only to witness a good confession but to seal their testimony with their blood. For their craftiness,

¹ *Plures sacra Christiana, quæ susceperant patria superstitione abdicata, fide inconstanti, nullo vetante deserebant. Labes Hispali maxime est grassata, . . . &c. Nam majori commissio delicto, igne post diuturnum carcerem et tormento necabantur: leviori de caussa, ignominia inurebantur familie perpetua: non pauci, bonis publicatis, æternis tenebris, vinculisque mandati.*—Mariana, *Hist. Hisp.*, lib. xxiv., cap. 17.

² *Coroner's Inquest*, &c., p. 65.

they needed the wisdom of the serpent; and even their enemies have not ventured to state anything which should lead us to think that they did not combine with it the harmlessness of doves,—their charges being confined to the circulation of Lutheran books and the dissemination of Lutheran opinions. And who compelled them to this craftiness? Who drove them to disguise, and concealment, and the shadow of night? Those on whose behalf they are now reproached. Had there been freedom of discussion, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience in Spain, there had been no need of “clandestine manœuvres,” of secret meetings, or of “waterproof cases.” But to proceed with our quotation, which becomes more interesting as we advance.—

“They soon found, however, that the Inquisition was made of too stern stuff to be brow-beaten:”—

Let us pause again. What is this about brow-beating or trying to brow-beat the Inquisition? It is strange how the Popish controversialist seems to make it his business to mistake or misunderstand history. To take it as it stands would never serve his purpose, and even in the subordinate clauses of a seemingly unimportant sentence he often contrives to convey by implication, insinuation, or quiet assumption, a number of perversions.

Resuming our quotation, which was broken off in the middle of a sentence:—

—“but craftiness, under the disguise of religious zeal, made great progress for a time.”

No motive is assigned for this craftiness. No evidence is given of it. It is mere gratuitous aspersion which is here employed against the characters of some of the most single-hearted and devoted men of God.

“But the Inquisition soon developed their hypocrisy, and set its face against them. The Inquisition, like all the courts of justice in Spain, had two seats; Valladolid for all the north, and Seville (or sometimes Granada), for all the southern provinces. If there were afterwards branch Inquisitions established in other towns, they had no power of life and death; they might apprehend and try, but ultimately the process and the prosecuted must be remitted to the one or the other of the above Courts.”

I shall not at present investigate the accuracy of these statements as to the amount of powers vested in the branch Inquisitions, or the way in which the autos-de-fe in Murcia and other provinces were managed, but I beg the reader to observe what is here said about the power of life and death. If words have meaning, it is here admitted, though accidentally and unconsciously, that the two principal courts of the Inquisition had power of life and death. So that the delivering over to the ordinary royal judge was a mere form, which did not affect the real powers of the Inquisitors, nor their own notions of these powers or modes of speaking about them, except when it was convenient to take advantage of it as a pretext.

“It was, then, to these two towns, the head quarters of the Inquisition, that Luther directed his principal attention; but to his grief, he found the Inquisition at its post.”

As if Luther and the Reformers had gone forth, Quixotically, to attack the Inquisitor General and Court of the Supreme;—another instance of the Popish way of reading history.—

“After mature investigation, the names of the reforming Apostles were ascertained, the places where they held their *clandestine meetings*, their *private signals*, their *spies*, &c. All being duly ascertained, the leaders and a few of their followers were apprehended. According to Dr M'Crie, fourteen were seized at Valladolid, and thirty-four at Seville. BUT HOW MANY OF THESE WERE BURNED ALIVE? ONLY TWO. THE REST WERE INDEED BURNED; BUT IT WAS ONLY AFTER THEY HAD BEEN DULY HANGED AS PLOTTERS OF MISCHIEF.”¹

“Duly hanged!” This aged pamphleteer approves of it entirely. “As plotters of mischief!” What mischief? The propagation of the Protestant religion in Spain. The man who is permitted to preach and to publish all the Popery he pleases in Protestant Scotland, and openly to gather around him all who choose to receive his instructions, is not ashamed to abuse our liberty of the press in the quiet abode of a Popish Earl, for the purpose of persuading us that the persecuted Reformers of Spain

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., pp. 65, 66.

were not persecuted but righteously punished; and in proof that they were plotters of mischief who deserved to be hanged, he calmly refers to their *clandestine meetings*, and their *private signals*,—well knowing that the very power which put them to death had reduced them to this necessity. Has Popery changed its character since the sixteenth century, as it has become fashionable for liberal Protestants to suppose? Have the Papists of Scotland repudiated and reprobated the sentiments of this vindicator of the Inquisition? No; but we may see from the sentiments which he expresses what they have in store for us, if they should ever have the power to do with us according to their will. If these *plotters* of mischief were duly hanged, would the same punishment not be too mild for those who have gone very great lengths in the perpetration of the same mischief, who have connected themselves with societies for the circulation of Protestant Bibles, and other “venomous books,”—or have actually preached the doctrines of the “Lutheran heresy?” If not burned alive, they might at least expect to be duly hanged, and to have their bodies burned after they were dead; concerning which the author to whom we are indebted for so plain an intimation of our danger, proceeds to speak in an inimitable consolatory strain:—

“Now, though the burning of the dead body served the purpose of inspiring horror into the living spectators, and preventing, perhaps, thousands from following the same course, I do not suppose that the body, after it was dead, cared much or felt much from being burned.”¹

What an amiable religion is Popery!

But a few words more as to the facts of the case. We have seen what this author says about the numbers seized at Valladolid and Seville. “According to Dr M'Crie, fourteen were seized at Valladolid and thirty-four at Seville.”² Here we have another interesting instance of the way in which quotations and references to authorities are made by Popish controversialists. Our only safeguard against deception will be found

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 66.

² Ibid.

in resolving to believe nothing which a Popish controversialist asserts, unless we have other reasons for it than his testimony, and to suspect every quotation and reference as a forgery until we have actually verified it. Compare this assertion, “According to Dr M'Crie,” &c., with a few sentences from Dr M'Crie himself. They relate to the first seizure of Protestants. “In Seville and its neighbourhood, *two hundred* persons were apprehended in one day; and in consequence of information resulting from their examinations, the number soon increased to *eight hundred*. The castle of Triana, the common prisons, the convents, and even private houses were crowded with the victims. *Eighty* persons were committed to prison in Valladolid, and the number of individuals seized by the other tribunals was in proportion.”¹ We have nothing to do at present with Dr M'Crie's authorities, we are only testing the accuracy of the reference made to him as an authority by the defender of the Inquisition. Were any Protestant convicted of such falsification, what would then be his position? But let us still proceed, disgusting as is such a task. We must take two sentences more from the defender of the Inquisition.

“So here, then, we have in all forty-eight persons tried, and condemned, and *sentenced to be burned* in all Spain, and of these *only three*, according to Dr M'Crie, were burned alive; while Ferraras, the judicious Spanish historian, proves that there were *only two*, for he shews that of the three enumerated one was hanged; so that all the hecatombs of Spanish martyrs come to be reduced within the narrow space of *two individuals*. These I admit, because they have names (Cazalla and Herezuelo), the others were condemned to various periods of imprisonment and penance.”²

That these sentences contain a mere tissue of falsehoods the reader will perhaps be ready enough to suppose after what he has seen already, and all the proof needful may again be found in comparing this new reference to Dr M'Crie with Dr M'Crie's own work. We shall find him recording the death by fire of Francisco de Vibera Cazalla, parish priest of Hormigos, and

¹ M'Crie, Reform. in Spain, p. 243.

² Coroner's Inquest, &c., pp. 66, 67.

Antonio Herezuelo, an advocate of Toro, at Valladolid, on *Trinity Sunday*, the 21st of May 1559,¹—of Leanor de Cisneros, the wife of the martyr Herezuelo, on the 26th of September 1568,²—of Domingo de Roxas and of Juan Sanchez, both at Valladolid, on the 8th of October 1559,³—of Garcia de Arias,—of Christobal d' Arellano,—of Juan Chrisostomo,—of Juan de Leon,—of Fernando de San Juan, master of the College of Doctrine in Seville,—of Doctor Christobal Losada, pastor of the Protestants there, all burned alive at Seville on the 24th of September 1559,⁴—of Julian Hernandez,—of Maria Gomez,—of Nicholas Burton, an English merchant,—and of William Burke, an English sailor, who were burned alive at the same place on the 22d of December 1560.⁵ He mentions others who suffered with them, and others also who suffered at later dates, but he does not always give the names, nor does it always clearly appear whether the victims were burned alive, or whether they were represented as becoming penitent at the stake, and, therefore, were strangled before the fire was applied. But here we have a list, extracted from Dr M'Crie's work, sufficiently exact as to the names, and as to the dates and places of martyrdom, of a considerable number of the martyrs of the Reformation burned alive by the Inquisition in Spain. What marvellous hardihood in that reference which we have just seen to this very work as naming only three! What an appearance of exactness, also, in the correction of an error as to one of the three, reducing the number to two, Cazalla and Herezuelo! A person not having Dr M'Crie's work at hand might probably enough read on without suspicion. But if this is the way in which Papists conduct controversy or the defence of their Church, what are we to think of the assertions made by attendant priests or friars concerning the penitence of those who continued obstinate till they were brought to the stake, and then, as already mentioned, were first strangled instead of being burned alive,—or of other deathbed conversions to Popery attested by Popish priests?

¹ M'Crie, *Reform. in Spain*, pp. 281–289.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 292–298.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 300–307.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 289–291.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 312–316.

It is needless to go farther,—but it seems scarcely credible that the very priest who has been guilty of thus audaciously falsifying his reference to Dr M'Crie, boasts in the same vile pamphlet of his being able to shew that Protestants “not only mutilate, but glory in mutilating Catholic works, in order to adapt them to Protestant principles!”¹

The great anxiety manifested by Popish writers in general, in this country and at the present time, to disconnect the Inquisition from the Church of Rome, and to represent it as a mere institution of the State, deserves a little further notice. Even the vindicator of the Inquisition, whilst demanding for it our approbation and admiration, still insists, like his brethren, upon this. And Keenan, who informs us that “most Catholics condemn it as loudly and earnestly as Protestants themselves,” and that it is “an engine which Catholics in general denounce as opposed to policy, justice, and charity,” declares that “it is a mere State engine, which certain rulers used as a matter of policy, not so much to put down heresy, as to check the seditions and immoralities that in every age were the consequences of heresy.”²

It is of importance to establish its connection with the Church of Rome. Its clerical character is of itself pretty demonstrative of this. It was a *jury of clergy*, says that ingenious author who represents it as a jury court. Nor does it appear that a charge of sedition was ever brought against any of the sufferers in Spain. They were tried for heresy, and for heresy alone. The earnest attention of the Inquisitors was directed to heretical books, and a law of Philip II. ordained the punishment of death, with confiscation of goods, against any who sold, bought, read, or possessed, any book that was forbidden by the Holy Office.³ That very name, The Holy Office, is significant of an acknowledged connection with the Church of Rome.

The Jesuit Mariana may be regarded as a good witness on

¹ Coroner's Inquest, &c., p. 34.

² Keenan, *Controv. Cat.*, ch. xxxii.

³ M'Crie, *Reform. in Spain*, p. 254.

this point, when speaking of the establishment of the Inquisition in Castile, he says, the Inquisitors were invested with authority by the Roman Pontiff, and represents them as merely countenanced by the approbation of Ferdinand and Isabella.¹ After this testimony of a Jesuit and a warm admirer of the Inquisition, it may be sufficient to produce the statements even of a Protestant historian concerning the connection betwixt the "Holy Office" and the "Holy Father." "The Inquisition, as a distinct tribunal," says Dr M'Crie, "was not erected until the year 1233, when Pope Gregory IX. took from the bishops the power of discovering and bringing to judgment the heretics who lurked in France, and committed that task to the Dominican friars."² "A papal brief was issued in 1236 for the special purpose of introducing the Holy Office into Castile."³ Then concerning the Inquisition in its more perfect and improved form; "The bull for establishing the Inquisition in Castile was issued on the 1st of November 1478."⁴—"Paul IV. acceded with the utmost readiness to the applications which were now addressed to him by Philip, in concurrence with Valdes, the Inquisitor-general, for such enlargements of the Holy Office as would enable it to compass the condemnation of the heretics who were in prison, and to seize and convict others. On the 15th of February 1558, he issued a summary brief, renewing all the decisions of councils and sovereign pontiffs against heretics and schismatics; declaring that this measure was rendered necessary by the information he had received of the daily and increasing progress of heresy; and charging Valdes to prosecute the guilty, and inflict upon them the punishments decreed by the constitutions, particularly that which deprived them of all their dignities and functions, 'Whether they were bishops, archbishops, patriarchs, cardinals, or legates,—barons, counts, marquises, dukes, princes, kings or emperors.'"⁵ "At

the request of Philip and Valdes, the Pope, on the 4th of February 1559, gave forth a brief, authorizing the Council of the Supreme, in derogation of the standing laws of the Inquisition, to deliver over to the secular arm those who were convicted of having taught the Lutheran opinions, even though they had not relapsed, and were willing to recant."¹ "To meet the expenses of this domestic crusade, the Pope, at the request of the Inquisitors, authorised them to appropriate to their use certain ecclesiastical revenues,"² &c., &c. It is no doubt true that the Pope could not have established the Inquisition in any country without the concurrence of its rulers; but it is equally certain that wherever it existed, it derived its authority from the Pope, and was in every sense an ecclesiastical tribunal. It is a vain attempt which British Papists make, to cast aside from their Church the credit of its name and deeds. Nor is it necessary to go farther in order to examine into the Popish claim to a reputation of mildness and charity.

¹ M'Crie, *Reform. in Spain*, p. 256.

² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹ Mariana, *Hist. Hisp.*, lib. xxiv., cap. 17. His words are:—"Romani Pontificis auctoritate, et favore Principum armati."

² M'Crie, *Reform. in Spain*, p. 82.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 253, 254.

CONCLUSION.

I have endeavoured in these pages to exhibit Popery as it exists in this country, in some of its most characteristic doctrines and practices, and in the arguments by which its advocates maintain them. I think I cannot easily be charged with any unfairness, either in the selection of authorities, or in the mode of dealing with them. Such an exhibition is necessarily imperfect, but not therefore incorrect. We shall not err in our estimate of what is submitted to our view, although that may yet be insufficient to produce an adequate impression of the wickedness, vileness, and absurdity of the whole system. We have certainly beheld that system subverting the first principles of Christianity, exalting the merits of man, and refusing the righteousness of Christ,—setting up an earthly priesthood to compete with Christ's priesthood, and a sacrifice made by their hands to compete with his sacrifice,—substituting for the pure worship of God an idolatry as remarkable for its degrading rites as for the multitude of its deities,—dethroning the Bible to give the priesthood absolute authority over the consciences of men,—changing the laws of God, and teaching a detestable morality,—paving the way for infidelity, alike by its rejection of the evidence of the senses in a most important instance, and by its multitudinous legends, solemnly related to recommend its doctrines or practices, but as ridiculous as the story of Tom Thumb or Jack the Giant Killer. Taking Popery as represented by its own most approved writers, we have seen it replete with things almost inconceivably mean and contemptible,—things unworthy of men to utter, to believe, or to do. But we find nothing meaner, nothing viler than the arguments to which recourse is

often had for its defence. Here we meet with trick and artifice of every kind, and misquotation, and forgery, and impudent falsehood.

I may be censured for not speaking more respectfully of the religion of so many of my countrymen. It has become fashionable to speak of Popery with respect, because men are extremely ignorant of it. Let me ask those who would have it treated with respect, to turn to some of the quotations in the preceding pages, and reading these, to justify, if they can, their own sentiment.

As for the advocates of Popery, I would have spoken respectfully of them all, if it had been possible. But I could not express sentiments which I did not entertain, and which, with their books in my hands, it was impossible to entertain. I have often been filled with astonishment that men should dare to write and publish what some of these men have published, knowing as they must, how easily their dishonesty could be exposed. But I have observed with astonishment that what would destroy a Protestant controversialist and silence his voice for ever, produces no effect upon a Popish bishop or priest. Like some of the fabulous heroes of romantic legends, who rose again after they had been hewed to pieces, and fought as vigorously as ever,—or the heroes in the Hall of Odin, who were said thus to come to life every day, ready for fresh combats on the morrow, the defenders of Popery can never be unfitted for continuing its defence. One thing is obvious of many of them,—they are incapable of being affected by any sense of shame.

But truth will prevail; and the exposure of Popery, whether in its erroneous doctrines, its base practices, or the dishonest arguments of its defenders, is not to be deemed unprofitable, because these defenders refuse to be silenced. A knowledge of what Popery is, is not only important for Protestants in reference to their own religion, but in reference also to grave questions connected with civil government and the interests of society. Perhaps it is not to be regretted that it has of late forced itself so much upon public attention.

With all other feelings, however, which the study of Popery is calculated to awaken, there must surely be combined in every rightly constituted mind a lively compassion for the victims of this system of error,—and not least, for those over whom it has prevailed so much as to make them zealous, with a degree of zeal that would be honourable in a good cause, under the idea of meritoriously serving God, in the employment of the most wicked means for its advancement or defence. And this, combined with an increasing gratitude to God, and an increasing love of the Bible, and of its precious truths, should lead to greater exertion for the diffusion of that gospel light which we possess, with its accompanying blessings of liberty, and peace, and hope, and joy of salvation. Nor are we without great encouragements to such exertion in the promises of God,—in the reason which we have to think that the predicted period of the reign of Antichrist has now nearly expired,—in the example of the sixteenth century,—and even in the facts of the present time, the prevailing dissatisfaction of educated minds in Popish countries,—the increasing desire for the word of God,—the disposition, which even Moehler acknowledges, of many of the inferior Popish clergy of the continent, towards a religion less ritual than that which they have been taught and have been trained to teach,—and the movements which have already taken place in Ireland and in Italy. “Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain that they may live!”

APPENDIX.

I have, in this volume, refrained from making any use of the publications of Mr Newman,—although perhaps he might have been quoted as properly as Cardinal Wiseman himself. But I thought it possible that an Anglican who has recently gone over to Rome, might not be deemed so fair a representative of Popish sentiments. He seems, however, to be so fully acknowledged by his Popish brethren, and in particular by Popish dignitaries, that I feel somewhat inclined to regret my resolution. His “Lectures on certain difficulties felt by Anglicans in submitting to the Catholic Church,”¹ contain arguments, which I believe to be unanswerable, as addressed to Anglicans, i.e., Tractarians, and viewed from the common ground occupied by them and Papists,—a sufficient vindication of the consistency of Mr Newman’s (public) course, and a logical developement of the consequences of the principles asserted in what he calls the movement of 1833. The publication of such a work cannot be regretted. If it lead a few Anglicans to do as Mr Newman has done, by placing themselves in the only position which they can consistently occupy,—it may surely be expected to startle many not so far gone in error, and conduce to their recovering a better ground of Protestantism. But apart from its bearing upon the principles and position of English Tractarians, it contains much which is of deep interest as a mere exhibition of Popery, and of the arguments found necessary on its behalf by an acute and apparently earnest mind. Of the twelve lectures which the volume contains, the last five are those of which in the present work I would have been most disposed to have availed myself. The very titles are in a high degree attractive, and promise much to those who are curious concerning such subjects. “Political

¹ London, 1850.

State of Catholic Countries no Prejudice to the Sanctity of the Church ;"—"The Religious Character of Catholic Countries no Prejudice to the Sanctity of the Church ;"—"Differences among Catholics no Prejudice to the Unity of the Church ;"—"Heretical and Schismatical Bodies no Prejudice to the Catholicity of the Church ;"—"Christian History no Prejudice to the Apostolicity of the Church." These are theses certainly, which, however difficult, the advocate of Popery is bound to maintain, and Mr Newman does not shrink at least from the announcement of them. But how are they maintained? Partly by assertion,—partly by such explanation of terms as sucks all the strength out of the ordinary Popish arguments,—and partly by evasion, ingenious yet perhaps unconscious.

The extracts which I can now make must be very brief and few, and I must make them almost without remark. But I shall here subjoin a very few quotations from the chapters which Mr Newman has devoted to these topics.

Perhaps the strength of his argument in the first of these chapters, on the Political State of Catholic Countries, may be found in the following sentences.

"The question was this:—How is it, that at this time Catholic countries happen to be behind Protestants in civilization? In answer, I do not determine how far the fact is so, or what explanation there may be of the appearance of it; but anyhow the fact is surely no objection to Catholicism, unless Catholicism has professed, or ought to have professed, directly to promote civilization,—on the other hand, it has a work of its own, and this work, I have said or implied, is, first, *different* from that of the world; next, it is *difficult of attainment*, compared with that of the world; and lastly, *secret* from the world in its parts and consequences. If then Spain and Italy be deficient in secular progress, if the national mind in those countries be but partially formed . . . &c., &c. . . ; I repeat I do not admit all this except hypothetically; I think it an exaggeration;—then all I can say is, that it is not wonderful that civil institutions, which profess these objects, should succeed better than the Church, which does not."¹

Mr Newman thinks it enough to direct attention to the spiri-

¹ Newman's Lectures, pp. 200, 201.

tual object of the Church, "that of reconciling of the soul to God," and would set aside and out of view all the evidences that can be so plentifully adduced of the power of one religion to cramp and degrade, of another to expand and elevate the minds which come under its influence. If out of the heart are the issues of life, surely it may be expected that the influence which a religion has upon the heart will be manifested in the whole conduct, and that a religion generally prevalent will affect the political life and general character of a nation. But says Mr Newman, on behalf of his Church,—

"Her best fruit is necessarily secret; she fights with the heart of man; her perpetual conflict is against the pride, the impurity, the covetousness, the envy, the animosity, which never gets so far as to come to light; which she succeeds in strangling in its birth. From the nature of the case, she will do more in repressing evils than in creating good; moreover, virtue and sanctity, even where realized, are also in a great measure secret possessions, known only to God and good angels," &c., &c.¹

This seems to amount to denial of the proposition that a tree is known by its fruits,—or a transmutation of it thus, that its fruits are only to be known to God and good angels! And thus Mr Newman passes on to the removal of the difficulty arising from the religious character of Popish countries. He admits the features presented, at least many of them, to be such as Protestants regard with offence; but this, he says, is in great measure, because we look upon them with Protestant eyes;—and, so far, all Protestants may very safely agree with him; and it may well move us to thankfulness, because the picture which he himself draws of the aspect of society in Popish countries, is such as it implies a fearful perversion to regard without abhorrence. But all this, bad as we may think it, is, he tells us, the necessary result of Popery. It is an important acknowledgment.

"Now, this being considered, you will see how many things take place of necessity, which to Protestants seem shocking, and which could not be avoided, unless it had been promised that the Church should consist of

¹ Newman's Lectures, pp. 219, 220.

none but the predestinate; nay, unless it consisted of none but the educated and refined. It is the spectacle of supernatural faith acting upon the multitudinous mind of a nation, of a divine principle dwelling in the myriad of characters, good, bad, and intermediate, into which the old stock of Adam grafted into Christ has developed."¹

However, he propounds a simple cure for any disgust against Popery itself, which the contemplation of these fruits may produce.

"If it shall turn out that the aspect of Catholic countries is accounted for by Catholic doctrine, at least that aspect will be no difficulty to you when once you join the Catholic Church, for, in joining that Church, you will be accepting the doctrine. Walk into the Catholic Church, and the difficulty, like a phantom, will disappear"!!!²

What then is the connection, avowed by Mr Newman, between Popish doctrine and such facts as he describes,—such abounding and marvellous iniquity, of men declared to have the only faith of Christians,—the supernatural faith which comes by baptism?—According to Mr Newman, multitudes have faith without love,—faith without any purpose or desire to do good works,—nay, faith with a settled purpose of sin. Protestants err, he says, in supposing that faith and love, love and obedience, are inseparable. And then he says,—

"Faith is a spiritual sight of the unseen, and Protestantism has not this sight: it does not see the unseen; this habit, this act of the mind is foreign to it; so, since it keeps the word 'faith,' it is obliged to find some other meaning for it; and its common, perhaps its commonest, idea is, that faith is substantially the same as obedience; that it is the impulse, the motive of obedience, or the fervour and heartiness which attend good works. In a word, that faith is hope, or love, or a mixture of the two."³

Could Mr Newman imagine, as he wrote these words, that they contained a fair representation of Protestant doctrine? But we need not concern ourselves with this. We see that he supposes supernatural faith to exist in multitudes, in whom there is no love and no obedience. They have, therefore, he

¹ Newman's Lectures, p. 229.

² Ibid., p. 225.

³ Ibid., pp. 223, 224.

says, a vivid perception of spiritual things, "yet have no desire at all or affection towards them."¹—And what follows? "Strange stories of highwaymen and brigands devout to the Madonna," and of her "compassion towards impenitent offenders,"² &c., &c. (But we have already seen such stories promulgated upon authority which surely Mr Newman will not venture to impugn.) Hence also a prodigious jesting with sacred subjects,³—strange fruit indeed of supernatural faith,—and stranger still, a profuse employment of peculiar oaths, such as "God's heart, and God's eyes, and God's wounds, and God's blood."⁴—But enough. My limits are exhausted, and it seems as if the subject were carried as far as is at present needful. We Protestants think the profane and frivolous utterance of God's holy name an indication not of faith, but of the want of it. Mr Newman's opinion is exactly opposite. Surely we may wish Popery to be further defended by his hand. We may wish it many such defenders, and all publicity to their arguments. But both Mr Newman and Cardinal Wiseman seem different men in arguing against Anglicanism, on the common ground of Anglicanism and Popery, and in arguing against Protestantism properly so called, or in favour of Popery against Protestant antagonists.

¹ Newman's Lectures, p. 227.

² Ibid., p. 230.

³ Ibid., p. 233, &c.

⁴ Ibid., p. 232.

THE END.